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OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS ACT
I. INTRODUCrION
U PON PASSAGE OF THE OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS Acr OF 1975, the State of
Ohio waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in a court
established solely for that purpose. Within a relatively short period of time,
the Ohio Court of Claims has made a significant imprint on the development
of tort law in Ohio, distinguishing itself in its efforts to provide an effective
forum for those injured by the state or one of its instrumentalities while
defining the limits beyond which state liability for tortious conduct will not
extend. As might be expected of a new court interpreting a new statute, the
court of claims at times has been a little too zealous in guarding the boundaries
of governmental liability, and the methods of analysis employed by it have
lacked the precision that comes with experience. This article is aimed at
assisting practitioners before the court by analyzing areas that need
clarification or re-examination so that the court, with the assistance of those
who practice before it, may move toward greater accuracy and consistency in
carrying out the remedial objective of the Act.
The article is divided into three main parts. The first part gives an
overview of the Court of Claims Act, with particular reference to the concept
of sovereign immunity and its particular features in Ohio. It examines the
scope and effect of the waiver of immunity contained in the Act, outlines the
jurisdiction, organization and procedures of the court of claims, analyzes the
ramifications involved in choosing to proceed in that court, and discusses the
nature and effect of administratively determined claims in that court.
The second section analyzes the disposition of tort claims in Ohio in
comparison to interpretations of liability clauses of the California Tort Claims
Act, the New York Court of Claims Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
concept of discretionary function immunity is developed and the view of that
concept taken by the Ohio courts is discussed in detail.
A more complete view of Ohio Court of Claims Act interpretations can be
obtained by considering the treatment of claims by category, and this
constitutes the focus of the third section. The categories discussed are
administrative regulation of business activities, safety inspections, custody
and control of juvenile offenders, maintenance of public highways, care and
treatment of patients in state hospitals, custody and control of criminal
offenders, enactment of legislation, and "orthodox tort liability." Reference is
made not only to the developing jurisprudence in each category but also to the
concepts that are developed in the second part of the article. In that sense, the
third part has some comparative aspects to it as well.
II. THE COURT OF CLAIMS AcT
A. Overview
1. The Background of Immunity
The Court of Claims Act' provides that the state waives immunity from
liability and consents to be sued in the court of claims, thus ending an era of
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2743 (Page Supp. 1978).
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"sovereign" immunity in Ohio that had existed for nearly 135 years. The origin
of the concept in Ohio is attributed to an Ohio Supreme Court case decided in
1840, in which the state brought an action for tax deficiency against the
Franklin Bank of Columbus. 2 The bank counterclaimed that a tax from an
earlier year was excessive and demanded judgment for the excess of the
claimed refund over the alleged deficient payment. The court rejected the
demand, saying simply and without further explanation that it could not do
what the bank asked it to do. Two statements in the syllabus suggested that in
the view of the court the state's claim against an individual may be subject to
set-off to the extent of the debts owed by the state to that individual, but the
creditor would not be able to obtain a judgment against the state to collect the
excess. In this rather off-handed pronouncement, state immunity became
established in the law of Ohio without reference to "the King could do no
wrong," the maxim to which such immunity is often tied.3
The first Ohio Supreme Court case to consider tort liability of the state
came in 1917 in Raudabaugh v. State,4 where plaintiff claimed that the state
negligently constructed a reservoir, causing plaintiff's lands to be flooded. The
Ohio Constitution had been amended in September of 1912, adding the
2 State v. Franklin Bank, 10 Ohio 91 (1840). The state brought a tax deficiency action. The
bank claimed a refund from another year of greater amount than the deficiency. When judgment
was requested in favor of the bank for the difference, the supreme court simply said: "This we
cannot do." Id. at 100. No further explanation was given.
Paragraphs three and four of the syllabus state: "No judgment can be rendered against the
state;" "In a civil action by the state, the defendant may set off a debt due to him from the state."
Id. at 91 (syllabus para. nos. 3, 4). The court's action suggests that although the state was liable
for the excess of the refund over the tax owed, sovereign immunity barred the right to collect the
excess. Note, Claims Against the State of Ohio: Sovereign Immunity, the Sundry Claims Board
and the Proposed Court of Claims Act, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 462, 467 n.28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Claims].
The first constitution of Ohio (1802) made no mention of sovereign immunity. The relevant
article provided: "That all courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in his
lands, goods, persons or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law, and right and
justice administered, without denial or delay." OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (1802). See 1 DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
OHIO 297-98 (1851).
3 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs* 246. See generally Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the
Crown, in 6 OxFoRn STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HIsToRy No. XII (Vinogradoff ed. 1921).
Some of the best of the voluminous sources discussing the derivation of sovereign immunity in
the United States are: Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3),34 YALE L.J. 1,129,229
(1924-25), (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1,757, 1039 (1926-27); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility
in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577 (1928); Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963); Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the
United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795; Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental
Immunity, 15 CLEv.-MAa. L. REV. 529 (1966); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953); Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No
Wrong, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 597 (1970).
For a discussion of trends of state sovereign immunity see Harley, Governmental Immunity:
Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity, 16 WASHBURN L. REV. 12 (1976);LeFlar & Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954); Shumate, Tort Claims Against State
Governments, 9 L. & CONTENW. PROB. 242 (1942); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919.
The basis and history of sovereign immunity in Ohio is discussed in Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St.
2d 132,134-44,285 N.E.2d 736,738-44, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972); Claims, supra note
1, at 462-85; Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity: Long Lives the King, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 75
(1967); Comment, Claims Against the State of Ohio: The Need for Reform, 36 U. CIN. L. REV.
239 (1967).
4 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917), error dismissed, 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
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following language to article I, section 16: "Suits may be brought against the
state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law."5 Plaintiff
argued that the state was, by virtue of the new constitutional language,
immediately subject to suit without further consent by the legislature.
Comparing that constitutional clause with similar language in the con-
stitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, Washington and
Wisconsin, and with identical language in the California and Tennessee
constitutions, the court rejected plaintiff's contentions. The court asserted that
in all of those jurisdictions, court decisions had determined that the
legislatures would be required to take further steps to permit legal action to be
maintained against the state. Assuming that the framers of the Ohio
amendment knew of the California and Tennessee courts' interpretations,
which required enabling legislation to permit lawsuits against those states, the
court concluded that the Ohio clause was not self-executing and affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint. The doctrine of immunity, while
certainly of judicial origin in Ohio, was firmly placed within the control of the
legislature by the court. In effect, the decision meant that although immunity
from suit was no longer a good defense for the state, the language "in such
courts and in such manner as may be provided by law" made lack of consent a
good defense because without that consent the courts had no subject matter
jurisdiction.
In 1972 in Krause v. State,6 the Ohio courts were asked to abrogate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The action was brought by the administrator
of Allison Krause, a student killed in the Kent State tragedy. Unsuccessful at
the trial level, the administrator pressed the wrongful death and survivorship
action on appeal, arguing that the immunity doctrine denied equal protection
and that since it was judicially-created, it could be judicially undone. The
court of appeals reversed, and the Ohio Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to react to the appellate court's reasoning that the doctrine
was anachronistic, that it was under judicial attack in many jurisdictions, and
5 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. Article VIII, section 7 of the constitution of 1802 was carried over as
article I, section 16 of the revised constitution of 1851 without substantive change. i
The constitutional convention of 1873-74 retained article 1, section 16 without substantive
change. See 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEoATEs OF THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO 3546
(1873).
Upon the second reading of the proposed amendment, the proponent stated that the
amendment "recognizes the right of the individual to seek redress for claims against the state in
such courts as may hereafter be designated .. " Id. at 1431. On the third reading the same
delegate stated: "The legislature ought to have a right to provide by law for the adjustment of
controversies between its citizens and the state. That is the sole purpose of this proposal." Id. at
1919 (emphasis added). The few objectors feared that juries would require the state to pay unjust
claims and that a flood of litigation would result. Id. The proposal passed by a vote of 88 to 6. Id.
at 1960.
During the drafting of the explanation to the people a delegate questioned whether the
explanation accurately stated that "[tihe amendment says that the Legislature shall provide the
method of bringing suit. Will the amendment itself confer the right to bring the suit?" Id. at 2028.
Delegate Peck replied: "The amendment does confer that right." Id. This exchange has been the
source of the dispute as to whether the amendment is self-executing. The supreme court has
repeatedly declared that the amendment is not self-executing. E.g., Thacker v. Board of Trustees,
35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973); Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972); Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102
(1917).
6 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
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that the judiciary should overcome the inequities resulting from legislative
inertia.7 The supreme court rejected the arguments and concluded that the
adoption of article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution by the people of the
state "foreclos[ed] to this or any other court the authority to examine the
'soundness' or 'justice' of the concept of governmental immunity."8 The strong
reaffirmation of Raudabaugh made it quite clear that state immunity was
firmly embedded within the powers of the legislature and that abrogation at
common law would not be forthcoming.
Within one year of the Krause decision, the House Judiciary Committee of
the Ohio General Assembly recommended passage of House Bill 800, which
proposed the establishment of a court of claims. The bill was passed June 4,
1974, and became law as the Court of Claims Act, comprising chapter 2743 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
2. Scope of the Waiver of Immunity
The Act waives the state's immunity from liability and confers its consent
to be sued "and have its liability determined in the court of claims."9 Although
the waiver and consent are unlimited,10 they are given in exchange for "the
complainant's waiver of his cause of action against state officers or
employees,"" thereby limiting the complainant's choice of defendants.
The waiver clearly excludes all governmental entities but the state from its
operation.' 2 "State" is defined as "the state of Ohio, including, without
limitation, its departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, in-
stitutions, and other instrumentalities. It does not include political sub-
divisions."' 3 Political subdivisions are defined as "municipal corporations,
townships, villages, counties, school districts, and all other bodies corporate
and politic responsible for governmental activities in geographic areas
smaller than that of the state to which the sovereign immunity of the state
attaches."' 4 Thus, to the extent that political subdivisions had obtained
governmental immunity prior to the passage of the Act, that immunity is
retained. Those entities may only be sued, if at all, in the courts of common
pleas. 15  I
Political subdivisions may appear as defendants in the court of claims
7 Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1,3-12,274 N.E.2d 321,323-28 (10th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 31
Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
8 31 Ohio St. 2d at 147, 285 N.E.2d at 745.
9 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
10 For a discussion of the various degrees to which a state may waive its governmental
immunity, see Claims, supra note 2, at 487 n.121. The waiver of immunity in the Ohio Court of
Claims Act is an unlimited, total, or "blanket," waiver. Id.
11 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
12 Also not included in the waiver are hospitals owned or operated by one or more political
subdivisions. Id. § 2743.02(B). See text accompanying note 120 infra.
'3 OlHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.01(A).(Page Supp. 1978).
14 Id. § 2743.01(B).
15 The following section was added to Ohio Revised Code section 2743.02, effective February
7, 1978: "The only defendant in orginal [sic] actions in the court of claims is the state. The state
may file a third-party complaint or counterclaim in any civil action except a civil action for one
thousand dollars or less, that is filed in the court of claims." Id. § 2743.02(E). Prior to this
amendment of section 2743.02, it had been held that Ohio Civil Rule 20(A) on permissive joinder
permitted the joinder of political subdivisions to the state in original actions filed in the court of
[Vol. 28:149
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under certain circumstances, however. For example, where the state has filed
a third-party complaint against a political subdivision or where the state has
been joined as a defendant in a common pleas action against a political
subdivision and mandatory removal to the court of claims has followed, the
court of claims would have jurisdiction.
3. Court of Claims - Organization and Procedure
The court of claims was created pursuant to the Ohio Constitution as one
of the "courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be
established by law."' 6 A public court of record, it sits in Franklin County,
although the chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court may direct it to sit in
some other county if substantial hardships and the dictates of justice require it
to be so removed. 17
The Act also confers powers of judicial appointments for the court of
claims upon the chief justice. Judges selected for temporary assignment on
the court are to be chosen from the ranks of incumbent judges on the supreme
court, courts of appeal, common pleas courts, or from retired judges eligible
for active duty.'8 Normally, one judge will hear and determine the cases
against the state, but in novel or complex cases and upon application, the chief
justice may appoint a three judge panel to hear and decide them. 9 By
appointment of the supreme court, the clerk and deputy clerk of the court of
claims serve the administrative needs of the court. The Act requires
appointees to these positions to be attorneys admitted to the Ohio bar.20
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, except where inconsistent with the
Act, apply to all actions in the court.2' In addition, the court of claims has
promulgated its own set of "local rules" pursuant to article IV, section 5 of the
Ohio Constitution. 22 The party filing a complaint or other pleading requiring
service of summons in the court of claims must name the defendant or
defendants with specificity23 and provide the clerk with the original of the
pleading and a sufficient number of copies to serve each named defendant
and the attorney general.24 The pleading, in non-administratively determined
actions, shall take the form provided in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. 2
claims. Basham v. Jackson, 51 Ohio App. 2d 100,367 N.E.2d 66 (10th Dist. 1977), aff'd, 54 Ohio St.
2d 366, 377 N.E.2d 491 (1978).
Where an action is brought against a political subdivision in common pleas court and the state
is joined as a party, a petition for removal of both actions shall be filed in the court of claims. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(E)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
Substitute House Bill No. 149 has, in effect, legislatively overruled Basham. The only manner
in which a political subdivision may now appear as a defendant in the court of claims is either by
way of removal or where the state files a third-party complaint against a political subdivision.
'8 Omo CoNsr. art. IV, § 1 (1851) (amended 1968, 1973).
7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
18 Id.
19 id. 2743.03(C).
20 Id. § 2743.07.
21 Id. § 2743.03(D).
22 OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R. (effective December 19, 1978).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.13(A) (Page Supp. 1978). For example, the claimant must
name the department of the state under whose auspices the allegedly wrongful conduct took
place.
24 Id. § 2743.13(B).
25 Id. § 2743.03(D).
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The parties may obtain extensions of time in which to move or plead by filing
a written motion stating the basis of the extension, supported by documenta-
tion and, if appropriate, affidavits.26 Such motions must also be accompanied
by a proposed order which states the duration of the extension.
7
All motions are determined without oral argument unless otherwise
ordered and must be supported by written statements of arguments and
authorities in support thereof.28 Parties opposing the motion have fourteen
days from the date of service upon them to file a brief in opposition to the
motion29 and failure to do so may be cause for the court to grant the motion as
filed.30 If facts not on the record must be considered for the purposes of the
motion, the moving party must file and serve copies of all the evidence
supporting the motion.3 Reply briefs or additional briefs require a showing of
necessity and leave of the court.32
A claim against the state pending in the court may be settled by the parties
with the approval of the court and the attorney general.33 Upon a finding that
the proposed settlement is unsatisfactory, the court may require the parties to
reconsider their agreement.3 4 Settlements are to be implemented in
compliance with the procedure established for the payment of judgments in
section 2743.19 of the Act.
Judgments against the state rendered in the court of claims must be made
specific in their designation of the instrumentality (department, office,
bureau, commission, board, agency or institution) against which liability has
been imposed.35 No execution for the payment of money is permitted to issue
against the state or its instrumentalities. 36 Judgments are accomplished
through a detailed procedure set out in the Act.3 7 The clerk of courts sends
certified copies of the judgment to the Office of Budget and Management and
the state auditor"8 after all rights of appeal have been exhausted.3 9 The auditor
then draws a warrant on the state treasury payable to the judgment creditor in
the amount certified, increased by the allowable interest.40 Expenses of the
judgment are charged against unencumbered funds in the appropriation to
the instrumentality of the state against which the judgment was rendered, and
the availability of such funds must be certified to the auditor by the Office of
Budget and Management.4'
26 Omo CT. CL. LOCAL R. 4(B).
27 Id.
28 OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R. 4(C).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.15 (Page Supp. 1978); OHIo CT. CL. LOCAL R. 7(A).
34 Orno CT. CL. LOCAL R. 7(B).
31 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.19(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
36 Id. § 2743.19(B).
37 Id. §2743.19.
38 Id. §2743.19(C)(1).
39 Id. § 2743.19(D). If only part of the judgment is appealed from, the other portion of the
judgment may be processed for payment as described in section 2743.19. Id.
40 Id. § 2743.19(C)(4).
41 Id. § 2743.19(C)(3).
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If unencumbered funds are unavailable in the appropriation to the state
instrumentality, the Office of Budget and Management makes application for
the payment of the judgment out of the emergency purpose fund "or any
other appropriation for emergencies or contingencies."42 Payment will be
made out of these funds if there are sufficient monies to pay all pending
emergency fund requests. 41 If sufficient monies do not exist in any of these
accounts, the head of the state instrumentality against which the judgment
was entered will request the General Assembly to appropriate the necessary
funds to pay the judgment until the appropriation is made and a proper
warrant is drawn.44
While proceedings in execution of judgment in the normal sense may not
be brought against the state,45 the judgment creditor does have recourse.
Upon failure of the clerk of the court of claims, the state auditor, the Office of
Budget and Management, or the head of the defendant instrumentality to act
as required, a writ of mandamus can be sought to compel the action.46
One of the exceptions to the "rules of law applicable to suits between
private parties" 47 is a prohibition of jury trials in civil actions against the
state.4 However, with respect to actions which do not constitute a claim
against the state, the parties are permitted to have the case decided by a jury.49
Where appropriate, jury demands must be made pursuant to Rule 38 of the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and removal of actions to the court do not
extend the time period in which such demands must be made.50 The party
requesting a jury trial files a motion with the clerk requesting that a panel of
prospective jurors be provided. The clerk in turn requests the jury
commissioners of the court of common pleas in the county where the action is
tried to supply the panel. 51 The state then pays the expenses incidental to the
jury. trial except for the juror costs, which are taxed to the losing party. 52
4. Court of Claims - Jurisdiction and Appeals
Jurisdiction of the court of claims is conferred in the same section of the
Act which created the court. That section grants: (a) "exclusive, original
jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of
immunity contained in section 2743.02;" (b) "exclusive jurisdiction of the
causes of action of all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court of
claims;" (c) exclusive jurisdiction to determine damages sustained by private
parties caused by the state's defective title in lake lands; (d) "jurisdiction to
hear appeals from the court of claims commissioners;" (e) "full equity powers
42 Id. § 2743.19(C)(5).
43Id.
44 Id. § 2743.19(C)(5)-.19(C)(6). The instrumentality may make this appropriation request
through successive bienniums, if necessary. Id. § 2743.19(C)(6).
4-1 Id. § 2743.19(B).
46 Id. § 2743.19(C).
47 Id. § 2743.02(A).
48 Id. § 2743.11.
41 Id. "The right to jury trial applies to claims which are removed to the court of claims
pursuant to R.C. 2743.13(E)(2) [sic]." OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R. 6(A).
0 OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R. 6(B).
5 OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R. 5(A).
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.11 (Page Supp. 1978).
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in all actions within its jurisdiction;" and (f) the power to "entertain and
determine all counter claims, cross claims, and third-party claims."3 The
jurisdiction is statewide, of course, but is limited in the sense that the Act has
no applicability where the state has previously consented to be sued.54 In
addition, the Act confers upon the court of claims the same powers as a court
of common pleas with respect to subpoenaing witnesses, compelling
production of evidence, and punishing for contempt.55
The Act also provides for the administrative determination of claims in
some circumstances. If the claim originally filed with the court is for one
thousand dollars or less, the clerk of the court is required to determine the
claim .5 Procedure for administratively determined claims is established by
the clerk57 and, in keeping with the Act, that procedure is "informal and
designed to accommodate persons not skilled in the law."58 For example, the
formal Ohio Rules of Evidence do not apply, and the clerk determines the
probative value of proof offered in these determinations.59 Essentially, the
clerk has the same powers that the judges of the court do in regulating the
conduct of such proceedings. 60 Determinations in accordance with this
provision of the Act are processed for payment in the same manner as if they
were judgments rendered by the court.61
Appeals from administrative determinations are taken by filing a motion
for review by the court of claims.62 Such appeals are decided without oral
argument unless ordered by a judge of the court.63 No further appeal from the
judgment of the court rendered in review of such a case may be taken,64 and
the claimant is barred from commencing further civil actions in the court
based upon the same transaction or set of facts as that of the administratively
determined action.65
53 Id. § 2743.03(A).
54 Id. § 2743.02(A). For example, Ohio Revised Code section 119.12 permits appeal to a court
of common pleas from the determinations of administrative agencies covered by the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act; appeals from Workers' Compensation decisions are also
permitted in common pleas courts. Landowners whose property has been appropriated by the
state may sue for just compensation pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 5519.02; claims for
refunds of estate tax that have been denied may be appealed to a probate court pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code section 5731.30. There are various other situations in which the state has previously
given its consent to suit in like manner. The practitioner would be well-advised to fully consider
the availability of such an action in the courts of general jurisdiction in a given case before
instituting court of claims proceedings.
55 Id. § 2743.05.
56 Id. § 2743.10(A). Prior to the 1977 amendments to the Act, claims for one hundred dollars or
less were subject to this procedure, and claims for between one hundred and one thousand dollars
were determined by the court unless the claimant consented to have the claim determined by the
clerk. Act of June 27, 1974, 133 Ohio Laws 875 (1974) (current version at OHio REV. CODE AN.
2743.10(A) (Page Supp. 1978) ).
57 OHIo CT. CL. LOCAL R. 6.
58 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.10(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
59 Id.; OHIO CT. CL. LocAL R. 6(E).
60 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.10(A) (Page Supp. 1978); OHIo CT. CL. LOCAL R. 6(C).
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.10(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
62 Id. § 2743.10(D); OHIo CT. CL. LOCAL R. 6(H).
63 OHIO CT. CL. LoCAL R. 6(H)(5).
6 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. 0 2743.10(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
6 Id.
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All actions permitted by the Act must be commenced within the period of
time "applicable to similar suits between private parties" but no later than two
years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action.66 This period of
limitations is tolled, however, by disabilities, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
section 2305.16. For example, an incarcerated claimant is not entitled to have
the limitation period tolled "during imprisonment unless the imprisoned
person is of unsound mind."6' 7
The periods of limitation now applicable represent a simplification and
some liberalization of the former law. Prior to passage of amendments
bringing about these changes in 1977, actions sounding in tort for personal
injury, property damage and wrongful death were required to be
commenced within 180 days of accrual or appointment of an executor or
administrator. 68 Extending the period to the applicable general statute of
limitations avoids the confusion and potential hardship presented by the
special limitations language of the earlier section. However, under the original
act, claimants were able to toll the limitations period for two years by filing
notice of an intention to file a claim within the 180 day period,69 a procedure
no longer available under the amended section.
In addition to its original and exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions
against the state, the court of claims has "exclusive jurisdiction of the causes of
action of all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court . . . .,0 In
an action in any court other than the court of claims, a party who files a
counterclaim against the state or who makes the state a third-party defendant
is required to file a petition stating the basis for removal in the court of
claims.71 The petition for removal must be filed within 28 days after the filing
of the counter-claim or third-party complaint.
72
Appeals from the court are treated in the same manner as appeals from the
courts of common pleas. Thus, since the court normally would sit in Franklin
County, appeals would be taken to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
73 It
68 Id. § 2743.16.
67 Id.
6' Act of June 27, 1974 § 2743.16(A), 135 Ohio Laws 869, 878 (1974) (current version at Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.16 (Page Supp. 1978) ).
66 Act of June 27, 1974 § 2743.16(B), 138 Ohio Laws 869, 878 (1974) (current version at Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.16 (Page Supp. 1978) ).
70 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
71 Id. § 2743.03(E)(1).
72 Id. Before the passage of the 1977 amendments, there was a conflict between the Court of
Claims Act and the Court of Claims Rules over the time in which a petition for removal had to be
filed. Both Court of Claims Rule 4(B) and former Ohio revised Code section 2743.03(E)(1)
required the petition for removal to be filed within 28 days of the service of the petitioner's
counterclaim when the petition for removal was based upon a counterclaim asserted against the
state. However, when the petition for removal was based upon a third-party complaint against
the state, the Court of Claims Rule required filing the petition within 28 days of the filing of the
third-party complaint, while the statute required the petition to be filed within 14 days. In Jacobs
v. Shelley & Sand, 51 Ohio App. 2d 44,365 N.E. 2d 1259 (10th Dist. 1976) the court of appeals
held that the longer period of time allowed by the Court of Claims Rules would be applicable.
The court also held that "[t]he failure of the clerk [of the court from which the action was re-
moved] to properly forward all papers [as required by section 2743.03(E)(2) of the Ohio Revised
Code] does not defeat the removal, or affect the fact that subject matter jurisdiction for adjudi-
cation of the removed claim has been vestbd in the Court of Claims." Id. at 49, 365 N.E.2d at 1263.
The 1977 Amendments bring the rules and the statute into accord.
71 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.20 (Page Supp. 1978).
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would follow that if the court were to sit by designation of the supreme court
in some other county, appeal would be taken to the appropriate district court
of appeals, but it is not clear from the statute whether this is the intention of the
General Assembly or whether it intended all appeals to be taken in the Tenth
District.
B. A Closer Look
1. Waiver for Waiver - Quid Pro Quo or Surplusage?
The original Act was amended in 1977 to include language which required
the waiver of liability to be "in exchange for the complainant's waiver of his
cause of action against state officers or employees. 7 4 The complainant's
waiver is complete except in the case where the officer or employee's
wrongdoing is determined by the court to have been outside the scope of
employment.
7
The exact purpose of the added language is not clear, but it apparently is
an attempt to afford some measure of protection to state officers and
employees from the burdens of appearing and defending lawsuits and
satisfying judgments against them. For this purpose to be effective, the
amendment must have some protective effect beyond what the law would
provide absent the new language.
Close consideration of the operation of the law would seem to suggest that
such a result has not been achieved. First, the complainant has the option of
proceeding against the state in the court of claims or suing the officer or
employee in one of the other courts of the state. The waiver of the cause of
action against officers and employees is effective only if the former course is
taken. Second, in situations where the officer or employee was acting within
the scope of employment and the complainant had elected to sue the state in a
losing claim, principles of res judicata would operate to protect the individual
actors even absent the waiver language. Third, where the complainant has
obtained a favorable judgment against the state, the obvious collectibility of
the judgment76 would seem to present no reason to pursue the individual
officer or employee unless the complainant was dissatisfied with the amount
of the judgment. In such a case, collateral estoppel and res judicata would
provide the officer or employee the desired protection. Finally, in the case
where the officer or employee has been found to have acted outside the scope
of employment, the complainant's waiver is void by operation of the statute.
The phrase "[e]xcept in the case of a civil action filed by the state,"77 which
begins the second paragraph of the waiver section, is also a problem. If the
intention of the phrase is that the state does not waive its causes of action
against state officers and employees, or that a party sued by the state should
be able to seek indemnification from state officers and employees, and no
other meaning was intended, the language chosen was unfortunate. As it is
stated, the phrase presents the issue of whether the party sued by the state
74 Id. § 2743.02(A).
75 Id.
76 See id. § 2743.191(B).
77 Id. § 2743.02(A).
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waives its causes of action against officers and employees upon filing a
counterclaim against the state. If that is the desired effect, the protective
function of the waiver requirement is called into further question since it
should not turn upon which party filed the original action.
Furthermore, problems of policy arise where the complainant's case is
dismissed for reasons other than because the state officer or employee was
acting outside the scope of employment.78 As will be discussed later, one
principle of decision employed by the court of claims is that state liability will
not follow from an activity for which there is no analog in the private sector.79
It may be said that a person should be charged with knowledge that a
condition of having a claim against the state adjudicated in the court of claims
is the waiver of causes of action against individual actors and should therefore
not be heard to complain of the obvious effects of the waiver if unsuccessful in
that court. Nevertheless, the question remains why the state should wish to
preclude an injured person from seeking a remedy if it is otherwise legitimate
and would not result in a burden upon public funds.
If protection of individual officers and employees of the state is indeed the
objective of the amendatory language, two further points can be made in
response: (a) the common law regarding official privileges and immunities
already provides a substantial measure of protection for such people, and (b)
there are more effective methods of affording such protection.
When comparing Ohio Revised Code section 2743.02 with the indem-
nification policies of other jurisdictions, it becomes apparent that the Ohio
scheme is weak. California8 0 and New York8" have adopted indemnification
systems for the benefit of public employees who have had judgments or
settlements rendered against them under certain conditions. In California,
employees of public entities 2 may request the public entity employing them
to defend them against suits arising from acts or omissions occurring within
the scope of their employment. The public entity is authorized to pay any
judgment or settlement rendered against its employees, provided that the
employees cooperate in the defense and request the defense not later than ten
days before the trial date. The defense may be made subject to agreements
with the employers that the public entity shall pay the judgment or settlement
only if it established that the injury was caused by acts or omissions within the
scope of employment. An employee may recover any portion of a judgment
paid by the employee and which the public entity normally would be
required to pay, so long as the act was within the scope of employment and
the employee has defended the suit in good faith or has reasonably
cooperated with the public entity in its defense of the case. The public
employer will escape the obligation to indemnify the employee in such cases
78 E.g., McCord v. Ohio Div. of Parks & Recreation, 54 Ohio St. 2d 72,375 N.E.2d 50 (1978).
McCord involved a claim against the state for, among other things, the negligence of a lifeguard
employed by the state. The action was dismissed because the court decided that a "recreational
user" statute absolved the state from liability. The case is discussed at notes 604-09 infra and
accompanying text.
" See notes 313-17 infra and accompanying text.
80 CAL. GOVT CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1979).
81 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW ch. 47, § 17 (McKinney 1979).
82 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1979).
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if it can show that the employee "acted or failed to act because of actual fraud,
corruption or actual malice." s
Generally, this California indemnification system flows in only one
direction: from the public entity to the state employee. In most situations the
public entity may not be indemnified by the employee for any judgment paid
by the public entity.84 The employee will be required to indemnify the
employer in the case where the public entity did not conduct the defense of
the employer and it establishes that the employee acted out of fraud,
corruption, or malice or that the employee willfully failed to conduct a good
faith defense against the lawsuit.8 5 If the public entity conducts the defense of
the employee subject to a reservation of rights, it may obtain indemnification
from the employee if the employee fails to establish that the act causing the
injury was within the scope of employment, if the public entity proves that the
act was done with fraud, corruption or malice, or if it shows that the employee
willfully failed to cooperate in the defense.86 If the defense of the lawsuit was
conducted by the public entity without a reservation of rights, indemnifica-
tion from the employee may be sought only where the employee has failed to
reasonably cooperate in good faith in the defense of the lawsuit.
8 7
The New York scheme of indemnification88 differs from the more detailed
California law in several interesting respects. Indemnification of the public
employee under the New York law covers acts of the employee within the
scope of public employment or duties except where intentional or reckless
wrongdoing produced the injury.89 Provision is made for the state to pay
private attorney fees for the employee if the state attorney general does not
conduct the defense for the employee.90 The state's duty to defend or
indemnify is further conditioned upon the delivery of proper documentation
of the proceedings to the attorney general within five days of receipt and "full
cooperation" in the defense of the proceedings.9' Upon satisfaction of the
notification and cooperation requirements, the duty of the state to defend and
indemnify becomes operative, subject only to the provision for state review
and approval of settlement offers and the exception that indemnification
for punitive or exemplary damages, fines, penalties or monies recovered
pursuant to citizen-taxpayer actions under the state finance law.9"
When compared to these two schemes of indemnification, it is difficult to
conclude that the limiting language of section 2743.02 was intended to
provide protection to state officers and employees. Furthermore, it appears
- Id. § 825.2.
- Id. § 825.4.
a5 Id. § 825.6(a).
86 Id. § 825.6(b).
87 Id. § 825.6(c).
88 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw ch. 47, § 17 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
- Id. ch. 47, § 17 3(a). The thrust of this additional requirement may be to restrict the
increasingly liberal interpretation placed upon the concept of scope of employment by the
courts. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), discussed in 82
HAav. L. REv. 1568 (1969).
90 N.Y. PuB. OF. LAw ch. 47, § 17 2 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
91 Id. ch. 47, § 17 4.
92 Id. ch. 47, § 17 3(c).
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that judicial application of the general indemnity principles of Ohio law may
permit the state to seek indemnification from its negligent officers and
employees for judgments it was required to pay in court of claims
proceedings.93
2. Extent of the Waiver
As previously stated, the waiver of sovereign immunity is unlimited in
degree. However, the scope of the waiver is limited by the language of the Act
to actions brought against the state exclusive of political subdivisions and to
those actions for which the state has not previously consented to suit. Two
questions are immediately raised in connection with this provision: (1)
whether the waiver can be indirectly extended to political subdivisions and, if
not, what measure can be used to delineate between an action against the state
and an action against a political subdivision; and (2) what constitutes a prior
consent to suit. The first question will be addressed here. The second will be
treated in a later section.94
Despite the seemingly unambiguous language of the Act which defines
state as "the state of Ohio. . . . It does not include political subdivisions ' '
and political subdivisions as "areas smaller than the state to which the
sovereign immunity of the state attaches,"98 a claimant has challenged the lack
of jurisdiction over political subdivisions. In Haas v. Hayslip,97 the claimant
filed concurrent actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County98
and in the court of claims, 99 alleging that two members of the City of Akron
Police Department intentionally shot at and injured him. Haas also alleged
that the City of Akron had been negligent in the selection, employment, and
retention of the two police officers. The common pleas court dismissed the
case on the ground of sovereign immunity. 0 The court of claims, upon a
simple analysis of the Act, dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.10 1
On appeal from the common pleas decision, the court of appeals, in a
unanimous decision, reversed the dismissal, emphasizing the judicial origin of
the doctrines of sovereign immunity10 2 and municipal immunity.tm  The
fundamental thesis of the court was that the immunity for political
subdivisions was derived from and dependent upon state sovereign immunity
13 See State v. Troop, 44 Ohio St. 2d 90, 95, 338 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1975), where the court
implied that such a right would exist in favor of the state. The court was, however, reading a
statute which, at that time, did not contain the language discussed here and relied upon a section
of the Act that was subsequently repealed for support of its conclusions regarding joinder.
14 See notes 224-309 infra and accompanying text.
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.01(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
" Id. § 2743.01(B) (emphasis added).
97 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 364 N.E.2d 1376 (1977).
" Haas v. Hayslip, No. 76-1136 (Ohio C.P. Summit County June 20,1976), rev'd, No. 76-8205
(Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976), decision of appeals court rev'd, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135,364
N.E.2d 1376 (1977).
" Haas v. State, No. 75-0572 NI (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 31, 1975).
100 No. 76-8205, slip op. at 2 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976).
'01 No. 75-0572 NI, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 31, 1975).
102 See notes.2-3 supra and accompanying text.
103 See notes 109, 124 infra.
19791
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
and that if the sovereign has waived the foundational immunity, the
underpinnings for the judicial doctrine respecting municipalities are
removed.10 4 Maintaining that the immunity for political subdivisions could be
supplied by an affirmative grant of the legislature, which would override the
theory of judicial origin upon which it relied, the court found no specific
creation of local immunity in the Act. Even though the definitions section of
the Act specifically excluded political subdivisions, and section 2743.02(A)
specifically mentioned only the state, the court reasoned that these sections
meant only that actions against political subdivisions could not be brought in
the court of claims. Those sections did not mean that actions against local
government entities could not be brought in any other court of record in
which a non-state party may be sued.105 The court of appeals ordered the
common pleas court to entertain the action.
The Ohio Supreme Court entertained the city's appeal and reversed the
court of appeals by a 4-3 decision,106 finding sections 2743.01 and 2743.02 of
the Act to be, "forthright and unambiguous, and permit[ting] facile
discernment of the legislative intent to preserve the defense of sovereign
immunity to political subdivisions.' ' 0 7 To the court of appeals rationale that
municipal immunity was judicial in origin, was derivative in status, and
required affirmative legislative re-creation when the base of state immunity
was removed, the supreme court responded that no authority had been cited
which precluded selective waiver of immunity. That response was inapposite
to the court of appeals' holding that the legislature could not selectively waive
immunity by implication.08 An analysis of the theory of derivative immunity
and its application in this instance demonstrates the inadequacy of the
supreme court's response.
The main premise of the theory of derivative immunity is that political
subdivisions were afforded immunity at common law in Ohio because they
were agents of the state. The underlying principle is that sovereignty is
coextensive with the constituency that comprises the sovereignty, not with the
instrumentalities of government. The political subdivision, having no
independent sovereignty because it is an agency of the state, attains no
immunity independent of that emanating from the state.0 9 The conclusion to
104 No. 76-8205, slip op at 4 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976).
105 Id.
10 Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 364 N.E.2d 1376 (1977).
107 Id. at 139, 364 N.E.2d at 1379.
108 See No. 76-8205, slip op. at 3 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976).
109 Case law in Ohio supports this view. Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210
(1927) held: "The non liability for governmental functions is placed upon the ground that the state
is sovereign, that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, and that the municipality is the
mere agent of the state and therefore cannot be sued unless the state gives its consent by
legislation." Id. at 283, 156 N.E. at 212.
The first case in Ohio which bifurcated municipal corporations for the purpose of imposing
tort liability by distinguishing between public and private functions was City of Dayton v. Pease,
4 Ohio St. 80 (1854) (citing the landmark case of Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531,38 Am.
Dec. 669 (1842)). The standard set in Pease was reversed in Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio
St. 158,126 N.E. 72 (1919). Fowler was overruled in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St.
342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922). See generally Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383,391-402,189 N.E.
2d 857, 862-69 (1963) (Gibson, J., concurring) (tracing the Ohio history of municipal immunity
and listing all cases up to 1963 by their function and all articles on the subject). See also Spooner v.
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be drawn is that when the state waives its immunity without limitation of the
scope of the waiver, the former extension of immunity enjoyed by political
subdivisions of the state is ended"0 unless the legislature grants a new
immunity to the subdivisions.
Although the theory of derivative immunity was accurately stated by the
court of appeals, it erred in its application of the theory in this instance.
Crucial to its analysis was the assertion that the definition of state in the Act
"cannot be considered as a legislative .. .grant of what was essentially a
judicially created immunity.""' It is clear that the judicial origin of the
concept of sovereign immunity was supplanted by the affirmative act of the
constituency which amended article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. As
previously mentioned, 12 this amendment has been conclusively interpreted
as waiving sovereign immunity and substituting the jurisdictional defense of
lack of consent to suit, which only the legislature has the power to
implement." 3 Political subdivision immunity for governmental functions is
acquired only because such functions are in pursuit of those activities in which
the whole state has an interest;" 4 the subdivision is acting in place of the
sovereign and as its agent." 5 Activities of a governmental character
performed on behalf of the state by a political subdivision cannot give rise to
liability without the consent of the legislature under article I, section 16 any
more than can an act of the state in its governmental capacity. Article I, section
16 is thereby operable for both sovereign immunity and municipal
immunity." 6
This constitutional mandate thus is the obstacle to relaxation of municipal
immunity for which the court of appeals failed to account. The waiver of
McConnell, 22 F. Cas. 939,939 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838) (No. 13,245) ("sovereignty ... resides with
the constituency, and not with the functionaries of government"); State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis,
119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1928) (sovereignty of state extends to municipalities); Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Union Say. Bank Co., 29 Ohio App. 154, 163 N.E. 221 (7th Dist.), aff'd, 119 Ohio St.
124, 162 N.E. 420 (1928); Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 OR.
L. REv. 250 (1937) (tracing the history of the concept in England and its adoption by courts in the
United States).
110 There is some support for this conclusion in other jurisdictions. E.g., Bernardine v. City of
New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945); Annot., 161 A.L.R. 367 (1946). The New York
Court of Claims Act section 8, which provides: "The State hereby waives its immunity from
liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in
accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against
individuals or corporations," does not distinguish "state" from "political subdivision" as does the
Ohio Court of Claims Act. Also, there is no provision in the New York Constitution similar to
article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 19 & art. 6, §§ 1, 9; Kelso v.
City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913,390 P.2d 2 (1964); contra, Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa
845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). See also Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317,145 N.W.2d 524 (1966)
(dicta).
" No. 76-8205, slip op. at 4 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976).
112 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
1'3 Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 763, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052
(1972); Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281,156 N.E. 210 (1927); Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St.
513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917), error dismissed, 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
114 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 284, 156 N.E. 210, 213 (1927).
"5 Id. at 283, 156 N.E. at 212; accord, Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436,438, 131 N.E.2d
721, 723 (1956). But see City of Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941).
116 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 283, 156 N.E. 210, 212 (1927).
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immunity under article I, section 16 remains inchoate until the legislature
removes the lack of consent to suit as a defense. The rationale of the court of
appeals that suits may be brought against political subdivisions in courts other
than the court of claims simply because the legislature failed to specify a court
for such actions misapprehends the nature of the lack of consent defense." 7
Even assuming that article I, section 16 does not preclude binding
common pleas jurisdiction when the state confers court of claims jurisdiction
for actions against the state but fails to confer specific jurisdiction over claims
against other government entities, the theory of derivative immunity does not
serve. Expressed in another way, the theory maintains that, unless otherwise
expressed, the immunity of political subdivisions is wiped away by waiver of
sovereign immunity. That means that the extent of local government
immunity is controlled by the scope of the waiver. Less than a full and
unconditional waiver would undermine the court of appeals' application of
the theory, if the waiver intended to retain some aspects of immunity.
The intent of the Ohio General Assembly seems clear in the definition of
political subdivisions: " 'Political subdivisions' means municipal cor-
porations . . .and all other bodies corporate and politic responsible for
governmental activities only in geographic areas smaller than the state to
which the sovereign immunity of the state attaches."118 As the Ohio Supreme
Court recognized, the use of the present tense "attaches" expresses the intent
to retain local immunity." 9
There is further indication of the legislative intent to retain local immunity
in that the Act specifically waives immunity for hospitals owned or operated
by political subdivisions. 20 If political subdivisions were intended to lose
immunity by operation of the derivative theory, this waiver would be empty
language. 12 It is apparent from this part of the Act and the great care which
the legislature exercised in defining "state" and "political subdivision" that the
phrase "state hereby waives its immunity" was not intended to extend to local
immunity.122
The dissent in Haas attempted to achieve the same result as the court of
appeals without utilizing the same faulty argument. Ignoring the question
certified to the court, the dissent instead chose to engage in a policy-oriented
argument for the abrogation of municipal immunity. The main thesis of the
opinion was that since the doctrine had been judicially created, it could be
judicially abrogated regardless of legislative intent.'23 Marshalling arguments
advanced in other jurisdictions,'1 24 the dissent asserted that legislative and
M7 See Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135,137,364 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 (1977); Krausev. State,
31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 136, 285 N.E.2d 736, 739, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). See also
West Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Masheter, 6 Ohio St. 2d 142, 216 N.E.2d 761 (1966) (the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be used to circumvent sovereign immunity).
I's OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.01(B) (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
11 Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 137-38, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 (1977).
120 Ono REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
121 Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135,138-39,364 N.E.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1977). The court of
appeals admitted this finding but found no expression of intent. See Haas v. Hayslip, No. 76-8205
(Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1976).
122 51 Ohio St. 2d at 138, 364 N.E.2d at 1378.
in1 Id. at 140, 364 N.E.2d at 1379 (Brown, W., J., dissenting).
'24 The overwhelming trend is in favor of the abolition of municipal immunity. E.g., Scheele
v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963) (judicially abolished); Veach v. City of Phoenix,
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judicial inroads already made upon the doctrine diluted the flood of litigation
objections to abrogation.1 25 The ability of local governments to protect
themselves with insurance eliminates the fear of financially crippling the
units.1 26 Inequities of the governmental-proprietary dichotomy method of
deciding cases and the clear equity of placing the burden of damages on the
local government rather than on the injured individual require a reversal of
the tendency to blindly accept past policy under the guise of stare decisis, said
the dissenters.
The dissent is not persuasive in this approach. Refusal to rigidly adhere to
stare decisis may be appropriate and even laudable under some cir-
cumstances, but if a court is going to allow the jurisprudential function of stare
decisis to be overridden for the sake of making an equitable policy
operational, it should at least recognize the jurisprudential function of a
logical argument responding to the constitutional questions raised by its
approach. The dissent comes up short in this regard. Judicial abrogation of
immunity contravenes article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, which
precludes the judiciary from establishing the courts and the manner in which
suits may be brought against the state or anyone.12 7 To hold otherwise would
not only require the court to run counter to stare decisis and overrule
precedent inconsistent with the dissent's approach but would require some
argument to overcome the constitutional philosophy upon which that
precedent is based. The legislative intent established in the language of the
Act to permit local immunity to remain intact lends support to the conclusion
that the legislature had affirmed the judicial approach taken in that line of
precedent and had chosen not to exercise the power article I, section 16
confers upon the legislature to change the law. Blind adherence to stare decisis
may well be as revolting as the dissent suggests, 12  but revulsion for one
judicial tendency does not supply an adequate predicate for judicial
usurpation of the legislature's constitutional power. All of the arguments
102 Ariz. 195,427 P.2d 335 (1967) (judicially abolished); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.
2d 211,359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (judicially abolished); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (judicially abolished); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ.,
453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (judicially abolished); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832(W. Va. 1975) (judicially abolished). For listings of actions taken by state courts and legislatures,
see Haas v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135,141 n.6, 364 N.E.2d 1376,1382 n.6 (1977); RESTATEMErNT(SEcoND) OF Toa'rs § 895A, Special Note to the Institute Regarding §§ 895B and 895C (Tent.
Draft No. 19, 1973); Harley, supra note 2, at 33.
For critical analyses of the concept, see Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-
Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934); Green, Freedom of Litigation III: Municipal
Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REV. 355 (1944); Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A
Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 330 (1953); Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A
Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463 (1963); Comment, Judicial Abrogation of
Governmental and Sovereign Immunity: A National Trend with a Pennsylvania Perspective, 78
DICK. L. REV. 365 (1973).
125 See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,595,305 A.2d 877,882 (1973). See
also David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or Suit,
6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1959).
'2 See David, supra note 125, at 45-53.
127 See Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 143-44,285 N.E.2d 736,743-44, appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
128 The dissent quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes' statement that "[i]t is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past." 0. W. HoLMEs, CoL.LEcrn LEcAL PAP'ERs 187(1920), quoted at 51 Ohio St. 2d at 142, 364 N.E.2d at 1381 (Brown, W., J., dissenting).
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detailed by the dissent may well appeal to those interested in achieving a
system in which culpability of a defendant is determined irrespective of its
status as a private person or government entity. However, the simplistic
compendium of arguments constructed by the dissent relates only to the
"why" questions of abrogating immunity; it does not relate to the question of
how to overcome the constitutional limitation of judicial power.
Abrogation of local governmental immunity, long supported by respected
legal scholars, should stand upon sound legal theory as well as upon sound
policy. The three dissenting justices of the Ohio Supreme Court, proffering
the familiar and acceptable policy considerations, advocated an unwise judi-
cial approach. The court of appeals opinion, concerned about the need for a
sound legal theory, misapplied the derivative immunity theory and ignored
clear legislative intent contrary to its holding. The majority opinion, while
legally correct and heavily steeped in historical analysis, failed to address the
court of appeals argument directly and declare convincingly why it is that the
legislature may selectively waive sovereign immunity.1 29
3. Nature and Effect of Proceeding in the Court of Claims
The Act requires complaints and other pleadings in the court of claims to
name as defendant each state department, board, office, commission,
agency, institution, or other instrumentality whose actions are alleged as the
basis of the complaint. '"1 3 0 'A question which naturally arises from this
requirement is whether the fact that a complaint names the wrong
instrumentality is proper ground for dismissal of the claim. The court of
claims has held that the answer to this question should be yes. The Franklin
County Court of Appeals has implied that the answer should be no.
In Novatny Electric Co. v. State, ' 3 claimant was an electrical contractor
who contracted with the state through the Department of Public Works to do
electrical work for the University of Akron. Alleging that the state had caused
delay in the performance of the contract, claimant filed a complaint referring
to the defendant as the State of Ohio, Department of Public Works. The
defendant department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, contending first that the Board of Trustees
of the University of Akron, rather than the department, was the proper
defendant and was not named on the complaint and, second, that the
complaint did not state a claim regardless of which agency of the state was
named. The court of claims sustained the motion on both grounds and
dismissed the complaint.13 2
The reasoning of the court of claims to support its dismissal on the ground
of improper designation of a party defendant was that since the Act provided
for judgments in the court of claims to be satisfied from funds in the possession
12' The majority's treatment of the power to selectively waive immunity is limited to this
sentence: "Appellees fail to cite authority that the state may not selectively waive, through the
general assembly, sovereign immunity with regard to political subdivisions." 51 Ohio St. 2d at
139, 364 N.E.2d at 1379. The opinion fails to cite authority in support of its view to the contrary.
130 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.13(A) (Page Supp. 1978), mirrored in OHIO CT. CL. LOCAL R.
4(A).
131 73 Ohio Op. 2d 384 (Ct. Cl.), rev'd, 46 Ohio App. 2d 255, 349 N.E.2d 328 (10th Dist.
1975).
132 73 Ohio Op. 2d at 388.
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of the defendant department, 3 3 the party designation requirements of the Act
were more than superficial. 134 It found the error "serious in that it could defeat
ultimate recovery assuming the claim to be valid."135
Although the decision in Novatny was relied upon by the court of claims in
subsequent decisions, 36 it was reversed by the court of appeals. The latter
court found that the Department of Public Works was a proper party to the
action, that the University of Akron should be joined pursuant to Rule 19(A) of
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and that it was therefore error to dismiss
the complaint.1 37 While the court of appeals did not directly address the issue
of whether failure to properly designate the defendant department should
result in dismissal, the language of its opinion which maintains that it is the
court of claims which has ultimate responsibility for determining which
department should be liable for a judgment against the state suggests that its
answer would be no.138
Unless the improper designation of the defendant department prejudices
the state in the defense of a claim, dismissal of the suit should not follow. If the
Office of the Attorney General, to which a copy of each complaint against the
state is sent, is aware that a named state instrumentality is not the proper
defendant, it should follow in most cases that the office knows which
instrumentality should be named. In such an event, the name of the correct
defendant could be substituted by appropriate motion to the court and any
judgment which might result could then be satisfied from funds of the proper
state instrumentality. This approach would seem to be in keeping with the
Ohio Supreme Court's admonition that the Act should be "liberally construed
in order to promote . . . [its] object and assist the parties in obtaining
justice."139
This is not to say that the party designation section is of superficial
importance or that attorneys engaging in practice before the court of claims
should leave defendant identification to the Office of the Attorney General.
Rather, practitioners should take all appropriate steps to identify and name
with specificity all instrumentalities of the state which should be properly
brought into the litigation. Failure to do so should not prejudice a full and fair
defense of the claim. If the court of claims is unable, through the suggested
procedure, to prevent such prejudice, improperly designated claims should
be dismissed.
1'3 See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.19 (Page Supp. 1978).
'34 73 Ohio Op. 2d at 384.
135 Id. at 388.
"a In both Bilger v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0166 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 14, 1975) and
Hester v. Warden, No. 75-0272 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 28, 1975), the court of claims dismissed
plaintiffs' complaints which had inaccurately named state instrumentalities as defendants.
However, in each case there were alternative grounds for dismissal, and the court did not make
clear upon which ground(s) the case was dismissed.
In B.G. Danis Co. v. Jackson, No. 75-0255 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 13,1975), however, the court of
claims found that the naming of the Director of the Department of Transportation as defendant
rather than correctly naming the department to be "innocent error, if it is error," where the
content of the complaint made it clear that no claim was being asserted against the director
individually. Id., slip op. at 2.
'3' 46 Ohio App. 2d at 261, 349 N.E.2d at 332.
185 Id. at 258, 349 N.E.2d at 330.
13' State ex rel. Moritz v. Troop, 44 Ohio St. 2d 90, 92, 338 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1975).
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One area of procedure which has engendered some problems for the court
of claims has been the permissible joinder of parties-defendant, although
most of those problems seem to have been eliminated by the 1977
amendments. 40 As mentioned previously, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to all actions in the court except where inconsistent with other
provisions of the Act. Rule 20(A) of the Rules of Civil Procedure would permit
the joinder of parties as defendants "if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction [or] occurrence ...and if any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action."'14 But the court of claims is
a court of limited jurisdiction, and civil rule 82 requires that the rules not be
"construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.' 42
Thus a potential conflict existed between the civil rules and other provisions of
the Act' 43 in the area of permissive joinder of defendants. The statutory
conferral of exclusive jurisdiction to determine civil actions against the state
could be interpreted to mean that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction
to hear claims against private individuals, and utilization of civil rule 20(A)
would thereby be prohibited by rule 82.
The latter argument was advanced in the court of claims by the state in
Boggess v. Tarrent, 44 a tort claim alleging injuries inflicted by state
employees. Plaintiff sued the state, joined the employees and demanded relief
against the state or, in the alternative, against the individual defendants. The
state moved to dismiss the complaint against the private individuals on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over private persons in original
actions filed against the state. The court recognized the logic of the state's
argument but overruled the motion on the basis of the anomalous situation
created by the operation of another section of the Act which gave the court
jurisdiction over joined parties in cases removed to the court and with respect
to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party practice, but not with respect
to joinder by plaintiffs in cases originally filed in the court. Applying a theory
of pendent jurisdiction, the court permitted the joinder of employees in the
original claim to "promote judicial efficiency, avoid multiplicity of suits, and
avoid possible inconsistent results."'4 5
The Ohio Supreme Court ratified the Boggess result in State ex rel. Moritz
v. Troop,'46 a proceeding on a writ of prohibition sought by the director of the
department who had employed the individuals Boggess had sued in the court
of claims. The plaintiff in Moritz sought to prohibit the court of claims from
exceeding its jurisdiction in adjudicating the liability of a private individual.
'10 See generally Note, Limitations on Joinder of Defendants in the Ohio Court of Claims, 45
U. CIN. L. REV. 460 (1976).
"I OHIo R. CIv. P. 20(A).
14 OHiO R. Civ. P. 82.
'3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(E) (Page Supp. 1978) prevents joinder of any defendants in
an original action against the state.
'" 73 Ohio Op. 2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
14 Id. at 347.
146 44 Ohio St. 2d 90,338 N.E.2d 526 (1975). Following the denial of a motion to reconsider in
Boggess, Moritz had sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme court to forbid the court of
claims from exceeding its jurisdiction in Boggess.
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However, rather than utilizing the pendent jurisdiction theory of the court of
claims, the supreme court said that the Court of Claims Act was a remedial
measure, was to be liberally construed, and was not inconsistent with civil rule
20(A) .47 It found no indication of legislative intent to prohibit joinder by the
plaintiff in the face of the ability of the state to do so in a third-party claim. 48 It
also believed the state should favor joinder for the purpose of raising
indemnification claims against employees .49
The notions of judicial economy and efficiency, avoidance of multiple
lawsuits, and avoidance of inconsistent results apparently did not convince
the legislature when it considered the 1977 amendments to the Act. Waiver of
liability and consent to be sued is now made conditional upon the claimant's
waiver of causes of action against state officers and employees, 50 thereby
legislatively overruling Moritz.
The question which remains is whether a plaintiff may join private
individuals as parties-defendant when those parties are not officers or
employees of the state. The answer is clear: the court of claims has refused to
extend the pendent jurisdiction rationale of Boggess to attempted joinder of
non-employees.' 5' Furthermore, the 1977 amendments to the Act seem to
have foreclosed further speculation on whether the Moritz approach would
be applied by the court of appeals to such actions with the addition of the
clause, "[t]he only defendant in original actions in the court of claims is the
state."112
This legislative abrogation of permissive joinder of defendants is
unfortunate for claimants who have been injured by a combination of state
and private actions. In such circumstances, the claimant must file separate
actions in separate courts, forego the action against the private individual and
proceed solely against the state, or forego the action against the state and
proceed against the private individual in a court of general jurisdiction. In the
latter situation, the claimant may proceed with the hope that the individual
defendant will file a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint
against the state.'5 Once that has occurred, the removal procedure to the
court of claims becomes operable, and the court has jurisdiction over all of the
parties to the case.5 4 The delays, extra burdens on courts of general
jurisdiction, potential for inconsistent results and needless complexity of this
denial of free joinder by the 1977 amendments are obvious.
The Ohio General Assembly should move to rectify this situation and
147 Id. at 92, 95, 338 N.E.2d at 528, 529.
1'1 Id. at 95, 338 N.E.2d at 530.
149 Id.
150 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page Supp. 1978).
'51 Claycraft Co. v. B. G. Danis Co., No. 75-0394 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5, 1975); Ciampone v.
Hughes, No. 75-0300 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 5,1975). However, the court did allow the state to join an
individual as a defendant to a counterclaim asserted by the state against the plaintiff in Huffman-
Wolfe Co. v. State, No. 75-0103 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 27, 1975).
152 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
153 Where the suit is brought against the state, the claimant will hope that the state will do the
same with respect to the private individual.
OmIO aEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.03(E)(1), 2743.031(A) (Page Supp. 1978); OHIO R. Cv.I'. 1,3(11).
1979]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
amend the Act to permit joinder of parties-defendant who are not officers or
employees of the state. The judicial economy to be obtained is obvious. The
Rules of Civil Procedure are adequate for dealing with possible problems
created by joinder cases. 15 5 Furthermore, a procedure allowing for liberal
joinder by plaintiffs might save the state administrative effort by bringing into
the case all the appropriate parties which may be subject to the state's claim
for contribution from joint tortfeasors.56 Under present law, many of the
difficulties allegedly presented by the joinder of a private party with the
state157 cannot be avoided completely, but it is certain that by requiring
separate forums and separate actions for injuries arising under one set of
operative facts, those problems are multiplied, not solved.15 1
Another procedural problem presented by the Act concerns the
applicable statute of limitations. A person suing the state in the court of claims
must do so within the limitations period that is applicable to similar suits
between private parties 5 9 but "no later than two years after the date of the
accrual of the cause of action."' 60 Since the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
require statute of limitations defenses to be affirmatively pleaded 16' and make
a failure to do so a waiver of the affirmative defense, 162 the question arises
whether the state can be held to have waived the statute of limitations. Since
the Act requires determination to be made in the court of claims "in
accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private
parties,"' 6 it is apparent that if the state fails to raise the defense by answer or
motion, it may amend its answer within the discretion of the court in
accordance with civil rule 15 to assert the defense at a later time in the
proceedings. 64 If the state fails entirely to assert the defense, should the court
of claims dismiss the action on its own motion?
There is strong support for the conclusion that the statute of limitations
defense is jurisdictional and that the court of claims may dismiss an action on
its own motion when the period of limitation on a claim has run. The waiver of
immunity section of the Act'65 makes the waiver "subject to the limitations"' 166
of the Act. The time periods permitted for suits by section 2743.16 obviously
operate as part of those limitations, and it would appear that compliance with
that section is a jurisdictional element of a cause of action against the state.
The statutes of limitations applicable to actions brought against the United
States are considered jurisdictional, whether the action is brought in the
United States Court of Claims'167 or in a federal district court under the
155 See OHio R. Crv. P. 20(B), 38(D), 39, 42.
156 See Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31, 2307.32 (Page Supp. 1978).
151 See Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948). See also Braun v. State, 203 Misc.
563, 117 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
158 See Lowe v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 817 (D.N.J. 1941).
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.16 (Page Supp. 1978).
160 Id.
161 Omo R. Civ. P. 8(C).
162 OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(H).
1 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
164 See 4 HAR'ER, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVL PRACrICE 81 (1979) and cases cited therein.
'6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
166 Id.
1'7 United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972);
Driskell v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 339 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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Federal Tort Claims Act' 18 or the Tucker Act, 189 and the United States may
not waive the defense. 170 The state,171 the court of claims,'172 and the court of
appeals73 have all treated the statute of limitations defense as jurisdictional,
and the court of claims on at least one occasion has taken the approach of
considering the time limitations in a removal case on its own motion.7 4 There
seems to be little room for doubt that once the statute of limitations has run on
a claim, a claimant's reliance on the waiver theory to overcome the defense
will not be successful.
Finally, a third procedural problem raised by the Act concerns the scope
of the prohibition of jury trials. 175 The prohibition is not considered to be a
violation of Ohio Constitution, article I, section 5, which provides, "[the] right
of trial by jury shall be inviolate,"' 176 because under conventional legal theory
the right to jury trial referred to in that section relates only to the right as it
existed at the time of the adoption of the state constitution. 7 7 Since the state
was not subject to suit when the constitution was adopted, article I, section 5
does not guarantee a jury trial in such cases.178
A more controversial issue is to what extent " [p]arties retain their right to
jury in the court of claims of any civil actions not against the state.' 17 9 The
restrictions on joinder of parties-defendant contained in the 1977
amendments to the Act render the issue of jury trial moot in situations
involving an original action in the court of claims, but what happens when the
case comes to the court by way of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
complaint removal proceeding? Does the prohibition operate to prevent the
claimant from demanding a jury trial against the private individual
defendants? If so, do the private defendants also forfeit their rights to a jury?
If a jury trial may be had between the private parties but not with respect to
the state, how is such a trial to be accomplished?
The Ohio Supreme Court shed some light on these questions in State ex rel.
Moritz v. Troop. s0 However, since the case involved a joinder of private
parties to which the 1977 amendments did not apply, and the court was not
1 6 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
169 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
170 Christian Beacon v. United States, 322 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1963).
171 Westfall v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction, No. 77-0695 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 3, 1978).
172 Williams v. Ohio Decorative Prods., Inc., No. 78-0141 PR (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 3, 1978).
173 Aratari v. Department of Rehab. & Correction, 48 Ohio App. 2d 239,356 N.E.2d 759 (10th
Dist. 1976).
174 Williams v. Ohio Decorative Prods., Inc., No. 78-0141 PR (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 3, 1978).
175 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.11 (Page Supp. 1978).
176 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5.
177 Pokorny v. Local 310, International Hod Carriers Union, 38 Ohio St. 2d 177, 311 N.E.2d
866 (1974); City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St. 2d 197, 299 N.E.2d 686
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974).
17' For similar reasons, the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, which is not
applicable to state governments in civil actions either directly or by incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment, has not prohibited the denial of a jury trial to plaintiffs in actions against
the United States. Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442 (1977); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). The Galloway Court held that the
right to trial by jury guaranteed by the seventh amendment referred only to that right as it existed
in the common law when the Constitution was adopted and hence did not exist with respect to a
proceeding against the United States.
179 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.11 (Page Supp. 1978).
180 44 Ohio St. 2d 90, 338 N.E.2d 526 (1975).
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squarely faced with the issues raised above, the questions remain open. The
state argued in Moritz that the employees of the state were not susceptible to
suit in the court of claims because of the Act's failure to mention employees
and because the prohibition of jury trials where the state was concerned
would lead to conflicting decisions on the same issue if the court decided the
issue relating to the state and a jury decided the issue relating to the employee.
The supreme court rejected the argument and, emphasizing the language of
the Act which provided that the right to jury trial was retained in actions that
were not brought against the state, concluded that the court of claims could
permit a jury trial of claims not against the state, at least with respect to issues
"peculiarly susceptible to determination by a jury.' '181 Nevertheless, the court
seemed to imply that the plaintiff in the action would not be able to demand a
jury in its claims against the private party. Addressing itself to the state's
argument relating to possibly conflicting decisions of judge and jury, the court
said the problem "could only arise where the defendant-employee requests a
trial by jury."182
A court of appeals decision has indicated that jury trials should be
permitted in third-party complaint situations, thereby reversing the court of
claims disposition of the issue. In Huffman Wolfe Co. v. State,183 the court of
appeals held that a third-party defendant is entitled to a jury on claims
brought against it in the third-party proceedings or which it had brought
against another third-party defendant. The court interpreted section 2743.11
to mean that parties retain their rights to jury trials if the claims asserted are
not against the state. This decision would seem to indicate that where the is-
sues sought to be tried by a jury are distinct from the issues between the
claimant and the state, parties engaged in litigation should be entitled to have
those issues decided by a jury.
If the state asserts a counterclaim against a claimant, should that claimant
be entitled to a jury trial? The plain language of section 2743.11 prohibits jury
trials in claims brought against the state; it does not prohibit jury trials in
claims brought by the state. Furthermore, if the courts were to infer the latter
prohibition, potential constitutional problems would arise which are not
involved in the prohibition of jury trials in claims against the state. Jury trials
as a matter of right in claims against private individuals were in existence at
the time of the adoption of the Ohio Constitution and would seem to be
clearly protected by article I, section 5. To date, however, no Ohio court has
addressed this precise issue, and both Moritz and Huffman v. Wolfe Co.
resisted giving section 2743.11 its broadest possible construction. In Radojeics
v. Ohio State Reformatory,8 4 an administratively determined case, a deputy
clerk of court did find Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 13(A) inapplicable in
administratively determined cases and held that the state could not
counterclaim against the plaintiff, on the partial ground that the plaintiff might
have a right to a jury trial on the state's counterclaim.
A brief comparison with practice in the United States Court of Claims is
'81 Id. at 93, 338 N.E.2d at 529.
182 Id. (emphasis added).
183 No. 76 AP-31 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1976).
184 52 Ohio Misc. 73 (Ct. C1. 1977).
[Vol. 28:149
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss2/3
OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS ACT
instructive on these issues surrounding the right to a jury trial. A century ago
the United States Supreme Court ruled that a jury trial is unavailable in
counterclaims by the government against the plaintiff. 185 The bases for the
holding were that such lawsuits "are not suits at common law within its true
meaning"'86 and that Congress has in effect given notice to claimants that if
they avail themselves of the forum provided for pressing their claims against
the government, they do so with the knowledge that the absence of a jury is a
condition attached to the use of the forum. 87 In view of the Ohio Court of
Claims Act provision proclaiming that suits are to be determined according to
the "same rules of law applicable to suits between parties, subject to the
limitations set forth in this chapter,"'88 the same reasoning would not follow.
Those "same rules of law" are obviously an incorporation of the common law
into the Act, and the claimant in Ohio would not seem to have clear notice that
a counterclaim asserted against him by the state would not carry with it a right
to a jury as one of those limitations.
If claimants are given notice by a later court decision of sufficient authority
or by an amendment to the Act that a counterclaim by the state will be
determined solely by the court of claims, a prohibition of a jury trial on the
basis of the McElrath v. United States'89 reasoning would not appear to be
unreasonably harsh. It then could be forcefully argued that claimants
knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to jury trials by subjecting
themselves to the clear possibility of a counterclaim by the state. Perhaps
distinctions between permissive counterclaims' 9" and compulsory
counterclaims' 91 could be drawn, reserving the right to jury trials only in the
former. In that way, the potential difficulties of a two-tiered trier of fact
proceeding could be avoided in many situations, and the potential conflict
with the Ohio constitutional guarantee of jury trials could be avoided in those
situations where that guarantee would most strongly be brought to bear.
Any parties brought involuntarily into an action in the court of claims by
means of permissive joinder, third party practice, interpleader, or pursuant to
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 19.1 should retain their rights to trial by
jury as to any claim asserted against them and any claim they are compelled to
make against parties other than the state. 92 In those instances where parties
brought involuntarily into the action have permissive claims they desire to
assert against another party, it is preferable to leave it to the discretion of the
court to determine with reference to the posture of the other matters involved
185 McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
Is Id. at 440.
187 The Court stated that "Congress, by the act in question, informs the claimant that if he
avails himself of the privilege of suing the government in the special court organized for that
purpose, he may be met with a . . . counterclaim ...upon which judgment may go against
him, without the intervention of a jury .... Id. In Tucker Act cases, it has been held that the
plaintiff has no right to a jury determination of the government's counterclaim. Terminal Ware-
house of New Jersey v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1950) (relying upon McElrath).
'" OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page Supp. 1978).
189 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
110 OHIO R. Civ. P. 13(B).
,' OHO R. Ctv. P. 13(A).
192 OHO R. Civ. P. 13(A), 14(A).
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in the litigation whether the permissive claim should be tried to a jury. This
approach would not seem to produce a hardship on the permissive claimant,
since such claimant would have the option of pursuing the claim in another
forum. However, if the permissive claim brings yet another involuntary party
into the litigation, the latter party's asserted right to a jury trial should be
controlling.
In removal cases, there should be no doubt that all parties retain their
rights to trial by jury as they existed prior to removal of the case to the court of
claims. Since the court of claims must overcome the difficulties presented by
having two distinct triers of fact in the same proceeding in removal cases, this
state of affairs should work to undermine the counterarguments to free joinder
of parties. 193
The suggestions raised here are not insensitive to the obvious problems
created by the two-tiered trier of fact situation that would be presented in
such proceedings. But, as the United States Supreme Court said in United
States v. Yellow Cab Co.,'9 those problems are not insurmountable.'9 There,
the Court suggested that federal courts could look to the manner in which
issues of equity are tried to the courts and factual issues of law are tried to
juries in federal practice.'9 If the trial indeed found such problems to be
insurmountable, the Court believed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)
could be utilized to conduct separate trials. These observations could well be
applied to practice in the Ohio Court of Claims. Some further means of
mitigating the difficulty in these cases can be found in State ex rel. Moritz v.
Troop,197 where the Ohio Supreme Court found the possible conflict between
decisions of court and jury to be "not clearly inevitable."'' The court
suggested the possible use of an advisory jury' 99 and implied that all parties
could consent to a trial by jury pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure
39(C).200
113 See notes 70-72, 154 supra and accompanying text.
194 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
195 Id. at 555.
190 Id. at 556.
197 44 Ohio St. 2d 90, 338 N.E.2d 526 (1975).
198 Id. at 93, 338 N.E.2d at 529.
9 For an example of the use of an advisory jury, see Moloney v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
200 That rule provides:
In all actions not triable of right by jury (1) the court upon motion or on its own initiative
may try any issue with an advisory jury or (2) the court, with consent of both parties,
may order a trial of any issue with a jury, whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by
jury had been a matter of right.
OHIo R. Civ. P. 39(C). However, section 2743.03(D) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that the
Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern actions in the court of claims "except insofar as inconsistent
with this chapter." Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(D) (Page Supp. 1978). Inasmuch as section
2743.03(C) of the code requires that "[a] civil action against the state shall be heard and
determined by a single judge," id. § 2743.03(C), it appears that rule 39(C) is inconsistent with
section 2743.03(C) and is therefore inapplicable to actions in the court of claims. In United States
v. Schlitz, 9 F.R.D. 259 (E.D. Va. 1949), a United States district court suggested a novel, if
somewhat questionable, means of dealing with the possibly conflicting decisions of the court and
the jury in a case in which the defendant had counterclaimed against the government for damages
to his automobile sustained in the accident underlying the government's suit against him. The
court suggested that the factual issues relating to the defendant's negligence and the United
[Vol. 28:149
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss2/3
OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS ACT
One of the most cogent objections to jury trials in the court of claims points
to the possibility of conflicting findings of fact on the amount of damages to be
awarded to a claimant in a joint tortfeasor situation. That possibility of conflict
has been found to be convincing enough in the federal setting to persuade a
court to deny joinder of individual defendants with the United States in
Federal Tort Claims Act proceedings.20' The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, met the problem by producing a formula to
determine the rights of contribution the respective tortfeasors would have
against each other where the court and jury had reached differing verdicts on
damages.20 2 The jury awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in damages against the
private defendant. The court, finding the government to be jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff, awarded damages of $10,000. The court
decided that if the plaintiff collected the $10,000 from the United States, the
private defendant would be liable to the United States for $5,000 in
contribution. If the plaintiff were to collect the $15,000 from the private
defendant, the government would be liable to that defendant for contribution
in the amount of $6,000, this sum being the same percentage of $15,000 as
$10,000 was to $25,000, the total of the awarded damages.
4. Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims-What is the "State"?
The language of the Act to which one would readily refer to determine the
jurisdiction of the court of claims seems straight-forward and clear enough on
its face, but the court has not been without its problems in applying that
language to the realities of governmental organization. The definition of
"state" includes "its departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies,
institutions, and other instrumentalities." 203 The jurisdiction of the court
covers "all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of
immunity," 204 "all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court of
claims,"'205 "appeals from the decisions of the court of claims com-
missioners," 206 "full equity powers," and "all counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party claims."20 7 As discussed earlier, political subdivisions are excluded
from the definition of state. But what should be the result when a municipality
performs a special function as an agent of the state? Should the "agency or
instrumentality" clause override the exclusion? Suppose the defendant is not
clearly the exclusive agent of either the state or a political subdivision but
carries out functions for both. Does the jurisdiction of the court of claims
attach to such entities for the purpose of determining claims by parties injured
by the activities of those entities?
States' contributory negligence be submitted to the jury by means of special interrogatories.
These findings of fact would then be res judicata and binding on the court in determining whether
the United States was primarily negligent.
20' Benbow v. Wolfe, 217 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1954).
201 D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Slingland, 266 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
203 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.01(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
204 Id. § 2743.03(A).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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In Stahl v. City of Mansfield,28 claimant relied on earlier Ohio Supreme
Court theory to argue that the city and its police officers should be included
within the court of claims' jurisdiction as "agencies" of the state. The
argument was based upon the case of City of Cincinnati v. Gamble,20 9 which
had held that when a municipality is performing duties such as police, fire, and
health protection, it is acting as an agent of the state.210 Applying this theory to
the political subdivision in Stahl, plaintiff asserted that court of claims
jurisdiction would be obtained over the defendants because of their actions in
the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state. The court of claims
accepted the notion of the city and its employees as agents of the state in
performing governmental functions on behalf of the state but nevertheless
dismissed the action. Notwithstanding the agency theory of the Gamble case,
the court held the specific exclusion of political subdivisions from the
jurisdiction of the court was controlling. On appeal, the court of appeals
adopted the court of claims' reasoning but added the premise that regardless
of the relationship of agency between the state and the defendants, the
requirement of the Act that any judgment must be charged against
unencumbered monies appropriated to the defendant entity21' precluded any
action where the only defendant was a political subdivision.2 1 1
A method of classification of defendants who may not clearly be
considered as an agent of the entities included on the list of instrumentalities in
the Act's definition of "state" has been formulated by the court of claims in
Snyder v. Crawford County Board of Elections.213 In that case, plaintiff
named as defendants the Secretary of the State of Ohio, in his office as
chairperson of the Board of Elections, and four members of the County Board
of Elections. Urging that the court take jurisdiction over the four county-level
defendants, claimant pointed out that the Secretary of State appointed the
local members and that the county board functioned under the Secretary of
State as agents of the state in administering its election laws. The court
dismissed the Secretary of State from the action on the ground that he was not
involved in any decision of the local board from which the claimant sought
redress.21 4 To aid it in its ascertainment of the relationship between the state
and the local board, the court looked to the election laws contained in the
Ohio Revised Code.2 15 Consideration of the provisions of the code pertaining
to appointment and funding of local boards of election revealed that while the
members of the local boards were appointed by the Secretary of State as
plaintiff had asserted, the expenses of such boards are paid from the county
treasuries. 216 From that observation the court concluded that the source of
208 No. 76-0125 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 4,1976), afi'd, No. 76 AP-289 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July
8, 1976).
209 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941).
210 Id. at 230, 34 N.E.2d at 231.
211 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.19(C)(3) (Page Supp. 1978).
212 No. 76 AP-289 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 8, 1976).
213 No. 75-0408 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5, 1975).
214 The secretary was immune from liability for negligent appointment of the county board
members because the appointments were made in the exercise of his governmental duties.
215 Oono REv. CODE ANN. ch. 3501 (Page 1972).
216 Id. § 3501.17.
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funding determined the agency relationship217 and that the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over an agency of the county.
The court expanded upon this classification formula in Beegle v. State.218
There, plaintiff sued the Public Employees Retirement System of the State of
Ohio, 219 claiming the system had breached a contract between defendant and
plaintiff's deceased husband. One issue raised was whether the system was an
agency of the state and thus within the jurisdiction of the court of claims. In its
determination of this issue the court once again referred to the enabling
provisions of the Ohio Revised Code. The court found two factors present in
the make-up of the defendant to be distinctly important: (1) the employees of
the system were not subject to the state civil service classification or pay
schedules, and (2) the system, rather than being funded by the Ohio General
Assembly, was financed by state and local government units as employers and
contributions from employees. The court pointed out that under the Act no
execution may issue upon a judgment, 20 and satisfaction of judgment may
only be obtained by charging the judgment "against available unencumbered
monies in the appropriations to whichever state departments, boards, offices,
commissions, agencies, institutions, or other instrumentalities are named in
the judgment."2 21 Although the court dismissed the complaint on other
grounds,222 the opinion clearly indicates that since the system's financing
arrangement did not include an appropriation of unencumbered funds from
the legislature, it was not to be classified as an agency of the state within the
contemplation of the Act.
These interpretations of the Act demonstrate that while the definitions
section exclusion of political subdivision is viewed by the court as a clear and
straight-forward limitation of jurisdiction to claims in which the state's
activities gave rise to the claim to be litigated, 223 the definition of "state" falls
short of being complete. The method of characterizing a government entity as
an agency of the state by looking to the source of its funding should be
considered by practitioners in cases where the entity does not, on the basis of
superficially observable factors, clearly fall within the definition of "state."
But a complete classification of all extant governmental entities as falling
either within the definition of "state" or "political subdivision" must await
further decisional analysis.
217 Snyder v. Crawford County Bid. of Elections, No. 75-0408, slip op at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5,
1975).
21 No. 75-0420 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 10, 1975).
219 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 145 (Page 1978).
220 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.19(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
221 Id. § 2743.19(C)(3).
222 The court's treatment of the issue of the system's status as an agency of the state is dictum.
The action was dismissed on the grounds that OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 145.09 (Page 1978)
constituted a prior consent to suit. No. 75-0420, slip op. at 4.
Although in a civil action between private parties the fact that a defendant is judgment proof
would not affect the jurisdiction of the court, the Court of Claims Act permits the collection of
judgments only by drawing a warrant on the fund appropriated to the entity named in the
judgment. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.19 (Page Supp. 1978). If the entity is not funded by the
state, the implicit conclusion is that the entity does not fall within the definition of "state" and thus
is not within the jurisdiction of the court of claims.
221 Claims that are subject to the court's removal jurisdiction do not fall within this
interpretation.
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5. Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims-What is "Prior
Consent to Suit"?
Naming the state as defendant in an action brought in the court of claims
does not insure that jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. The Act is
inapplicable "[t]o the extent that the state has previously consented to be
sued." 224 The Ohio General Assembly failed to specify which actions of the
state amount to prior consent to suit, thereby leaving the classification of this
issue to the judiciary. As yet, the courts have not fashioned a controlling
definition of prior consent to suit to aid practitioners.
There is case law pertinent to the general issue to which, at the date of this
writing, the court of claims has yet to refer. The United States Supreme Court
has declared: "The term 'suit' means the prosecution or pursuit of some claim,
demand, or request. In law language it is the prosecution of some demand in a
Court of iustice."2 5 The Ohio Supreme Court has concurred in that definition
by saying, "[a] 'suit' is the pursuit in a court of justice of the remedy to which
the party by reason of the existence of the supposed facts, believes himself to
be entitled." 2 6
This view of the meaning of suit is reinforced by a reference to the Ohio
Constitution, article I, section 16. That section requires the legislature to
provide the courts and the manner in which suits may be brought against the
state, making it clear what is required before "lack of consent" may be said to
have been removed. 227 The Ohio Supreme Court has not only frequently
declared that no consent to suit exists unless the legislature has executed article
I, section 16, but it also has determined that a state commission created to
consider claims against the state for damages due to construction activities of
the state "was not a 'court' nor was a prosecution of a claim before such a
commission in the nature of a 'suit' in a court of justice within [the] meaning"
of article I, section 16.228 These examples suggest a simple approach to
resolving the issue of whether prior consent to suit has been given: unless a
procedure is provided by which a party may prosecute an action against the
state in a court of justice, prior consent to suit cannot be said to exist, and the
court of claims jurisdiction attaches.
The court of claims has not employed such a simple approach in its
consideration of the consent to suit issue. It has faced the issue in three
situations: (1) where a statute provides for a judicial appeal from an
administrative finding to a court of common pleas; (2) where a statute
provides that the administrative determination is final and no appeal to a court
is permitted; and (3) where the party's only method of recovery is by way of
an extraordinary remedy. The court's treatment of these three situations has
been distinct.
224 OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
222 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 265, 407 (1821) (emphasis added).
226 Baltimore & Ohio HR. v. Larwill, 83 Ohio St. 108,116,93 N.E. 619,621 (1910) (emphasis
added).
227 See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
228 Raudabaugh v. State,26 Ohio Dec. 563 (C. P. Mercer County 1916), afi'd, 96 Ohio St. 513,
118 N.E. 102 (1917), error dismissed, 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
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a. Administrative Determination with Provision for Judicial Review
The court of claims has consistently and properly held that where the Ohio
Revised Code provides for an appeal to a court of common pleas by a party
adversely affected by a final determination of an administrative board, the
jurisdiction conferred by the Act does not attach. In Simko v. Treasurer,229
plaintiff sought recovery for an allegedly improper revocation of a liquor
license. The Department of Liquor Control had revoked plaintiff's license,
and upon administrative appeal the Liquor Control Commission affirmed.
Construing the provision of Ohio Revised Code section 119.12 which permits
an appeal of such decisions to a court of common pleas to equate with prior
consent to suit, the court found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the
claim.2 30
The court of appeals has utilized the same analysis on this issue. In a case
involving the denial of a license to a nursing home operator, the court of
claims, in Marshall Nursing Home v. Ackerman,"' found the right to appeal
conferred by section 119.12 to constitute prior consent to suit and dismissed
the action. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, stating that where a
statute provides a means for a judicial review of a departmental determina-
tion, it is the exclusive means of obtaining judicial relief . 22
The prior consent to suit clause of section 2743.02(A) of the Act most
clearly applies to this type of case. The exclusive power of the legislature
conferred by article I, section 16 has been executed by providing a court and
the manner in which suit may be brought. The manner provided may be
characterized as an administrative remedy required by. statute;21
nevertheless it satisfies the case law definition of "suit" and is thereby subject
to the limitation on court of claims jurisdiction. One who fails to exhaust that
remedy should not be heard to try to avoid its requirements or to try to obtain
alternate decisions in different forums by seeking relief in the court of claims
prior to exhaustion.2 34
b. Administrative Determination with No Right for
Judicial Review
A few cases have been filed involving situations where the General
229 No. 75-0351 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 20, 1975). An excellent analysis of the Ohio procedures for
judicial review of administrative decisions can be found in Note, Judicial Review of
Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 853 (1973).
230 No. 75-0351, slip op. at 3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 119 (Page 1978) is the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act. Section 119.12 provides for appeal by parties adversely affected
by any order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication. Section 119.01 further defines
"agency" and "adjudication."
3 1 3 Ohio Op. 3d 143 (10th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
32 Id. at 145. See also, e.g., Tyus v. Moritz, 52 Ohio App. 2d 143,368 N.E.2d 846 (10th Dist.
1976); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 52 Ohio App. 2d 271,369 N.E.2d 1056 (10th Dist.
1976).
233 See Eggers v. Moor, 162 Ohio St. 521, 124 N.E.2d 115 (1955). See also 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 20.01-.10 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
234 The parties must be subject to the jurisdiction of the administrative remedy procedures.
See Drain v. Kosydar, 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, 374 N.E.2d 253 (1978); Jones v. State, No. 77 AP-688
(Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 1,1977); Kearns v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health, No. 77-0462 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. Mar. 24,1978).
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Assembly has either provided no procedure for review of local administrative
decisions or has provided for a series of administrative hearings with no right
to appeal a final determination to a court of common pleas. An administrative
procedure of such a character does not satisfy the definition of suit offered
above and should not, therefore, be considered to be prior consent to suit. The
court of claims' treatment of the consent issue in the context of these cases has
been inconsistent.
In two illustrative cases the court found its jurisdiction to attach because no
right of judicial review existed. In Bealine Realty, Inc. v. State, 2 5 a lessor of
property leased to the Department of Liquor Control sought recovery of
damages for an alleged breach of the lease. Reviewing the statutes governing
the actions of the department, the court noted that "[n]o court other than the
Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County has jurisdiction of any action
against . . . the department of liquor control, to restrain the exercise of any
power or to compel the performance of any duty under Chapters 4301, and
4303, of the Revised Code."' 6 However, the statutes were construed as
inapplicable to an action for a breach of a lease, and no court was found to
have been given jurisdiction over such matters.2 17 Kady v. Peltier 2 8 involved
an alleged breach of contract by the Department of Commerce for failure to
pay plaintiff overtime as required by statute. The court concluded from a
review of the pertinent statute2 39 that there was no provision for an
administrative hearing or a judicial review of claims for overtime pay.240 Since
the state had provided no means for suing for overtime, the court decided that
jurisdiction attached.
The more interesting aspect of these cases is not that jurisdiction was
found by reference to whether a statutory right of review existed, but rather
the degree to which the court was willing to refine its analysis of the statutes. In
both cases the General Assembly had provided for either a direct suit in
common pleas court or a full administrative hearing procedure culminating in
a right to appeal to common pleas court in most areas of activity in which the
particular department was involved.2 41 However, no specific procedure or
right to suit was granted to cover the particular controversies in these cases,
and the court of claims correctly decided that the state had not conferred its
consent to be sued in such controversies.
But the court has not been consistent in inquiring whether the state has
given prior consent to suit in cases of this type. For example, in Lawrence v.
Ohio Bureau of Employment 242 the court denied jurisdiction in a claim where
plaintiff sought redress for an alleged improper two-day suspension. The
applicable statute provided for a full administrative hearing resulting in a
right to appeal to common pleas court, but only in cases of suspension of more
m No. 75-0318 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 19, 1975).
238 Id., slip op at 2, citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.10, 4301.31 (Page 1973).
23' No. 75-0318, slip op. at 3.
238 No. 76-0113 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 5, 1976).
239 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.04 (Page 1978).
240 No. 76-0113, slip op. at 4.
241 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.03 (Page 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1968);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.10 (Page 1973).
242 No. 75-0520-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 23, 1977).
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than five days.2 43 The court relied heavily upon an Ohio Supreme Court
opinion which had analyzed the statute and which had concluded that "a
complaint filed in the Common Pleas Court . . . seeking to test the legality
of an order . . . suspending such employee for five days or less does not state
a cause of action for which relief may be granted."244 The court concluded
from this that the legislature had preempted the field of employee
suspensions. In so doing, it ignored the essential point that the decision upon
which it relied was proper only prior to the Court of Claims Act waiver of
sovereign immunity.
The court's analysis in Lawrence is at best questionable. A claim arising out
of a suspension of employment is essentially an action for breach of a contract
of employment. The General Assembly, prior to consenting to be sued in the
court of claims, had chosen to limit its consent to cases in which a suspension
was for more than five days. This limited consent is no different from the
limited consent given, as noted in Bealine, to actions "in connection with the
execution of leases" 245 but not inclusive of actions for the breach of a lease.
Nor is it different from the consent to suit, referred to in Kady, in matters
concerning "reduction in pay or position, job abolishments, layoff, suspension
[of more than five days], discharge, assignment or reassignment to a new or
different position classification,"' 24 but not in matters concerning claims for
overtime pay. The fact that the legislature had refused to extend consent to
suit for suspensions of no longer than five days or had intended to occupy the
field of employee suspensions prior to the enactment of the Court of Claims
Act is now irrelevant. In creating the court of claims, the Act explicitly
declared that the court has jurisdiction over actions against the state unless it
had given prior consent to suit. The prior intention to limit actions against the
state is now displaced by the general consent to suit expressed in section
2743.02 of the Act.
The issue of when prior consent to suit exists has been given equally
unsatisfactory treatment by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of
appeals affirmed the court of claims' dismissal of a complaint alleging a
wrongful reduction of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 47 benefits
by the Department of Public Welfare in Bolin v. White.24 Properly reading
Ohio Revised Code section 5107.05 to limit the plaintiff to appellate
procedure within the Department of Public Welfare, the court of appeals then
concluded that "no provision has been made for judicial review of the welfare
questions set forth."2 49 Surprisingly, the court affirmed the dismissal on the
ground that to find jurisdiction would convert the court of claims into a court
243 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Page 1978).
244 Anderson v. Minter, 32 Ohio St. 2d 207, 212, 291 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1972). The court of
claims here seems to have confused lack of jurisdiction with failure to state a cause of action.
24' Bealine Realty, Inc. v. State, No. 75-0318, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 19, 1975), citing
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.10 (Page 1973).
246 Kady v. Peltier, No. 76-0113, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 5,1976), citing OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 124.03 (Page 1978).
247 See generally OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 5107 (Page 1970).
21' 51 Ohio App. 2d 92, 367 N.E.2d 63 (10th Dist. 1976), aff'g Bolin v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, No. 75-0435 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 16, 1975).
219 51 Ohio App. 2d at 95, 367 N.E.2d at 65.
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of appeals, which the court found to be outside the intention of the General
Assembly. 50
To conclude from an analysis of administrative remedies that the statutory
provision of those remedies does not constitute a right of judicial review is to
conclude that there exists no prior consent to suit. A full administrative
hearing does not satisfy the definition of "suit" developed previously in this
discussion.2 51 Furthermore, finding court of claims jurisdiction over actions
involving a reduction in welfare benefits would not, as the court of appeals
proclaimed, convert the court of claims into a court of appellate review. The
court of claims should not entertain an appeal but, rather, should conduct a
trial de novo. 252 No cause of action against the state would accrue for an
improper administrative action until the aggrieved party had exhausted the
procedures for administrative review of the alleged wrongful administrative
decision.25 3 Only at the point of exhaustion of the administrative avenues
would the claimant have the first opportunity to plead in a court of justice that
a wrong had been committed. We have already seen that the General
Assembly has consented to be sued to provide redress for such wrongs in the
courts of common pleas.25 In the Bolin case, the claimant had no such prior
existing right. If this is so, the only proper conclusion to be reached is that the
state has not previously consented to be sued over welfare benefits questions.
The court of claims should have found jurisdiction over the claim and then
proceeded to determine whether the plaintiff had stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
Where the General Assembly has not provided for judicial review of an
administrative action, the court of claims should not avoid the clear mandate
of the Act. Lack of prior consent to suit requires the court to exercise its
jurisdiction to determine the claim. To find that the legislature intended that
administrative review procedures occupy the field or are conclusive upon the
aggrieved party, and to base that finding upon pronouncements of the
legislature prior to the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, is to ignore the
intent of the legislature. If a party seeks relief from improper actions of the
state for which that party may not otherwise pursue a remedy in a court of
justice, the court of claims should take jurisdiction to determine whether a
cause of action has been pleaded.
c. Where Mandamus is the Only Prior Remedy
Whether the availability of an extraordinary suit, such as mandamus,
amounts to prior consent to suit is a question that the court of claims has had
great difficulty answering. The issue has arisen specifically in instances where
250 Id. The court also declared that welfare claims do not include rules of law applicable to
suits between private parties.
251 See notes 224-28 supra and accompanying text. The argument that a suit in a court of justice
is unnecessary because the claimant has been granted due process in the administrative hearings is
inapposite to the issue in these cases. An administrative hearing even with full due process
trappings is not the equivalent of a consent to suit.
252 The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act provides for a trial de novo in certain instances.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1978).
5 See notes 233-34 supra and accompanying text.
254 See notes 229-30 supra and accompanying text.
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state activity has resulted in a taking of or damage to private property.
Background of decisional and statutory law in the area of appropriation of
property to state use and eminent domain proceedings is necessary to clarify
the analysis which follows.
The Ohio Constitution, article I, section 19 delineates the power of
eminent domain by providing: "Where private property shall be taken for
public use, a compensation therefore shall first be made in money, or first
secured by a deposit of money; and such compensation shall be assessed by a
jury ... "255 Since this section is not self-executing,256 the Ohio General
Assembly has enacted several statutes to establish a procedure for
appropriation. 257 The pertinent statutes, reflecting the constitutional provi-
sion, require the state to first attempt to purchase the property.25 8 If an
agreement cannot be reached with the property owner, the public agency
may file a petition for appropriation with the proper court259 and may at the
same time deposit with the court an amount equal to the value of such
property plus any damage to the residence.260 Upon such deposit, the agency
may take possession and enter the land.261
After the deposit has been made or the petition has been filed, the
landowner may elect to contest the stipulated value.262 The jurisdiction of the
court in such proceedings is limited to a determination of damages.263 Any
issue concerning the authority or propriety of the action by the state must be
raised by way of a prayer for injunction in a separate action.26 4 The landowner
is entitled to a jury determination of just compensation. 26
Such proceedings are required only where there has been a taking of
private property for public use.266 Since the constitutional provision has been
the only available means of redress prior to the enactment of the Court of
Claims Act, it has been broadly construed. For example, a physical taking of
the property by dispossession need not be established.267 "Any substantial
255 OHIO CoNsT. art. I, § 16.
2-6 Watson v. Trustees of Pleasant Township, 21 Ohio St. 667 (1871); McArthur v. Kelly, 5 Ohio
140 (1831).
257 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 163 (Page 1978); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 5519 (Page 1970 &
Supp. 1973) (procedure for appropriation by the state). For procedures for appropriation by
other governmental entities, see Annotation to OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 (Page 1955& Supp. 1978).
258 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.04 (Page Supp. 1978).
25' Id. § 163.05. The statutes grant jurisdiction over appropriation actions to both common
pleas and probate courts. Id. § 163.01(B). Only the court of common pleas will be referred to in
the text.
2-0 Id. § 163.06.
261 Id. If the purpose for which the land is appropriated is the making or repairing of public
roads, structures on the land may be appropriated. Id. § 163.06(B). For all other purposes, the
right of possession upon deposit does not extend to structures. Id. § 163.06(A).
282 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 163.08,163.09 (Page 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page
1970).
'63 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.09 (Page 1978); Thormyer v. Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276,164 N.E.2d
420 (1960).
'4 City of Worthington v. Carskadon, 18 Ohio St. 2d 222, 249 N.E.2d 38 (1969); Preston v.
Weiler, 175 Ohio St. 107, 191 N.E.2d 832 (1963).
265 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.09 (Page 1978).
66 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
267 Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 142, 16 N.E.2d 310, 317 (1938).
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interference with the elemental rights growing out of ownership of private
property is considered a taking."26 The interference need not be absolute or
permanent.2 69 A temporary deprivation of any valuable use is a taking pro
tanto.270
When a taking has been accomplished and an action for appropriation has
been commenced, the court's jurisdiction includes the determination by the
jury of all damages, consequential damages as well as direct ones.2 71
However, where no taking has been established, a landowner claiming an
injury which is merely consequential to the taking of another's property is
without a remedy; the loss is deemed damnum absque injuria.272
The significant disadvantage to the landowner under these statutes, aside
from the lack of a remedy for mere consequential injury, is that only the state
is empowered to initiate the proceedings. Where the state fails to take the
appropriate legal action, the landowner must seek mandamus to compel the
state to perform its duty.2 7 3
On numerous occasions landowners alleging that the state has taken or
damaged property without first appropriating the property have sought
jurisdiction in the court of claims without first having sought to obtain a writ of
mandamus. Early decisions by the court of claims consistently denied
jurisdiction over the action. Two of those decisions will serve as illustrations.
Plaintiff sought recovery in two causes of action against the defendant in
Claycraft Co. v. Ohio Department of Transportation.2 7 4 The first cause of
action alleged negligence during highway construction which resulted in
consequential injury to plaintiff's property. The second cause of action sought
compensation for the taking of plaintiff's septic tank easement located on
another person's property. The latter property previously had been ap-
propriated by the state. The court dismissed both causes of action on
the grounds that the only recovery permitted to a landowner is for damages
arising from a taking, that appropriation could have been accomplished
268 Id. Paragraph one of the syllabus declares: "any taking, whether it be physical or merely
deprives the owner of an intangible interest appurtenant to the premises, entitles the owner to
compensation." Id. at 135, 16 N.E.2d at 310 (syllabus para. no. 1).
269 City of Mansfield v. Balliet, 65 Ohio St. 451, 471, 63 N.E. 86, 106 (1902).
270 E.g., State ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154,209 N.E.2d405 (1965) (low
and frequent airflights over property); Prestonv. Weiler, 175 Ohio St. 107,191 N.E.2d 832 (1963)
(change of street grade which impairs access to the road from adjacent lot); Lucas v. Carney, 167
Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958) (surface water flooding); McKay v. Kauer, 156 Ohio St. 347,
102 N.E.2d 703 (1951) (surface water flooding); City of Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169,190
N.E. 387 (1934) (percolating water); City of Norwood v. Sheen, 126 Ohio St. 482, 186 N.E. 102
(1933) (sewage overflow); Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166,64 N.E.
141 (1902) (telephone pole installation); City of Mansfield v. Balliet, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86
(1902) (sewage overflow). See Masley v. City of Lorain, 48 Ohio St. 2d 334,336,358 N.E.2d 596,
598 (1976) (telephone pole installation). But see Huelsman v. Department of Transp., 56 Ohio
App. 2d 100,381 N.E.2d 950 (10th Dist. 1977) (holding no cause of action for damage due to loss
of percolating water).
271 City of Cincinnati v. Schuller, 160 Ohio St. 95, 113 N.E.2d 353 (1953); Grant v. Village of
Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St. 167, 65 N.E. 891 (1902).
272 Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938). See also State ex rel. Fejes v.
City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47,213 N.E.2d353 (1966) (vibrations from construction equipment);
McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964) (odor from sewage plant).
273 Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 303, 175 N.E.2d 725 (1961).
271 No. 75-0394 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5, 1975).
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through mandamus proceedings, and that article I, section 19 of the
constitution requires the assessment of compensation be performed by a
jury.275
Further evidence of the court's reluctance to take jurisdiction in claims of
this nature is present in Lehner v. State.276 There, the plaintiff alleged a
continuing nuisance in runoff from a salt storage box caused her land to be
rendered unusable for the production of crops. The box had been constructed
by the state on highway property. The court construed article I, section 19 to
limit the right of compensation for injury to land to those cases in which a
taking could be established. 277 Upon the assumption that a pro tanto taking
could be found, the court declared, as it did in Claycraft, that mandamus
amounted to a prior consent to suit and dismissed the action despite the fact
that it sounded in tort.
Thus the early jurisprudence of the court of claims resulted in three
reasons for refusal of jurisdiction over claims raising allegations of injury to
private property. The first reason was that article I, section 19 was found to be
the exclusive basis for an action claiming injury to property. Mere injury that
does not constitute a taking, pro tanto or otherwise, is damnum absque injuria.
Second, the court concluded that where a taking of any sort could be
established, the statutory procedures would be the exclusive manner of relief,
and mandamus as the means of enforcing those procedures would constitute
prior consent to suit. Finally, as an alternative ground for dismissal, the court
has interpreted the jury requirement of article I, section 19 to be mandatory,
and thus an action before a judge in lieu of appropriation proceedings would
be unconstitutional.
A suggestion of change in the court's reasoning crept in by way of dictum
in Graber v. Jackson.278 In that case plaintiff alleged that the construction of a
highway caused a great amount of silt to flow into and fill up a lake located on
plaintiff's property. Plaintiff asserted that the state was negligent in the
construction. The court was consistent with the earlier decisions in holding
that whenever a taking can be established, the statutory proceedings for an
appropriation action provide the exclusive remedy and can be enforced only
by the employment of mandamus. However, the court also correctly
suggested that where a mere consequential injury to property has occurred,
no prior consent to suit exists and the court of claims would then have
jurisdiction.27 9
The dictum of Graber became the holding of GottemoeUer v. Ohio
Department of Transportation.2 10 Plaintiff claimed that weed spray,
275 See also Johnson v. Jackson, No. 76-0410 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 4, 1976); Lemaster v. Jackson,
No. 75-0364 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 11, 1975); Hairston v. State, No. 75-0326 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 18,
1975).
276 No. 75-0549 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Jan. 13, 1976).
277 Id., slip op. at 3. In this series of cases the court continually asserted that since article I,
section 19 of the Ohio Constitution provides for compensation only where there exists a taking, no
action lies for mere damage to property. The court incorrectly read article I, section 19 as
prohibitive and exclusive rather than as a remedial right. See notes 282-83 infra and
accompanying text.
2" No. 76-0316 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 9, 1976).
279 Id., slip op. at 6 (dictum).
2'0 No. 75-0431 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 24, 1976).
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negligently applied along the roadside by defendant, drifted onto his garden,
killed his plants and thereby caused him fifty dollars in damages. In finding
jurisdiction over the claim, the court fully retreated from the reasoning of its
earlier decisions. The previous jurisprudence of the court had improperly
relied upon Ohio Supreme Court decisions handed down prior to enactment
of the Court of Claims Act to declare that mere consequential injury to
property was damnum absque injuria.281 The supreme court had firmly
established, under the conditions of sovereign immunity, that the right to
compensation under the constitution did not extend to cases where the
property had been injured but not taken.2 82 But the basis for that principle of
decision, article I, section 19, had not barred an action for damages; it merely
failed to provide compensation whenever property was merely injured.
Sovereign immunity barred the cause of action. Since the Court of Claims Act
waived immunity, a tort action for injury to property caused by state activity
exists independent of a taking.283
The court of claims analysis of the consent to suit issue has frequently been
flawed by the conclusion that the availability of mandamus constitutes prior
consent to suit.28 4 Prior to the enactment of the Court of Claims Act the Ohio
Supreme Court held in several cases that mandamus against a state officer is
not a suit against the state within the purview of article 1, section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution. 28 The reasoning behind those holdings is that as soon as a state
281 State ex rel. Fejes v. City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47,51-52,213 N.E.2d 353,355-56 (1966);
McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 284, 199 N.E.2d 592, 594 (1964).
282 McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 284, 286, 199 N.E.2d 592, 594, 596 (1964).
283 In such actions the constitution does not entitle the plaintiff to a trial by jury. During the
1912 constitutional debate, critics of the amendment of article I, section 16 stated: "If this door is
thrown open it will be a great expense to the state. The case will have to be tried by
juries . . . and the idea will be that 'The state has a lot of money and we will make the state
pay.' "2 PaOCEEINcs AND DEBATES OF TIE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF Omo
1919 (1912). See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Broeder, The
University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Nm. L. REv. 744 (1959); Claims, supra note 2, at 495-98.
The Ohio constitutional requirement of article I, section 5 that "the right of trial by jury shall
be inviolate" has been interpreted to provide the right only as it existed at common law prior to
the adoption of the constitution. Belding v. State ex tel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301
(1929). Thus, the absence of a jury in the court of claims would not be unconstitutional. Claims,
supra note 2, at 495.
284 E.g., Johnson v. Jackson, No. 75-0410, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 4, 1976); Graber v.
Jackson, No. 76-0316, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 9,1976); Lehner v. State, No. 75-0549, slip op.
at 2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Jan. 13,1976); J.P. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0396,
slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 10,1975), af 'd, 51 Ohio App. 2d 83,367 N.E.2d 54 (10th Dist. 1976);
Lemaster v. Jackson, No. 75-0364, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 11, 1975); Claycraft Co. v. B.G.
Danis Co., No. 75-0394, slip op. at 9 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5, 1975); Edmisten v. Department of
Transp., No. 75-0199, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 2, 1975). Contra, Kermetz v. Cook-Johnson
Realty Corp., 54 Ohio App. 2d 220, 376 N.E.2d 1357 (10th Dist. 1977); State exrel. Edmisten v.
Jackson, No. 75 AP-557 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 1, 1976).
One other flaw in the court's analysis is that it reads Ohio Revised Code section 163.03 as
constituting a prior consent to suit. Section 163.03 provides that "damages are recoverable by civil
action to which the state or agency hereby consents." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.03 (Page 1978).
The court fails to note that this consent applies only to actions for damages resulting from entry
upon lands for the purpose of making "surveys, soundings, drillings, appraisals and examinations
as are necessary and proper" under Ohio Revised Code chapter 163. The court should restrict its
application of section 163.03 to actions for damages resulting from a privileged trespass by a state
agency in its preliminary studies prior to appropriation.
215 State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203, 181 N.E.2d 31 (1962); State ex tel. Nichols
v. Gregory, 130 Ohio St. 165, 198 N.E. 182 (1935) (true even though the state is the real party in
interest); see Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390,411 (1886); see generally State ex
rel. Ferguson v. Shoemaker, 45 Ohio App. 2d 83, 341 N.E.2d 311 (10th Dist. 1975).
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activity results in a taking, the duty then arises on the part of the officer in
charge of the activity to initiate the appropriate proceedings. A mandamus
action lies to compel the performance of that duty and is brought against the
officer, not against the state. 26 The litigation then does not constitute a suit
against the state.28 7 The court of claims analysis of this issue, in light of this
prior case law, is extremely weak.
Another approach employed by the court of claims involves a certain
measure of circular reasoning. It is founded upon the orthodox requirement
that since mandamus is an extraordinary writ, the writ will not issue unless
there is no adequate remedy at law.2 11 In order to reach a conclusion of no
jurisdiction the court of claims must first find that prior consent to suit has been
given. In order to find that prior consent to suit is present, the writ of
mandamus must lie. If there is an adequate remedy at law through the court of
claims, the writ would not properly lie. The court then concludes that the
Court of Claims Act is not an adequate remedy at law because the constitution
requires that compensation for a taking "shall be assessed by a jury. "289 The
court interprets this latter provision to mean that the right to jury trial may not
be waived in such cases. Since section 2743.17 of the Act precludes the use of a
jury in action against the state, the court bases its conclusion that the Act is not
an adequate remedy at law upon that section.290 Aside from the obvious
circularity of such reasoning, it contains the further critical flaw of failing to
recognize that a jury trial may be waived. 291 Conventional practice in all other
phases of our legal system demonstrate that the right may be waived. The
non-availability of a jury in the court of claims should not compel the
conclusion that if someone seeks redress against the state subject to the
limitations on the waiver of immunity, the process would be unconstitutional
and thereby inadequate.
An illustration of how an injured party can become trapped in the circular
rationale surrounding this issue is provided by Edmisten v. Ohio Department
of Transportation292 and State ex rel. Edmisten v. Jackson.2 93 Plaintiff
complained of an interference with her rights of ingress and egress to her
property by a project of the department, carried out pursuant to a contract
with the Village of Williamsburg. The project was for the purpose of changing
the grade of the street which abutted plaintiff's property. Plaintiff first sued the
state and the village for money damages in a court of common pleas. The
286 Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390, 411 (1886).
287 Id.
288 See Morgan v. Canary, 44 Ohio App. 2d 29, 335 N.E.2d 883 (10th Dist. 1975).
289 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
290 E.g., Johnson v. Jackson, No. 76-0410, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 4, 1976); Graber v.
Jackson, No. 76-0316, slip op. at5 (Ohio Ct. CI. July 9,1976); Lehnerv. State, No. 75-0549, slip op.
at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Jan. 13,1976); J.P. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0396,
slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 10,1975), aff'don other grounds, 51 Ohio App. 2d 83,367 N.E.2d 54
(10th Dist. 1976); Lemaster v. Jackson, No. 75-0364, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 11, 1975);
Claycraft Co. v. B.G. Danis Co., No. 75-0394, slip op. at 9 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 5,1975); Edmisten v.
Department of Transp., No. 75-0199, slip op. at 4,5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 2,1975). Contra, Kermetz
v. Cook-Johnson Realty Corp., 54 Ohio App. 2d 220, 376 N.E.2d 1357 (10th Dist. 1977).
211 City of Cincinnati v. Bassert Mach. Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 76,79,243 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1968);
Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 19, 231 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1967).
292 No. 75-0199 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 2, 1975).
213 No. 75 AP-557 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 7, 1976).
19791
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
court properly dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff then sought
relief from the Sundry Claims Board. As required, the action was refiled in the
court of claims.2 94 The court of claims dismissed the action by characterizing
an action in mandamus to compel the Director of the Department of
Transportation to institute appropriation proceedings as a prior consent to
suit.2 95 Plaintiff dutifully sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District
Court of Appeals. 296 The court of appeals denied the writ on the basis that an
action in the court of claims constituted an adequate remedy at law.297 The
court concluded that plaintiff's proper remedy was in the court of claims and
that her mistake was not appealing the dismissal from that court.29 8
The circle was broken by the incisive decision of the court of appeals in
Kermetz v. Cook-Johnson Realty Corp.299 The state was sued through third-
party practice for negligently permitting the City of Youngstown to engage in
the construction of a water main which interfered with a sewer system
constructed by the third-party plaintiff resulting in damage to the home of the
original plaintiff. The court of claims dismissed the action on the basis of its
now familiar precedents. The court of appeals seized the opportunity to
eliminate the conflict in its own decisions and to expand upon its holding in
State ex rel. Edmisten v. Jackson.300 The court rejected the court of claims'
analysis that mandamus is a prior remedy and that the right to a jury cannot be
waived. In its conclusion, the court of appeals laid out an orderly set of
procedures to be followed. Where there has been a physical taking or a pro
tanto taking, the property owner may bring an action in the court of claims; by
so doing the claimant waives the right to a jury assessment of damages.301 In
the alternative, the property owner seeking an assessment by a jury may bring
an original action in mandamus when a clear legal duty of a state official can be
shown to exist.30 2 The plaintiff's desire for a jury determination of
compensation prevents the possible action in the court of claims from being
viewed as an adequate remedy at law.
The Kermetz decision, in conjunction with the court of claims decision in
Gottemoeller, should settle most questions concerning the jurisdiction of the
court of claims over actions involving injury to private property. Where the
state official recognizes the liability of the agency for a taking of private
property and commences proceedings in a court of common pleas for the
appropriation of the property, the landowner has no claim for further relief.
The appropriation proceedings permit the landowner to be compensated for
all direct and consequential injuries resulting from activities of the state.303
294 See Act of June 27, 1974 § 3, 135 Ohio Laws 869, 883 (1974).
295 No. 75-0199, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 2, 1975).
296 State ex rel. Edmisten v. Jackson, No. 75 AP-557 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 7, 1976).
297 Id., slip op. at 4.
291 Id. at 5.
299 54 Ohio App. 2d 220, 376 N.E.2d 1357 (10th Dist. 1977).
300 The court sought to clarify its opinions in State ex rel. Nicholson v. Jackson, 54 Ohio App.
2d 215,377 N.E.2d 523 (10th Dist. 1977) and J.P. Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 51 Ohio App. 2d 83,
367 N.E.2d 54 (10th Dist. 1976).
301 54 Ohio App. 2d at 227, 376 N.E.2d at 1362.
302 Id. at 227-28, 376 N.E.2d at 1362.
303 City of Cincinnati v. Schuller, 160 Ohio St. 95, 113 N.E.2d 353 (1953); Grant v. Village of
Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St. 167, 179, 65 N.E. 891, 904 (1902).
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The court of claims has correctly reasoned, in denying "second thought"
actions,30 4 that to permit an action in the court of claims subsequent to the
completion of a proceeding for appropriation would run counter to the policy
of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.
A landowner has alternative remedies in the situation where the state
official disagrees that state activity has not amounted to a taking. One remedy
is to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the initiation of appropriation
proceedings. By taking this course of action, the landowner would preserve
the entitlement to a jury determination of damages, but not without incurring
some risk. The risk of the mandamus remedy is that the request will be denied
if the injury complained of does not at least amount to a pro tanto taking. This
is true even though the Ohio courts have taken a liberal view of what
constitutes a taking.305 The landowner must establish at minimum a
temporary deprivation of an intangible interest appurtenant to his premises
before mandamus will lie.306 If this minimum is satisfied, compensation for all
injury consequential to the activity complained of can be assessed .30 Where
the owner is able only to claim injury consequential to the taking of another's
property, mandamus will be denied.3 0 8 In the latter instance, the landowner
would be well-advised to select the alternative remedy.
An action brought in the court of claims would avoid the pitfall that the
injury complained of does not amount to a taking. As demonstrated in the
Gottemoeller case, the court of claims will take jurisdiction over tortious
injury to property without more being required. The corresponding
disadvantage to the landowner in the court of claims action, however, is the
waiver of jury assessment and a possible consequence that the value lost will
be assessed lower than it would have been by a jury of peers.30 9 If this
presumption is true, the landowner must balance the chances that the injury
does not constitute a taking against the possibilities that a trial to the court of
claims judge may act as a restraining factor on the determination of
compensation.
III. TORT CLAIMs IN Omo-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
One fundamental limitation on the abrogation of sovereign immunity has
been retained in virtually all jurisdictions which have waived the doctrine: the
courts recognize that among the totality of governmental activities some
should not subject the governmental unit to liability in tort regardless of the
otherwise tortious character or effect of the activity in a given case. Because
this limitation requires the courts employing it to establish boundaries of
governmental liability which a general and unlimited statutory waiver of
immunity would not on its face suggest, it is necessarily incumbent upon the
304 Barr v. State, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 111, 114 (Ct. CI. 1975). See De Czege v. State, No. 75-0111
(Ohio Ct. CI. Apr. 21, 1975).
30 Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 142, 16 N.E.2d 310, 317 (1938).
30 State ex rel. Fejes v. City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E.2d 353 (1964).
307 Grant v. Village of Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St. 167, 178-80, 65 N.E. 891, 895 (1902).
308 See State ex tel. Fejes v. City of Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E.2d 353 (1964).
309 See note 283 supra.
1979]
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
judiciary to interpret the "liability clauses" ol such statutes. Those
interpretations have taken the form of various doctrines which will be
examined in this section: (1) the discretionary function exception; (2) the
planning-operational distinction; (3) the policy formulation test; (4) the no
private counterpart or uniquely governmental function test; (5) the no
common law duty rule; and (6) the ultra vires act exception.
The language which the Ohio General Assembly chose to express the
abrogation of sovereign immunity in this state is quite similar to language
employed in other jurisdictions for the same purpose. Ohio has consented "to
have its liability determined . . . in accordance with the same rules of law
applicable to suits between private parties .... .310 The State of New York
declared that the state's liability is to be "determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals
or corporations. ... 311 The United States is liable in tort claims "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances . 3.."312 Interpretations of these and similar clauses, utilizing
the various doctrines listed in the previous paragraph to carry out the
fundamental limitation on liability mentioned earlier, have produced layers
of judicial confusion and contradiction. The Ohio Court of Claims has had a
rather difficult time in attempting to establish principles for decision in this
area. Being relatively new and inexperienced and still at experimental stages
in its jurisprudence, it has found itself struggling among those layers of
confusion and contradiction.
Interpreting the liability clause of the state's waiver of immunity has
proved to be particularly troublesome for the court of claims. The court has
sought guidance from decisions of state and federal courts in the search for a
suitable test of liability of the state. The principles adopted by the court are
best understood with reference to the development of federal tort liability
and interpretations of liability clauses utilized by other jurisdictions.
B. Federal Interpretations of the "Liability" Clause
of the Federal Tort Claims Act
1. The No Private Counterpart Doctrine
The first widely accepted delineation of the United States' liability for
tortious government activities was pronounced by the United States Supreme
Court in Feres v. United States.313 In a negligence action to recover damages
for the death of a United States serviceman who had died in a barracks fire,
Feres' executrix alleged first that the Army knew or should have known that a
defective heating system caused the barracks to be unsafe and second that the
soldiers assigned to the fire guard and their supervisors failed to exercise due
care in conducting the fire watch.314
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the action on the ground that
10 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
-11 N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
312 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
313 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
314 Id. at 147.
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the decedent's representative could not point to a case where a private
individual's liability would be even remotely analogous to that sought against
the Army. Soldiers have never been permitted recovery in any jurisdiction for
the negligent act of their comrades or superiors, and no new cause of action
had been created by the Tort Claims Act. Since private individuals do not
have the power to conscript an army, there could be no liability of a private
individual to provide an analog for the plaintiff's claim. The Court thus
adopted a narrow construction of the words "the United States shall be
liable . . . in the same manner . . . as a private individual under like
circumstances .... "315 essentially reading the phrase "under like cir-
cumstances" to mean "under the same circumstances."
Reasoning further, the Court said that if any analogy were possible at all, it
would be to state militia, and state militia were immune from tort liability. To
reach the opposite result and find liability would require the Court to draw a
parallel between the Army and a private landlord.31 Such a parallel was not
acceptable to the Court because it would ignore the peculiar relational status
of the parties and would require the selective consideration of less than all of
the circumstances of the case. That kind of selectivity would produce "novel
and unprecedented liabilities" 3 17 to be visited upon the government, an effect
clearly beyond the ken of Congress. Thus the principle was born which
maintained the immunity of the United States when it was engaged in an
activity for which there was no counterpart in the private sector. This
principle for decision was widely approved and followed,3 18 but the Court
soon had an opportunity to reconsider the interpretation of the liability
clause established in Feres.
315 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
310 340 U.S. at 141-42. One of the "circumstances" which was considered by the Court was the
serviceman-government relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor. The Court
observed that if this relationship were ignored, analogous private liability would be found. For
instance, there could be liability for negligence in the civilian doctor-patient relationship or for
latent defects in a landlord-tenant relationship. Since the plaintiff had produced no cases in which
the federal government or a state had been found liable to servicemen or militiamen, the Court
concluded that no analogous private liability could be found under all the circumstances. Id. The
Court thus seems to disregard the statutory requirement that the government be treated "as a
private person" for the purposes of tort liability.
317 Id. at 142. This phraseology has found its way into other federal opinions but is now
contrary to the prevailing view. See Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955),
discussed in text accompanying notes 319-24 infra, where the government argued that when the
activity itself was uniquely governmental, there would be no liability for negligent performance
of the activity.
A hypothetical situation was posited by the Court to illustrate the bizarre result that could
obtain from this approach. Suppose the chief petty officer negligently ran over a pedestrian on his
way to the lighthouse. Once there, he tripped over a wire and injured someone else. He then failed
to inspect an outside electrical connection which failed and caused a ship to run aground. On his
way out, the officer touched a key to an uninsulated wire and caused a fire. Under the "analogous
private activity" argument, the government would be liable for some of these acts and not others,
and yet all were done in furtherance of the officer's duties. The Court concluded that Congress
could not have intended such a result. 340 U.S. at 66-67. See also Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315 (1957).
31' See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Henning v. United States, 446
F.2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1971); Levin v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1975); Graham v.
Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966); Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579,167 N.E.2d 63,
200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Polishuk v. Beavin, 223 Tenn. 287,444 S.W.2d 140 (1969). Butsee United
States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
1979]
45Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
2. "Like Circumstances Means Like Circumstances"-
The Indian Towing Standard
In 1955 a towing company's tugboat was moving a barge loaded with
phosphate up the Mississippi River when it ran aground on an island upon
which the Coast Guard operated a lighthouse. The grounding caused water to
enter the barge and destroy the phosphate. The towing company brought an
action in Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States,31 9 claiming that the barge went
aground because the Coast Guard was negligent in maintaining the
lighthouse, thereby causing the light to fail, and that the Coast Guard
negligently failed to warn of the lighthouse inoperation.
The government strongly asserted, on the authority of Feres, that the
Coast Guard was performing a "uniquely governmental function" 320 and that
there could be no liability in the absence of analogous private activity.
Persuaded by this argument, the trial court had dismissed the action, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had affirmed.
The Supreme Court, limiting the application of the Fetes rationale,
reversed and remanded to the District Court. Writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter sharply criticized such a narrow construction of the liability
clause of the Federal Tort Claims Act. He recognized that the government's
construction changed the meaning of the liability clause from
"liability . . . under like circumstances . . ." to "liability under the same
circumstances;" 32' under like circumstances one who initiates a service to
warn the public of danger and induces the public to rely upon the warning
must perform the service in a non-negligent manner. To analogize the status
of the United States to that of a municipal corporation or other governmental
entity rather than a private individual would force federal courts to enter "the
'non-governmental'-'governmental' quagmire that has long plagued the law
of municipal corporations. '" 322 He rejected the Fetes test (essentially the "non-
governmental-governmental" test) as unworkable and firmly established the
standard of liability of the United States as like that of a private individual.
Speaking to the duty issue in the case, Justice Frankfurter said that
ordinary "hornbook" tort law would apply. Since the Coast Guard undertook
the function of warning people of dangers and encouraged reliance upon such
warnings by operating the lighthouse, it assumed a duty to maintain the
lighthouse with ordinary care or to warn of malfunctions.
The Indian Towing decision was not, however, a complete rejection of the
Fetes test. Distinguishing the cases, the Supreme Court ruled that Fetes
applied only to suits involving United States servicemen because federal law
is the sole authority by which the relationship of military personnel and the
federal government could be described.3 3 Thus Feres remains good
319 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
320 Id. at 64.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 65. Viewing decisions from all states on the issue of municipal liability, the Court
found the conflicts in the law, both interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional, to be irreconcilable.
The Court concluded that the "non-governmental-governmental" distinction was inherently
unsound.
323 Id. at 69. Interpreting the language of the liability clause to mean what the words seem to
plainly say, i.e., private individuals under like circumstances, the Federal Tort Claims Act
eliminates any need to rely upon the "non-governmental-governmental" distinction. However,
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precedent in a very limited area of federal law, but the decision in Indian
Towing displaced it as the dominant pronouncement upon the liability clause
of the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 24
C. The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act
1. The Reasons for Discretionary Immunity
Section 2680 of the Federal Tort Claims Act states that the Act shall have
no application to: "Any claim based upon . . . the performance or failure
to . . . perform a discretionary function . . . [by government employees],
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."32 While legislative history
on the exception is somewhat sparse, there is some evidence of the basis for
setting aside discretionary functions from the general imposition of liability
under the Act.
According to House Report Number 1287,326 the discretionary function
exception was intended to preclude tort actions arising from certain
authorized activities such as flood control or irrigation projects, when no
negligence on the part of government employees could be shown and when
the only ground for recovery would be that the same conduct by private
individuals would be tortious. 327 For example, in the management of a stream
bed in the interest of the public generally, the government operations may at
times result in injury to a private landowner; the exception precludes the
landowner from bringing a civil action in tort contesting the validity of the
governmental action.328 The exception amounts to a pronouncement of
the Court distinguished Indian Towing from Feres, ruling that the Feres test of liability is
applicable only to United States servicemen injured while performing acts in the course of or
incident to their service. Id. Cf. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (allowing recovery
under the Tort Claims Act even though the negligent act was not related to the serviceman's
military duty).
314 For an interesting application of the Indian Towing reasoning to an activity of a solely
"governmental" nature, see United States v. Gavaghan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960), in which
liability was imposed upon the government for the negligence of employees of the Rescue
Coordination Center in conducting a coordinated land-sea-air rescue under the National Search
and Rescue Plan.
'21 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See generally 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 233, §§ 25.08-.13; D.
SWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 13.107 (1970); James, The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an
Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957); Johnson, Federal Tort Claims Act-A
Substantive Survey, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 65 (1971); Reynolds, The Discretionary Function
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968); Comment, Federal Tort Claims
Act: Discretionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976); 45 U. CIN. L.
REV. 157 (1976).
32 H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945). The text of this report is set out in
Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 n.133
(1946). Gottlieb suggested that the discretionary function exception was intended to distinguish
between the act of the government "qua government" and those of a proprietary nature.
However, the governmental-proprietary approach has not been adopted. See notes 322-23 supra.
327 H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
321 See Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950). In Coates, the plaintiffs alleged
damage to their lands from an unusual overflow of the Missouri River. This overflow was alleged
to result from the federal government's program for control and development of the river. The
court dismissed, holding that the discretionary function exception was intended to foreclose
actions based upon an authorized activity such as flood control or irrigation when no negligence
on the part of the government was shown. There would be grounds for recovery only if the same
conduct by a private party would be tortious. Id. at 820.
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governmental privilege to act, even in the face of injury that might otherwise
be described as tortious.3 29 If the privilege were based solely upon common
law principles, the injured party would generally be able to overcome the
privilege upon proving that the discretion had been abused by the
defendant.330 The language of the section, however, forecloses that stralegy
from being employed, thereby preserving a vestige of sovereign immunity in
the law.
The root of discretionary immunity thus employed is the principle of
separation of powers, which is of primary importance in our constitutional
system of government.3 31 In fundamental analysis, the responsibility for basic
policy formulation and implementation has been committed in our tripartite
system to the legislative and executive branches of government. The judiciary
most certainly is closely involved in its role of defining and guarding the
statutory and constitutional boundaries inside which those formulations and
implementations must remain, but the courts have also been diligent to avoid
incursions into those areas of responsibility in ways which would tend to
cripple the effectiveness of coordinate branches of government.332
When those coordinate branches have dictated the course of official action
through statute or regulation and public employees act in accordance with the
judgment embodied in those dictates, actions in tort are thought to be an
inappropriate manner in which to challenge the validity of the official
conduct.33 The belief is that the legislative or executive choices between
alternate courses of conduct should be controlled by considerations of social,
political and economic factors, not by the potential for private damage
suits.M4
329 A second example was suggested in the House Report. Regulatory agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission, are often empowered to exercise discretion in the choice
between alternative courses of action. In the issuance of a stop order to a business for alleged
violations of law, for instance, the SEC assumes a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial character. An
order may subsequently be held invalid, either on the grounds that the agency abused its
discretion or because the order was negligently based upon inaccurate information. The
discretionary function exception would apply, according to the House Report, to preclude an
action brought by the business for loss of profits during the shutdown period. H.R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
'30 See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRtTs § 890 & Comments (1979).
3' Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 HAev. L.
REv. 488, 498 (1953). This commentary reviewed various factors which have been considered in
the judicial application of the exception, such as the language of the statutes under which
government employees act, the type of discretion which is exercised, the position of the
employee in the governmental hierarchy, the encouraging influence of a finding of liability on
future damage actions and the uniquely governmental nature of a given activity. Id. at 492-98.
The authors suggested that much of the reluctance in judicial applications of the exception has
resulted from the overemphasis of one or more of these factors in many cases. However, the note
concluded that the one guiding principle behind these factors was the traditional notion of the
separation of powers. Id. at 498.
332 Id. The discretionary function exception sought to reinforce the legal doctrine developed
prior to the passage of the Tort Claims Act whereby the courts "scrupulously refrained from
unwarranted interference with the legislative and executive departments of government."
33 See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 233, § 25.11.
331 Id.; Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 488, 492-98 (1953); Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act: The Discretionary Function
Exception Revisited, 31 U. MiAMi L. REv. 161, 188-90 (1976). See also Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782,793,794 n.8, 447
P.2d 352, 360, 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248, 249 n.8 (1968).
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This framework of thought should be kept in mind in the following review
of interpretations of the discretionary function exception that have been
rendered by the federal courts. In the evolution of the federal approach to this
provision, several significantly different views of discretionary immunity have
been employed. The success of each has depended upon its relative
correlation to the policy underpinnings of the exception.
2. Discretionary Acts of Government-The Federal Rejection
of the Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
Shortly after the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act two familiar
concepts were suggested as modes of interpretation of the discretionary
function exception. 335 The first was the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion,336 which had long been employed to test the extent of local government
liability.337 The other was the distinction between ministerial, or mandatory,
functions of public officials and those which required the exercise of
discretion. The latter approach is generally taken to determine whether a writ
of mandamus will lie against a public officer.3 8 It was believed that one of
these approaches would be employed in interpreting the Federal Tort Claims
3 Gottlieb, supra note 326.
3-1 Id. at 42. The author mentioned the governmental-proprietary distinction in relation to the
flood control example used in House Report 1284. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1945), discussed in text accompanying notes 326, 327, 329 supra. According to Gottlieb, the
exception would preclude action based on the appropriation of private lands when no negligence
on the part of government employees was shown. In such cases, the plaintiff would have to resort
to the historic demand for just compensation under the fifth amendment, and recovery for
remote or consequential damages would be disallowed. Gottlieb, supra note 326, at 42-43.
Although the governmental-proprietary distinction has not been adopted, the federal courts have
uniformly denied recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act in appropriation cases. See Coates
v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950) (denial of recovery for water damage allegedly
caused by negligent placement of dikes). But see Jemison v. Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala.
1958) (recovery allowed when government engineers drafted plans for dredging of river in
negligent disregard of rights of property owners along the shore).
17 See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 233, § 25.07. Davis termed the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction "one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law." A Virginia case was reviewed by
the author to illustrate the confusion which results from this approach. In Hoggard v. City of
Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939), the Virginia Supreme Court was called upon to
determine whether the operation of a swimming pool by the city was governmental or
proprietary. The court set out as the underlying test whether the act was for the common good of
all or whether it was done for special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. In prior cases the court
had determined that the operation of a jail, the removal of garbage and the establishment of parks
and playgrounds were governmental activities. On the other hand, the construction and the repair
of streets and sidewalks and the operation of a waterworks were found to be proprietary in
nature. Despite the similarity between a city playground and a city swimming pool, the court
opted for the waterworks analogy. Since the operation of a swimming pool was for the common
good, the court concluded the activity was governmental and not subject to liability. Id. at 156,
200 S.E. at 615.
33' Gottlieb, supra note 326, at 44. See also Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed
Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956). In this article,
Peck expounded at length on the possible use of the mandamus test in the application of the
discretionary function exception. The author suggested that the mandamus test would shift the
focus of the exception from the general nature of the activity or the position of the official in the
executive hierarchy to the actual decision made in a given case. In other words, it would be no
defense to argue that the general area of activity was one in which discretion might be exercised.
The government would have to show that a particular decision of a public official was in fact
made in the exercise of discretionary powers vested in him. Id. at 221-22. This approach has been
criticized for placing too great a burden on the government and for failing to define the degree of
discretion which must be present for the immunity to apply. See Reynolds, supra note 325, at 114.
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Act since the courts were already accustomed to applying the concepts to
other circumstances challenging governmental activity.
Those expectations have not been borne out by federal jurisprudence. The
United States Supreme Court definitely rejected the governmental-
proprietary distinction in Indian Towing,339 where it reviewed the case law in
the forty-eight states and, finding it to be hopelessly confused, declined to
follow that method of analysis. As discussed previously, the change in
perspective of the federal courts from the Feres doctrine to the Indian
Towing formula represents a relaxation of judicial caution in the area of
governmental liabilities with the growth of experience. The Feres court
adopted a rule of strict construction in favor of the government in order to
avoid incursions into uncharted areas of tort liability. As it became clear to the
judiciary that principles of ordinary tort law would be adequate to hold
government culpability within predictable limits, the courts, through the
Indian Towing analysis, expanded the scope of liability. However, the
discretionary function exception was not directly in issue in either of these
cases. The analysis of that exception must begin with consideration of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Dalehite v. United States.3 40
3. The Planning-Operational Distinction: Dalehite v.
United States and its Progeny
Dalehite was one of more than 300 lawsuits which arose out of the Texas
City disaster in 1947. Two ships had been loaded with FGAN, a chemical
fertilizer. The fertilizer was known to be flammable, yet one of the ships on
which it was loaded carried a large amount of explosives. The ship caught fire
and both ships carrying the substance exploded, devastating much of the city
and killing many people. Plaintiff alleged that the government was negligent
in investigating the properties of FGAN and transporting it in a congested
area without warning of the hazard of explosion.
Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, held that all the activities alleged
to have been negligently performed were within the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. To appreciate the majority opinion
fully, it is important to note that the entire FGAN operation was the subject of
an extremely detailed plan adopted at high executive levels. The plan
addressed all aspects of manufacture and shipment of the operation.3 41 The
Court held that the exception encompassed not only the initiation of programs
39 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,64-65 (1955). The Indian Towing decision
was not based upon the discretionary function exception but upon section 2674 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, which imposes liability on the United States in the same manner and to the same
extent as liability is imposed upon a private person under like circumstances. The Court rejected
the argument that the government could be held liable in the same manner as a private person
only when engaged in proprietary as opposed to governmental activities. The rejection of the
governmental-proprietary distinction in this context indicated that no provision of the Federal
Tort Claims Act would be interpreted as including it. See Reynolds, supra note 325, at 100.
The government conceded in Indian Towing that the discretionary function exception did not
apply. 350 U.S. at 64. Many states have likewise rejected the governmental-proprietary distinc-
tion. Although twenty-five states still use the distinction in the determination of municipal
liability, Pennsylvania appears to be the only state that applies the distinction to the liability of the
state. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 25.02 (1976).
340 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
341 Id. at 38-39. Even the type of bagging was specified.
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or activities but also executive determinations in the establishment of plans,
specifications, or schedules of operation. 342 It concluded that decisions made
at the planning stage of the activity, as opposed to the operational level, are
immune from liability under the discretionary function exception.343
Two main interpretations of the case have been suggested in the
commentary following it.344 One view is that whenever the initiation of a
government project is a discretionary act, the subsequent performance of the
project carries the discretionary immunity with it. Several lower court
decisions have reached substantially that result by this broad interpretation of
Dalehite.345 The other interpretation draws a line between planning phases
and the performance, or operational, phases of the project. Decisions at the
planning phase, involving the formulation of basic public policy, are within
the exception. Conduct at the operational stage is not. This second
interpretation of Dalehite has gained the most support.346 In American Exch.
Bank v. United States,341 for example, plaintiff sued for injuries sustained by
falling off the steps of a post office because there was no handrail. The trial
court held that the decision not to install a handrail was discretionary and
thereby within the exception. The case was reversed on appeal on the ground
342 Id. at 35-36.
343 Id. at 42.
344 For a discussion of Dalehite and its implications, see Reynolds, supra note 325, at 93-113.
345 In Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953), the government had conducted a
conservation operation which involved the spraying of herbicide over government lands. During
the spraying some of the herbicide drifted over the crops of adjoining landowners. The
landowners sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the resulting damage. The court of
appeals found no significant difference between the spraying of vegetation and the manufacture
and shipment of fertilizer which had been involved in Dalehite and affirmed the trial court's
finding that the spraying operation was a discretionary function. Id. at 766-67. In Ashley v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 39 (D. Neb. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1964), the
plaintiff had been bitten by a bear in Yellowstone National Park. The bear had been known to
have exhibited aggressive behavior in the past and was destroyed subsequent to the Ashley
incident. The court held that the handling of a troublesome bear was a discretionary function
within the exception, quoting the following language from Dalehite:
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily
follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection
of § 2 680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate
performs or fails to perform a casual step, each action or nonaction being directed by the
superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.
215 F. Supp. at 46, quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 35-36. The Ashley court held
that discretionary immunity encompassed not only the formulation of the policy regarding the
handling of wild animals but also the making of decisions effectuating the basic plan. 215 F. Supp.
at 46. These cases seem to define discretion as any exercise of judgment or choice and have been
criticized for applying the discretionary exception too broadly. See Reynolds, supra note 325, at
108-10.
341 See the discussion of Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States at note 319 supra. Although the
question of duty was at issue in Indian Towing, rather than the application of discretionary
immunity, the implication of the exception is clear. The Court held that the Coast Guard need not
have chosen to operate the lighthouse. However, once the discretion to act was exercised and
reliance on the light engendered, the Guard was obligated to use due care to maintain the light or
warn of its malfunction. 350 U.S. at 69. This determination has been viewed as implicit support of
the planning-operational interpretation of Dalehite. See 3 K. DAVis, supra note 233, § 25.10. Davis
concluded from Dalehite and Indian Towing that the government would not be held liable for
policy decisions at the planning stage of activity, but once the discretion to act was exercised there
was an obligation to perform at the operational level in a non-negligent manner. Id. See also D.
SWARTZ & S. JAcoBY, supra note 325, § 13.107.3.
347 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958).
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that the original decision to build a post office was discretionary but the
decision relating to the handrail was operational and subject to liability.34s
As the contrasting applications of the Dalehite concept indicate, decisions
which use the concept simplistically as a doctrinal tool to characterize the
circumstances of the case in order to achieve a particular result are subject to
criticism.349 The weakness, of course, is in the failure to develop a definition
for discretionary function. As long as options for decision can be presented,
the government activity can be asserted as discretionary in good faith. Does
the determination of discretion precede and dictate the determination of
whether the activity is a planning or operational stage or vice versa? One of
the best attempts to refine the concept of the planning-operational test
demonstrates that the distinction inherent in the test may be artificial and
merely a statement of the fundamental reasons for discretionary immunity. A
district court proposed this definition in Swanson v. United States:350
The planning level notion refers to decisions involving questions of
policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political,
economic, or social effects of a given plan or policy. . . . The
operations level decision, on the other hand, involves decisions
relating to the normal day-by-day operations of government.351
Since this definition is merely a reflection and restatement of the interest in
preserving the separation of powers in circumstances where the responsibility
for basic policy formulation has been committed to coordinate branches of
government, recent decisions have abandoned the planning-operational test
as artificial. A new test for discretionary immunity, addressed directly to the
reasons for the immunity, has begun to emerge.
4. The Policy Formulation Test
An independent test for discretionary immunity was proposed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Downs v. United States.3 52 A small passenger
plane was hijacked and taken from Nashville, Tennessee, to Jacksonville,
Florida, with the hijacker, his estranged wife, an associate and two crew
members aboard. When the plane landed in Jacksonville, Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents refused to allow it to refuel. When the agents used rifle
fire to disable the plane, the hijacker shot his wife, the pilot, and himself.
Survivors of the victims sued the F.B.I., alleging negligence in the agents'
handling of the affair.35,
The government argued that the discretionary function exception applied
to law enforcement operations, negating the court's jurisdiction over the
claim. The court of appeals disagreed. The court thoroughly analyzed the
legislative history of the exception and criticized other courts for attempting
348 Id. at 939.
34' See the discussion of American Exch. Bank and the planning-operational distinction in
Reynolds, supra note 325, at 103.
350 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
35 Id. at 220.
3-2 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
353 Id. at 994.
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to mold Dalehite into a precise standard. It also rejected the planning-
operational test as inadequate because it focused on the status of the
individual making the judgment.3 54 The court adopted the straightforward
approach of determining whether the judgments of public employees are of
the nature and quality that Congress intended to put beyond the scope of
judicial review. Since Congress intended discretionary functions to encom-
pass those activities directed to the formulation of governmental policy, the
court concluded that the justifications for the exception do not necessitate a
broader application than decisions representing an administrator's exercise of
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions .35 Under this restricted definition,
the action of the F.B.I. agents in Downs were held not to qualify for
immunity.356
The policy formulation approach most closely serves the policy
underpinnings of the discretionary function and presents the least danger of
developing as a doctrinaire mechanistic technique for deciding cases of
governmental liability. If the principles of orthodox tort law can be seen as
limitations on the threat of "runaway liability," then discretionary function
immunity should be defined no more broadly than necessary to preserve a
compelling interest the citizenry has in its government. Where legislative or
administrative prerogative is shown to be at a premium to avoid dilution of
the inherent separation of powers in our system of government, such a
compelling interest will have been demonstrated. In such a case, the courts
should apply the exception to prevent the threat of private damage actions
from having that effect. However, where no such considerations appear, or
where they are outweighed by the interests in providing a remedy for an
injury due to governmental wrongdoing, the exception should be narrowly
construed to prevent the preservation of "islands of immunity. '" 357
D. The Value of Federal Case Authority in Actions
before the Ohio Court of Claims
The Ohio Court of Claims and the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals
35 Id. at 996-97.
115 Id. at 997-98. See 45 U. CN. L. REv. 157, 162 (1976), concluding that the Downs court had
arrived at an accurate and workable interpretation of the discretionary function. Several states
have adopted the policy formulation approach to the interpretation of statutes analogous to the
federal discretionary function exception. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972). In
Abbott, the Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the history of the discretionary function
exception in federal and state courts and concluded that the policy formulation approach was the
best reasoned interpretation. Id. at 717-21. See also Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782,447 P.2d 352,
73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
35 552 F.2d at 997-98. The court distinguished an earlier decision in United States v. Faneca,
332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965), which held the actions of law
enforcement officers to be within the discretionary function exception. The decisions involved in
Faneca were those of two high executive officials in effecting the safe enrollment of a black
student at the University of Mississippi. These officials had formulated a plan to serve as a guide
for other government officials in similar circumstances. However, the Downs court held that
while the formulation of law enforcement policy fell within the exception, the courts could apply
the test of reasonableness to the actions of an F.B.I. agent in a given circumstance without
interfering in the policy determinations of coordinate branches of government. 522 F.2d at 997-
98.
357 Boileau v. DeCecco, 125 N.J. Super. 263, 266, 310 A.2d 497,499 (1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 234,
323 A.2d 449 (1974).
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have disagreed on the value of analogy to the Federal Tort Claims Act and
interpretations of the discretionary function exception. The court of appeals
has determined that the Federal Tort Claims Act is not a valuable resource in
interpreting the Ohio Court of Claims Act 35 8 because of a significant
difference in the language of the two statutes.35 9
There are obvious differences in the two enactments. First, the Ohio act is a
general waiver of sovereign immunity,360 while the Federal Tort Claims Act
provides a remedy only for property damage or personal injury arising from
the tortious conduct of public employees. 361 However, the cases in which the
concept of discretionary immunity has come into play have invariably been
tort actions so it would seem appropriate to utilize the federal cases as a
resource for analysis.
The statutes are more closely analogous in other important respects. As
previously discussed, under the federal act, the United States may be held
liable when a private person would be liable under like circumstances in
accordance with the law of the state in which the injury occurred.3 62 Similarly,
the liability of the State of Ohio is to be determined in accordance with the
rules of law applicable to suits between private individuals in the state.3 3
Counsel wishing to rely upon federal authority for their arguments in the court
of appeals should be aware of the view of that court on the value of such
authority, but that is not to say that counsel should refrain from using
appropriate cases. Such use, with careful attention paid to, and accentuation
of, the fundamental similarities present in the respective enactments should
prove to be helpful to both the attorney and the court.
The court of claims may be more receptive to the use of federal case
authority. That court has often indicated an affinity for the analog of the
federal discretionary function exception in its conceptualization of state
immunity in the conduct of discretionary acts.3 64 However, the court's
conceptualization of the exception has not been in line with the federal cases.
The federal courts have interpreted the exception provision of the Federal
Tort Claims Act since 1946, and the analysis has undergone a slow, but
positive, evolution. The effective practitioner should not assume that federal
law addressing a given factual circumstance has been received and
embraced by the court of claims but instead should be aware of areas of
congruence and divergence.
3s1 Shelton v. Bureau for the Prevention of Indus. Accidents & Diseases, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125,
129, 367 N.E.2d 51, 53 (10th Dist. 1976).
359 Id. The court of appeals did not discuss the point beyond this initial observation.
360 See OHIo REV. ConE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978); text accompanying note 10
supra.
361 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
362 See notes 316-25 supra and accompanying text.
363 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
36 The federal discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), was cited by the
court of claims in Devoe v. State, No. 75-0105, slip op. at 19 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18, 1975), and in
Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 8,345 N.E.2d 661,666 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The strength of this con-
clusion is evident in the fact that the court of claims has, by informal unpublished memo to the
Ohio General Assembly, discussed the possible amendment to the Court of Claims Act to include
an exception provision nearly identical to the Federal Tort Claims Act exception.
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E. California Interpretation of the "Liability" Clause
The California legislature enacted rules in 1963 which enabled public
entities to be held liable for injuries resulting from governmental activity.3
Rather than attempting to capsulate the liability of the government, as does
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the California scheme addresses specifically
most of the situations which might engender public entity liability. For
example, medical and public health related settings are addressed in one
chapter,366 while other chapters are devoted to fire protection, 36 7 police and
corrections, 368 and dangerous conditions on public property.369
A general liability section was enacted as well as the specific provisions. It
imposes liability upon a public entity when the acts of an employee of that
entity which are within the scope of employment would subject the employee
to liability. 70 That means that the public entity is subject to the same common
law principles of tort liability as the public employee. The statute embodies
the Indian Towing formula for determining governmental culpability and
eliminates the need to provide analogous private activities as a means of
distinguishing "non-governmental" from "governmental" activities. 371 Thus,
under the California courts' interpretation of the clause, although government
liability still is subject to the controls of the California Tort Claims Act, "when
there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception. 372 So long
as the plaintiff is able to establish some "acceptable theory of liability" under
the common law pertinent to the employee's actions, the courts, in applying
the California liability clause, will have little difficulty in imposing liability
against the public employer. 3 3
31 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979). This statute was passed in
response to Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,359 P.2d 457,11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
The decision in Muskopf, authored by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
abolished sovereign immunity for "governmental" acts when the state employees involved would
be liable. Immunity of the state was preserved for "discretionary" acts, but the court, citing its
decision in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961), implied that the state could be liable in some circumstances even if its employees
were immune.
3N CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 854-856.4 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979).
367 Id. 9 850-850.8.
3- Id. *9 844-846.
369 Id. 9 835-835.4, 840.2.
370 The California statute addresses itself to the possible implication that a public entity may
be liable even when the employee is immune by declaring that when an employee is immune
from liability, the public entity shall also be immune unless a statute provides otherwise. Id.
99 815.2(a), .2(b).
If a situation should occur wherein a public employee would be liable for an act or omission
but the public entity is granted immunity by declaration of statute, the statutory grant of
immunity prevails, and the public entity cannot be held liable for the act of its employee. Id. §
815(b).
37, Prior to the decision in Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), California was one of the jurisdictions struggling in the "quagmire" to which
Justice Frankfurter referred in Indian Towing. See Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 312 (1967).
372 Duarte v. State, 88 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 151 Cal. Rptr. 727, 737 (1979) (on rehearing),
quoting Muskopf, 55 Cal. 2d at 219, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94. See also Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 819, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857 (1976).
... Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 815,819,131 Cal. Rptr. 854,
857 (1976); see also Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
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F. New York Interpretation of the "Liability" Clause
Judicial treatment of governmental liability in New York presents a
confused tapestry of interpretation. Since the New York Court of Claims Act
pre-dated the Federal Tort Claims Act by several years and subjected the
state to the same principles of liability applied to individuals, the New York
courts had occasion to face the "governmental function" argument well
before the United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide Indian
Towing.37 4 In 1936, the New York Court of Appeals heard the claim of a minor
plaintiff who had been committed by a police court to a private reformatory
pursuant to statutory authority. Plaintiff was injured when she operated an
apparatus for ironing fabrics, allegedly without adequate instruction from her
supervisors. The issue presented in the action brought by the plaintiff in Page
v. State of New York 375 was whether the officers and employees of the
institution were officers and employees of the state, which would give rise to
the application of the state's waiver of immunity. Over a strong dissent, which
raised the argument that the reformatory was performing a delegated
function of government and that the state's waiver of liability had not
extended to such entities, the majority of the court affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff.
Some later decisions of the New York courts applied the same type of
analysis as that employed in Indian Towing. For example, the City of New
York has been held liable for negligently removing an illegally parked
motorcycle during a city campaign to relieve traffic congestion. The court
declared that the city's liability would be determined as if a private individual
had been carrying out the governmental activity. 376 When a state trooper
failed to warn about or remove an unlighted abandoned truck on the
highway, the state was held liable for the negligent exercise of the
governmental function. The court quoted with approval an earlier case which
had said, "[e]ven if there was no liability on the part of defendants to furnish
police protection to the public, when said defendants undertook to
act . . . they assumed the duty of acting carefully.
3 77
However, a strain of the disfavored Feres rationale exists in the New York
case law contemporaneously with the Indian Towing type of analysis. For
example, in Granger v. State,378 plaintiff claimed that the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles negligently failed to revoke the license of a motorist, after the
commissioner had received notice that the motorist's insurance had been
cancelled. Plaintiff was involved in an auto accident with the motorist and
374 See Bloom v. Jewish Bd. of Guardians, 286 N.Y. 349,36 N.E.2d 617 (1941), which rejected
the governmental function argument on the rationale that the defendant was exercising its
function as a delegate of the state, and since the state had waived immunity, the derivative
immunity of the defendant was thereby destroyed. Compare the approach of the Ohio courts
discussed at notes 96-110 supra and accompanying text.
375 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936).
376 Simon v. City of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 622, 624, 279 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1967).
377 Peterson v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 931,935,235 N.Y.S.2d 397,401 (Ct. CI. 1962), afi'd, 19 App.
Div. 2d 860, 245 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1963), quoting Mentillo v. City of Auburn, 2 Misc. 2d 818,
150 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
37s 14 App. Div. 2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1961).
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sought recovery from the state. Despite a statute directing the commissioner
to take the action plaintiff was complaining had not been accomplished, the
court found no liability for the reason that the function of the commissioner
was not the type of activity that could be engaged in by a private individual.
In Terrace Hotel Co. v. State,379 the claim for damages arising from the state's
attempt to appropriate negative easements on plaintiff's property for the
purpose of restricting highway billboards was dismissed because the acts
"could only be performed by a sovereign"380 and not by a private person. The
best that can be said then about the New York jurisprudence on the matter is
that the state's liability will be that normally imposed upon persons in the
private sector, except when the court is persuaded that the activity
complained of is "uniquely governmental" and cannot be performed by a
private individual. Given the type of activities upon which liability has been
imposed, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty what acts of the state
are those that "could only be performed by a sovereign" and thereby remain
immune. The decisions, in their collective characteristics, present a style of
judicial analysis that should not be emulated by the Ohio Court of Claims.
G. Ohio Interpretation of the "Liability" Clause
1. Introduction
Although Ohio's statute is not as comprehensive as the California Tort
Claims Act, Ohio's liability clause is similar to the California one and bears a
close resemblance to the New York and Federal Tort Claims Act clauses. Of
the judicial approaches in the three jurisdictions the one that would be the
least recommended to a relatively new court construing a similar statutory
scheme would be the New York approach. If there is pattern to that approach,
it would be best described as a "patchwork quilt" pattern of conflicting and
confusing case law which conforms to no reasonably predictable direction of
development. When a new court is charged with the task of construing a new
statute conferring a new regime of legal relationships between government
and people, a certain amount of caution and conservatism is to be expected as
that court experiments with principles for decision and seeks to "work the
bugs out" of the new system. Five years of operation may be too short a period
of time in which to reach solid evaluative conclusions about the performance
of the court of claims in its tasks. However, five years is not too short a time in
which to expect some directions for development to have been identified.
Unfortunately, the Ohio Court of Claims does not seem to have benefitted
as much from the federal experience as one might expect,381 and at present
371 46 Misc. 2d 174, 259 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
380 Id. at 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 558. A duty to use reasonable care to protect a potential victim
has been imposed upon a state employed psychotherapist who determines or should have
determined that his patient posed a serious threat of harm to that potential victim. A warning may
constitute a reasonable means of fulfilling such a duty of due care. Additionally, a duty to warn the
potential victim may attach to the police if a special relationship exists between them and either
the potential victim or the individual threatening the harm. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
381 The court of appeals should share this criticism, for it often decides cases without real
comment upon the analysis of the court of claims. See, e.g., Jones v. State, No. 77AP-688 (Ohio
10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1977).
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its analytical approach more closely resembles that of the New York courts.
Some patterns of decision have emerged. Interpretations of the liability
clause have produced essentially five theories which have repeatedly been
applied in the court of claims and Tenth District Court of Appeals decisions.
With some refinement of those theories the New York pattern can be avoided.
That refinement will come if the Ohio courts avoid the method of reasoning
from a result, a method which would employ legal theory in an empty and
meaningless way, espousing it as if it were doctrine instead of analytical
technique to be used to reason toward a result. The following sections
examine those theories with a view to suggesting where refinement is needed.
As will be seen, some imprecision and inconsistency is present in the decisions.
Refinement of judicial principles for decision comes by removing imprecision
and inconsistency. That task of removal is best approached by attorneys who
are aware of where imprecision and inconsistency lie. This discussion is
intended to assist in that task by delineating the flaws.
2. The Foundation of the Ohio Court of Claims' Philosophy
of State Liability-The Devoe Case
a. An Overview of Devoe
The possibility of judicial limitation upon the liability clause of the Ohio
Court of Claims Act first came in the area of tort claims arising out of
administrative regulation of business activities. In Devoe v. State,382 the
plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of the holders of preferred stock and
beneficial trust units of three corporations, alleging fraud and violation of
Ohio security law on the part of these corporations. The claim against the state
was that the Division of Securities of the Ohio Department of Commerce was
negligent because it had been informed of fraudulent practices of the issuers,
yet failed to deny registration of the securities and remedy the fraud. Plaintiffs
alleged further that the registration of the securities under these circumstances
constituted a misrepresentation to the public and a violation of federal
securities law. The court of claims dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.38 The court was apparently convinced that to impose liability under
such circumstances would render the state an insurer in the conduct of all of its
regulatory activities.384 Consequently, the court chose to construe the Court of
Claims Act narrowly and to severely restrict the scope of governmental
liability. Points of the opinion and the theories of law that were espoused in it
are treated separately below for the sake of clarity and emphasis.
382 No. 75-0105 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18,1975), aff'd, 48 Ohio App. 2d 311,357 N.E. 2d397 (10th
Dist. 1975).
38 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 21.
314 Id. at 20. The court summarized its dismissal of the action with the following words:
To hold the State of Ohio to be an "insurer," or "guarantor" of securities, registered as
required by Ohio law, would require an unmistakable statute to that effect . . . . To
insure against foolish or unwise speculative investments, commitments with a high risk
factor, and uneconomic enterprises susceptible of failure, can only be accomplished by
legislation revealing a clearly and unmistakably expressed intention to "insure."
Id. at 20-21.
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i. Violation of Federal Law
The court quickly disposed of the part of plaintiffs' claim alleging that the
state had violated federal securities law. The Federal Securities and Exchange
Act of 1933385 makes it unlawful for any person to use interstate commerce to
accomplish a fraudulent sale of securities.386 The word "person" is defined in
that Act to include governments or political subdivisions. 38 7 However, the law
is applicable only to persons who engage in the offer or sale of securities. 388
Since the state had not offered or sold any securities in the case, there could be
no violation of the federal act. The court also concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to hear claims based upon federal law and that the eleventh
amendment would bar a similar action against the state in federal court.389
ii. No Common Law Duty
The misrepresentation claim was based upon the theory that "the same
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties"390 would subject the
state to substantive common law principles of that tort. The court's response
was quite blunt: "There can be no such thing as common law liability
attaching to a sovereign state created by the enactment of a constitution by a
sovereign people. . . . There is no common law duty and there can be no
consequent common law liability."3 1 Absent a pronouncement of official
duties or a subsequent expansion or modification of them by constitutional or
statutory mandate, the common law would supply no scheme of liability to
modify the relationship of government to its people.
iii. Duty Imposed Only by Statute
Since the court had rather summarily disposed of the question of common
law liability, it subsequently looked to the statutes authorizing the Division of
Securities' activities as a possible basis for duty. The court concluded that
while the purpose of those statutes was to protect the public generally from
the dangers of fraud in the sale of securities, they did not impose a duty upon
the division to protect individual purchasers.392
There are several aspects of Ohio securities law which support the
negation of such a duty.393 Not all securities sold in Ohio are subject to
regulation by the division; notably excepted are those which are issued or
3- 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1971).
36 Id. § 7 7 q. Under this section, it is unlawful for any person, in the offer or sale of securities
by means of interstate transportation or communication, to employ any device or scheme to
defraud, to obtain money by means of a material misrepresentation of fact, or to engage in any
transaction or practice which operates to defraud purchasers.
387 Id. § 77b(2).
38 Id. § 77 q.
389 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 4-5.
390 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
391 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 5.
392 Id. at 13.
393 The Ohio "Blue Sky Law" is Omio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01-.45 (Page Supp. 1978). For an
overview of administrative procedures under this statute see Note, Ohio Securities Act: Powers,
Sanctions, and Constitutional Objections, 17 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1098 (1974).
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guaranteed by the federal government. 34 Even among those securities which
must be registered with the division, some may be rejected by description
only.395 The remaining class of securities, to which the securities in Devoe
belong, are subject to the more stringent registration by qualification.
Securities are qualified if the business of the issuer is not fraudulently
conducted, the proposed offer is not grossly unfair, and the sale of the
securities would not tend to defraud the public. However, an issuer applying
for registration by qualification must submit statements verifying the non-
fraudulent character of its securities, and the division may rely upon those
statements in making its determination.3 96 Further investigation of the issue
may be made by the division, but it is not required to do so by the law.397
Moreover, the initiation of enforcement proceedings against supposed
violators is clearly within the discretion of division officials.3 98 On the basis of
the provisions which permit but do not require the suspension of registration,
revocation of licenses, injunctions of sales, and initiation of criminal
proceedings, the court concluded that division employees could not have
been under a legal duty to do what the plaintiffs sought to have them held
liable for not doing.
iv. Ultra Vires Acts of Public Employees
In further consideration of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claim, the
court looked to the essential elements of the cause of action based upon that
theory. The fundamental tort law of misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to
establish the defendant's intent to mislead. The court reasoned that since a
state agency can act only within the "range of delegated authority,"39 9 and
state statutes do not authorize fraud and deceit, intentional torts by state
employees would be ultra vires and outside the scope of employment. For
such acts, the state could not be held liable for failure to "guarantee .. . the
fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it employs."4 '
v. No Analogous Private Activity
In attempting to explain further the inappropriateness of this particular
3% OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.02(B) (Page Supp. 1978). This section generally exempts all
securities which are issued or guaranteed by, and recognized as the valid obligation of, the United
States, a state, any political subdivisions and foreign governments with whom the United States is
maintaining diplomatic relations.
395 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.03-08 (Page 1968). Registration by description is a summary
procedure. The issuer must submit a statement, verified by oath, containing the name of the
issuer, a brief description of the securities, the amount of securities to be offered for sale, the price,
and a brief statement of facts demonstrating that the securities fall within the class subject to
registration by description.
396 Id. § 1707.09(K).
397 Id.
391 See id. §§ 1707.23-.26.
a9 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 6.
100 Id. at 7-8. The court quotes from 49 OHIO Jun. 2D State of Ohio § 28 (1961):
The rule that the government itself is not responsible for the misfeasance, wrongs,
negligence, or omissions of duty of subordinate officers or agents employed in the public
service follows from the fact that it does not undertake to guarantee to any persons the
fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it in all
its operations in endless embarrassments and difficulties, and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interests.
No. 75-0105, slip op. at 7. See Hunt v. State, 20 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 111 (Cuyahoga County 1912).
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negligence claim against the state, the court in effect resurrects the Feres
doctrine largely discredited in the federal law.410 Its reasoning in this respect
becomes somewhat obscure but essentially is as follows. The liability clause
of the Court of Claims Act provides that state liability shall be determined by
reference to rules of law applicable to suits between private parties; the
language of that clause was intended to allow recovery for breaches of
contract and ordinary negligence resulting from accidents or careless
conduct. Within those areas, the bar of sovereign immunity has been
removed. However, the Act did not create new causes of action, and private
parties do not ordinarily operate prisons, confine the mentally ill, or provide
for the public welfare through licensing and regulation of business.
Therefore, since there could be no private party liability, rules of law could
not be extracted from private parties' activities to cover the conduct
complained of by plaintiffs, and no action could be maintained against the
state.
The court emphasized the state's police powers to strengthen its
conclusion, explaining that the use of the police power "to undertake to
protect the public health, safety and general welfare .. ."402 is beyond the
authority of a private citizen. It quickly cautioned that the protection offered
by the exercise of police power did not guarantee protection against all the
injuries that an individual might incur, and the enactment of the Court of
Claims Act did not change that fact.
vi. Discretionary Function Immunity
The court's treatment of discretionary function immunity was incor-
porated in its discussion of the imposition of a statutory duty, so it is not clear
whether the court perceived the concept as an independent bar to a tort action
or simply as further support for its previous determination of a lack of duty
under ordinary negligence principles. At any rate, the concept was prominent
in the court's analysis and will be given separate treatment here for the sake of
clarity.
The court reasoned that since no duty had been imposed upon the Division
of Securities, any action in regard to securities regulation was discretionary.
The conferral of statutory discretion upon state officers or agents, it
concluded, could not possibly lead to subjecting to liability in tort the
activities of regulatory agencies in which those officers or agents exercised
their vested power. Quoting the discretionary function exception section of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Ohio Court of Claims acknowledged that no
such exception was contained in the Ohio act. Nevertheless, although the
language of the opinion is vague in this respect, it is clear that the exception
was incorporated into the Ohio law by judicial gloss.
b. A Closer Look at Devoe
i. Violation of Federal Law
The court of claims' dismissal of the alleged violation of federal securities
law was based upon sound reasoning. The Federal Securities and Exchange
401 See notes 323-24 supra and accompanying text.
402 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 9.
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Act of 1933 placed jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Act solely in the
federal courts. It is a fair conclusion that if the General Assembly wished to
complement that jurisdiction by declaring the violation of federal law to be
grounds for the maintenance of an independent private action in state courts,
it could have expressly stated that intention. At any rate, the state did not
appear to have violated the terms of the federal statute.4W
ii. The Misrepresentation Claim
There are broad ramifications of the court's dismissal of the misrepresenta-
tion theory of the action. 4 4 First, the logic employed by the court is fallacious.
While the relevant statutes do not "authorize" fraud and deceit, neither do
they "authorize" negligence or breach of contract. If conduct intended to
mislead or defraud on the part of state officers or employees is ultra vires for
that reason and cannot be imputed to the state as a predicate of governmental
liability, then breaches of contract, ordinary negligence and intentional torts
are likewise ultra vires. The court has simply dodged a difficult issue in its
treatment of this aspect of Devoe.
A few jurisdictions recently have experimented with governmental
liability for intentional torts. 40- Developments in these jurisdictions reflect a
growing idea that government, as a source of great wealth and power, should
compensate injured parties whenever possible within the requirements of
efficient operation.40 6 In most of these same jurisdictions, however, waiver of
sovereign immunity has been in operation for some time, and the courts are
experienced in determining the extent of liability on other grounds. Perhaps at
this stage of its jurisprudence, the Ohio Court of Claims should not be subject
to severe criticism for its conservative approach in construing a relatively new
statute. The problem of "statutory authorization" aside, the principles
employed by the court in this respect are consistent with a strict analogy to the
doctrine of respondeat superior, which traditionally 4 7 has relieved the
employer of liability for intentional torts of employees.
403 See notes 385-89 supra and accompanying text.
404 The court outlined the requisites for common law misrepresentation. Not-only must there
be an intent to mislead, but the other party must rely upon the representation to his damage.
Further, an action for fraud could be dismissed for gross inadequacy of consideration. The court
found no consideration on the part of the state and concluded that the relationship of the state to
the plaintiffs lacked the "degree of personal intimacy" required for the claim of fraud. No. 75-
0105, slip op. at 5.
406 Liability for intentional torts has most often been considered in the context of municipal
police activity. See Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (vicarious
liability for police intentional tort); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256,60 Cal. Rptr. 355
(1967) (intentional tort under statute imposing vicarious liability for municipal employees' torts);
City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965) (liability on agency theory for police
intentional tort).
406 See 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 908, 917.
407 See generally 2 F. HaPPE & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRas §§ 26.2, 26.9 (1956); 2 F.
MECHEM, AGENCY § 1926 (2d ed. 1914); W. PnossEa, LAW OF Towrs 464 (4th ed. 1971). However,
Ohio courts have long held private employers liable for the fraud and deceit of their employees.
See Healey v. City Passenger R.R., 28 Ohio St. 23 (1875); Toole v. Cleveland Trust Co., 22 Ohio
C.C. (n.s.) 112 (8th Dist. Ct. App. 1908). Furthermore, the distinction between intentional and
negligent torts of employees for the purpose of determining questions of employers' vicarious
liability is on the wane. See Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of His Ser-
vants, 45 Cw.-KFr'Nr L. REv. 1 (1968).
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iii. The No Analogous Private Activity Test
The court's interpretation of the liability clause of the Court of Claims Act
is more troublesome. Its approach is virtually the same as that employed in
Feres v. United States. 40 The Feres approach has been criticized for limiting
the scope of governmental liability too severely 409 All of the activities of
government are unique. Generally the only government activities which
approach those of private individuals are the ones deemed "proprietary" in
nature. The semantical trap apparent in that observation lead the federal
courts to repudiate the Feres interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Furthermore, as later discussion will point out, the application of the no
private counterpart test has been applied sporadically by the court. In the area
of claims alleging negligence in the maintenance of public roadways, for
example, a government activity normally not carried on by private
individuals, the cases appear to be in hopeless conflict. The approach should
be abandoned by the Ohio Court of Claims lest it find itself inextricably lost in
the labyrinth of "distinction so finespun and capricious as to be almost
incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation. 410
iv. Discretionary Functions-Obfuscation of Duty
and Immunity?
From its analysis of Ohio securities law, the court of claims in Devoe
concluded that the activities of the Division of Securities were matters of
discretion.411 As mentioned earlier, in one sense that analysis merely supports
the court's conclusion that no duty was imposed upon the division which
could support a negligence action by an individual purchaser. This reasoning
equates discretion with the absence of duty. The decision most certainly
stands for the proposition that when statutes authorizing state regulatory
activity contain directory, as opposed to mandatory, language, the court will
not be disposed toward finding a duty existent under ordinary tort
principles.412
The court may also have used the term "discretion" in another sense.
Citing the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, it
reasoned that because the division has a choice in the matters it is charged with
regulating, the ability to exercise discretion removes any duty it may have to
anyone.413 This mixing of the concepts of governmental immunity and duty to
concoct a gloss of judicial limitations upon governmental liability results in a
more comprehensive limitation than that employed by the federal courts in
construing the federal exception and discounts the significant developments
of federal law on the matter. This result bears further comparative analysis.
As the examination of federal law in previous sections pointed out, the
discretionary function exception to federal liability bars tort liability for a
408 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See notes 313-17 supra and accompanying text.
409 See notes 321-22 supra and accompanying text.
410 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
411 See notes 385-98 supra and accompanying text.
412 No. 75-0105, slip op. at 13-19.
413 Id. at 13.
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federal employee's performance or failure to perform a discretionary
function. The exception was intended, however, to preserve the in-
dependence of legislative or executive decision-making from judicial
intrusion in determining tort liability and amounts to a defense of immunity in
applicable situations, not as a blanket concept for a determination of no duty.
The interpretation of the exception has been refined in the federal courts from
the early position resembling the Ohio Court of Claims' blanket immunity
approach through the so-called planning-operational distinction, which left
some governmental decisions open to tort liability, to the policy-formulation
test of Downs v. United States. 414
The case of Smith v. United States415 illustrates the point that the policy
formulation test results in a more refined consideration of claimed
governmental tort liability than the court of claims approach in Devoe. The
proprietor of a business sued the federal government on the ground that the
Attorney General had failed to prosecute persons responsible for injuring
plaintiff's business. 4 6 Under the no private counterpart analysis of Feres,
employed by the Devoe court, the dismissal of the action would necessarily
result. Since the liability clause of the federal act subjects the government to
liability to the same extent as private individuals under like circumstances
(interpreted by Feres to rhean same circumstances), and since private parties
are not engaged in the prosecution of criminal offenses, there could be no
analogous private liability to satisfy the liability clause.
The problem with the no private counterpart analysis is that it would not
only prevent recovery in cases like Smith but also in situations clearly within
the contemplation of the Federal Tort Claims Act. House Report No. 1287
indicated that the purpose of the Act was to permit recovery for the common
law torts of government employees. 417 It did not say the purpose was to
impose liability upon the common law torts of government employees
engaged in activities in which private individuals commonly engaged. Such a
distinction would call for a clear statement of policy sustaining the conclusion
that there is a real difference, and the no private counterpart analysis does not
reflect that policy. The Indian Towing Co.418 case wisely rejected the no
private counterpart test as an inaccurate interpretation of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
Following Dalehite v. United States ,411 some courts held that whenever
the initiation of government activity involved the exercise of discretion, any
subsequent action in regard to the activity fell within the discretionary
function exception. 420 Although the discussion of the Devoe court is sparse in
this respect, there is a close parallel to its decision and this latter line of cases.
The employment of that rationale would, of course, result in dismissal in
Smith, since the enforcement of criminal statutes was within the discretion of
414 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
415 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 841 (1967).
41 375 F.2d at 244-45.
417 See notes 326-30 supra and accompanying text.
418 See notes 319-23 supra and accompanying text.
419 See notes 340-43 supra and accompanying text.
420 See note 345 supra and accompanying text.
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the Attorney General. The abstentionistic position of the courts based upon
the Dalehite rationale has been criticized, however, for its retention of
governmental immunity beyond unwarranted limits.
In Smith the government argued, on the authority of Dalehite, that the
discretionary function exception should apply because the decisions of the
Attorney General involved the exercise of discretion. 42' The court discussed
at length the absolutist interpretations of Dalehite and rejected the
government's argument. It suggested that Dalehite was unsound because it
permitted the conclusion that whenever federal employees are vested with
the authority to make decisions, there is sufficient discretion to qualify for
immunity. As the court aptly pointed out, any conscious act involves a degree
of choice.422 Consequently, something more than the mere presence of
discretion would be required to make the discretionary function exception
operable.
The planning-operational distinction also was treated by the Smith court.
The Attorney General had initially begun an investigation into the occurrence
at Mr. Smith's place of business, but the investigation was subsequently
discontinued. Plaintiff argued that once the investigation had been initiated,
the planning stage of official conduct had ceased, the operation stage had
begun, and the discretionary function exception should therefore not
apply. 423 The court rejected that approach as a rationale for decision. It might
provide a basis for decision in easy cases, said the court, but it was too
"finespun and capricious" a standard to provide any real definition of the
discretionary function exception in difficult cases.424
Instead, the Smith court applied the policy formulation test. Characteriz-
ing the Attorney General as "[t]he President's surrogate in the prosecution of
all offenses against the United States," 42 5 the court noted that his discretionary
powers of decision may depend upon matters wholly apart from questions of
probable cause. For instance, he may choose to prosecute only a strong case to
test an uncertain law, or he may defer prosecution to avoid inflaming racial
tensions. The discretionary function exception applied, said the court, not
because the Attorney General made choices but because his choices were
affected by the policy interests of the nation. 426
The government argued a second ground for dismissal of the action in
Smith, based upon ordinary principles of tort law. The plaintiff's theory of
liability in Smith, as in Devoe, depended upon the establishment of an
affirmative duty to take regulatory action. The government's contention in
Smith was that if any duty existed, such duty was owed not to the victim of the
crime, but to the general citizenry as a whole. Since no duty was owed by the
defendant to provide for the protection of plaintiff, there could be no liability
under ordinary tort principles. Because the court found the discretionary
421 375 F.2d at 245.
422 Id. at 246. "Most conscious acts of any person whether he works for the government ornot,
involve choice. Unless government officials (at no matter what echelon) make their choices by
flipping coins, their acts involve discretion in making decisions." Id.
123 Id. at 245.
424 Id. at 246.
425 Id. at 246-47.
426 Id. at 248.
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function exception applicable, it did not reach this secondary issue. However,
the obvious parallels to the Devoe case compel some comment.
Viewed in light of Smith, the determination of governmental liability
involves two considerations. The threshold question is whether the
governmental activity falls within the scope of the discretionary function
exception. The application of the exception forecloses any assessment and
judgment of the wrongful character of the conduct complained of, since the
defense amounts to immunity rather than a privilege which could be
overcome by a showing of sufficiently culpable behavior. However, if the
exception should be found inapplicable, the question of liability is still not
settled. The plaintiff must then establish the requisite predicate of liability in
the official conduct; the waiver of immunity does not mean that the
government has become an insurer. Hence, the issue of duty, if the breach of
duty is the requisite predicate of liability, becomes a secondary issue. Duty is
not dependent upon the determination of the immunity issue. Immunity,
likewise, is independent of the existence of a duty of care, operating as a
complete defense even in the face of an admitted breach of duty. 27
Obscuring this distinction, as the Devoe court did, may result in preservation
of a larger island of immunity than the Ohio Court of Claims Act intended.
The Devoe court did not discuss the full import of its statements about
discretion, and it is not clear how the concept of discretionary function
immunity will be applied in Ohio as a result of that shortcoming. It discussed
neither of the two favored approaches to the problem present in the federal
law. Some element of choice is present in virtually every official decision. The
issue of whether statutory language is mandatory or merely directory is the
subject of great debate in the case law 42s and provides no basis for the
imposition of an exception for governmental liability which such important
functional underpinnings as discretionary function immunity carry. Under
the policy formulation test, the exception applies to decisions by legislative or
executive employees which involve the weighing of public policy con-
siderations. In such cases the acts of government are immune because the
exception bars the judicial evaluation of the tortious character of the
decisions.
Conversely, if the decision or actions are not of such a nature that the
judicial determination of issues of tort liability would threaten the
independence of the decision-making process, then the exception does not
apply, and the determination of governmental liability is left to the principles
of ordinary tort law. The Devoe opinion indicates that the court failed to
comprehend the potential reach of its simplistic treatment of discretionary
function immunity.
IV. TORT CLAIMS IN OHIO-A CATEGORIcAL ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Having examined judicial attitudes about governmental liability in the
427 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 407, at 970-87.
428 See C. SANDS, 1A SUrEMuAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION §§ 25.02-.04 (4th ed. 1972);
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,406 (1950); Sutton, Use of "Shall" in Statutes,
4 J. MAR. L.Q. 204 (1938). See also Mullen v. Board of School Directors, 436 Pa. 211,259 A.2d 877
(1969).
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federal courts, in Ohio as illustrated by Devoe, and in other state jurisdictions,
the focus can turn to more specific consideration of the Ohio decisions. To
facilitate that examination, several categories have been identified into which
many Court of Claims Act lawsuits have fallen by virtue of their common
features. Interestingly, reconciliation of many of the decisions on the issue of
judicial limitations upon governmental liability can be accomplished only
through this categorization method.
The comparative analysis of the last section will not be disregarded,
however. Reference will be made to the principles developed there to test the
clarity and consistency of the Ohio decisions that have followed in the wake of
Devoe. This analysis will demonstrate that the court of claim decisions have
become a bit muddled, as if the court is lost in a forest of legal concepts and is
searching for a way through it. As the examination of the decisions proceeds,
perhaps some pathways can be identified.
B. Administrative Regulation of Business Activities
The court of claims' open-ended treatment of the discretionary function
exception in the Devoe case was soon limited in another business regulation
case. In Results, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 429 the plaintiff corporation alleged
that it had been injured by the actions of the Secretary of State in accepting
articles of incorporation of another business. Plaintiff was incorporated in
Ohio in 1966. A second business, also using the name "Results, Inc.," was
incorporated in 1972. Under Ohio law, the Secretary of State is forbidden to
accept articles of incorporation if the proposed corporate name is
indistinguishable from a previously incorporated business. 430 Following
successful negotiations with the second company, the first "Results, Inc." sued
the secretary to recover expenses incurred in protecting its corporate
identity. 431 The court of claims denied the state's motion to dismiss and held
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for which relief could be granted. 432
The state argued that it had not waived its immunity from suit for
governmental functions requiring the exercise of discretion and that the
decision of the secretary on whether to accept proposed articles of
incorporation was discretionary. 4- In support of this argument, the state cited
the New York case of Gross v. State,434 factually similar to Results, Inc. In
broad terms, the Gross court had held that the decision to accept articles of
incorporation required the exercise of judgment and discretion and could not
provide the basis of tort liability, 433 terms that were very reminiscent of the
opinion in Devoe.
429 No. 75-0295AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 30, 1975) (clerk's denial of Motion to Dismiss).
'30 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.05(A) (Page 1978).
I" No. 75-0295AD, slip op. at 1.
432 Id. at 2.
43 Id.
434 33 App. Div. 2d 868, 306 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1969). In the Gross case, it was the second-
incorporated business which brought suit. The New York Secretary of State had originally
accepted the plaintiff's articles of incorporation and then required the name to be changed when
a former corporation was discovered. Id. at 870, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
13 Id. at 871, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 31. The Gross decision rested primarily upon the governmental-
non-governmental distinction, the court concluding that the activity was governmental. The
court also held that the acceptance of corporate articles involved the exercise of judgment and
discretion and fell within New York's judicially-created discretionary function exception. Id.
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The court of claims rejected defendant's argument. Instead, it chose to
rely upon a federal case factually distinguishable from Results, Inc. and Gross.
Citing White v. United States43 for the proposition that "[a] negligent
exercise of discretion might well give rise to government liability,'" 437 the
Results, Inc. court decided that the incorporation laws of Ohio did not permit
the secretary the discretion to accept articles of incorporation bearing the
name of a pre-existing corporation.
The decision in Results, Inc. must be taken as a limitation upon the broad
language of Devoe. Curiously, the court did not employ the analysis of the
federal case that it had cited with approval. White involved a suit by the
administrator of the estate of a mental patient in a Veterans' Administration
hospital. The decedent had been permitted to roam the hospital grounds and
used that freedom to successfully commit suicide by throwing himself under a
train. His administrator contended that the employees of the hospital failed to
exercise the appropriate degree of care in light of the veteran's mental
condition. 43s The court in White applied the planning-operational distinction
to conclude that the decision to extend services was a planning-level exercise
of discretion, but that once the decision was made, the government was liable
for any subsequent negligence in treatment. 439
The court of claims in Results, Inc. did not discuss the planning-
operational distinction employed in White. Instead, it merely relied upon the
statutory description of the Secretary of State to conclude that no
discretionary authority existed. Since proof of the allegations would establish
a clear violation of law, the court held that a claim had been stated.440 In effect,
the court's reasoning was that the enabling statutes pertaining to these acts of
the secretary were mandatory and for that reason no discretionary function
immunity would arise and liability would attach for the violation of the
mandatory duty.
Thus while Devoe may have been limited by Results, Inc., the
fundamental problem of Devoe remained: the mixed concepts of duty and
discretionary function immunity. In both cases, the court of claims examined
the statutes authorizing state activity to determine whether a duty to act had
been imposed. In Devoe, a directory-only feature of the statutes was found
from the repeated use of the word "may" in the sections examined. From that,
the court concluded that the state was under no duty of care to individual
purchasers. In Results, Inc., the court determined that the pertinent statutes
were mandatory in nature, relying upon the language in the statutes
containing the word "shall.."441
Questions of state liability should not be made to turn upon the results of
such a mechanistic analysis of statutes. If the purposes of discretionary
function immunity are called into play by the governmental conduct being
436 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963).
437 No. 75-0295 AD, slip op. at 2.
438 317 F.2d at 14-17. The deceased had a long history of suicidal tendencies, which was
known by the hospital personnel. Id.
431 Id. at 18.
440 No. 75-0295 AD, slip op. at 2.
441 Id. at 16-17, quoting Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.05(A) (Page 1978).
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complained of in a given case, application of the policy formulation test of
Downs v. United States442 should accurately identify those cases where tort
litigation should not impede that governmental conduct. If there is no basis
for the application of immunity, the official conduct should be evaluated from
the standpoint of common law principles of duty, regardless of whether the
enabling statutes contain the words "shall" or "may." Even in the face of
statutory language saying officials "may do act X," those officials should be
required to exercise that discretion with an appropriate degree of care. That
degree of care can be delineated with a fair measure of reliability by reference
to common law tort principles that have been carefully developed over the
centuries. The issue of duty should not be couched in terms that permit the
question of whether the duty was present to turn upon the fortuitous presence
or absence of the word "shall." It should be fairly clear that the vast majority
of enabling statutes passed by the Ohio General Assembly were not worded
with a view to whether the official conduct-mandated or merely directed-
should be immune from judicial inquiry in private tort litigation. The court of
claims approach gives that effect to the language employed in a given statute.
Likewise, the question of state liability should not be couched in terms
which permit the issue of breach of duty to be decided by reference to
whether the statutory mandate or direction has been followed. Even in cases
where a statute says an official "shall" act, and the official does act, the issue of
whether, by so acting, the official breached a duty of care to the complaining
party should remain distinct and independent. The answer that a governmen-
tal operative had no choice in the matter because the statutory language
mandated the official action is not responsive. The official action may have
been mandated indeed, but that is not to say that such action needed to be
performed in a careless manner. The mechanistic approach of Devoe and
Results, Inc. do not permit analysis to proceed that far.
A technique of reasoning which, in effect, refers to the state of the law prior
to the passage of the Court of Claims Act has been combined with the
Devoe443 rule to produce a maddening circularity of reasoning. Given that
prior to the Act the state was immune from suit absent specific consent, it
should be a foregone conclusion that in most respects no common law duty
would have arisen which would be applicable in the context of governmental
operations. The Ohio courts, in recognition of this situation, have made the
determination of governmental liability turn upon the presence or absence of
the word "shall" in the statute.
This reasoning is illustrated in Jones v. State, 444 where the court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' action by the court of claims. In Jones the
plaintiffs claimed that the Division of Securities negligently supervised their
credit union, resulting in a subsequent suspension and ultimate liquidation of
the credit union corporation and causing plaintiffs extensive financial damage
in the impairment of their shares. The court of appeals stated simply, "there is
no common law liability upon the State under the circumstances involved.
442 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975). See notes 352-57 supra and accompanying text.
443 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the technique grew out of the obscure
language of the Devoe opinion.
444 No. 77 AP-688 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1977).
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Any liability must be imposed by statute.."445 It then stated that there was no
language in the enabling statutes "indicating an intent on the part of the State
to assume responsibility for poor, negligent, incompetent, or fraudulent
management of a credit union." 446 With such a focus could any other
conclusion have been reached? If the courts are going to cite the paucity of
common law liability against the state as a justification for looking to the
statutes as a basis for imposition of liability, and then declare that no
legislative intent to impose liability can be found, the liability clause of the
Court of Claims Act is all but emptied of meaning. To complete the circle, and
in so doing add a touch of irony to the decision, in Jones the court said that if
the enabling statutes had expressed an intent to impose liability upon the state,
then it would be questionable whether the Court of Claims Act would apply
since then it could be said that the statutes would amount to a prior consent to
suit. 447
It would thus appear that the court of claims and tenth district court of
appeals are concerned that if they embrace the theory that governmental
liability should follow when a statutorily required course of conduct is not
carried out and someone is injured thereby, it will render the state an insurer.
Given their mechanistic approach, which confuses discretionary function
immunity and duty, that concern is well-founded. If the courts can refine the
approaches to the point where these independent concepts can be analyzed
separately and the issues inherent in each can be independently decided, then
the basis for the concern is removed. Counsel for claimants before the court of
claims should not admit that there is no common law liability to be imposed
against the state in a given context but instead, should argue that the very
purpose of the liability clause of the Act was to create a regime of liability. The
abrogation of sovereign immunity may well have created a vacuum in the law
in specific contexts, making it impossible to employ the principle of stare
decisis in determining whether the governmental defendant is liable for its
acts. However, if the court believes that general principles of tort law cannot
safely be borrowed from the realm of private lawsuits, it should accept its
responsibility as a court at common law to establish precedent by reference to
general principles of justice and fairness to the parties. The artificial device of
referring to enabling statutes to "find" an imposition of liability will be, by and
large, a dry exercise, leading to the circular logic of the Jones case.
C. Safety Inspections
In 1974, a boiler exploded in a refinery of the Northern Ohio Sugar
Company, blinding and totally disabling an employee. Ohio law required that
the boiler be inspected by the Division of Boiler Inspection of the Ohio
Department of Industrial Relations, but the agency had failed to discover its
defective condition. The injured employee sought recovery against the state
in Shelton v. Bureau for the Prevention of Industrial Accidents and
Diseases,44 alleging negligent performance of the statutory duty of
inspection.
445 Id., slip op. at 4.
446 Id.
447 Id.
148 No. 75-0235 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 6, 1975), afl'd, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125,367 N.E.2d 51 (10th
Dist. 1976).
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The court of claims dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 449 As might be predicted from the foregoing
analysis of the Devoe line of cases, the court of claims concluded that the
Division of Boiler Inspection was under no duty which would support the
negligence claim of the injured worker. As in the Devoe case, the court based
its conclusion upon the statutes authorizing the division's activities. 450
However, the statutes applicable in Shelton were substantially dissimilar
to those applicable in Devoe. In Devoe, the court repeatedly quoted language
from the Ohio securities law, which used the term "may," to bolster its
conclusion that the Division of Securities was under no duty to individual
purchasers. The relevant statutes in Shelton declared that the inspection of
boilers shall be made, 451 that all boilers shall be inspected internally and
externally at least once a year, 452 and that the chief of the division shall enforce
the applicable safety standards. 43 Despite such language, the court held that
no duty to protect individual workers was imposed, concluding that the
statutes were intended to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.
Absent "a clear legislative directive,"' 454 the court was unwilling to recognize a
duty owed to individual workers. 455
On its face, the Shelton decision rested upon the court's finding of a lack of
duty under ordinary negligence law and no statutory duty having been
imposed by the enabling legislation pertaining to the Division of Boiler
Inspection. The decision was affirmed by the court of appeals on the same
reasoning. 45 6 If discretionary function immunity was a ground for the
decision, it was not directly discussed by either court. A subsequent opinion in
the court of claims, however, indicates that discretionary immunity played
some role in Shelton.
In Spencer v. State, 457 the court of claims implied, without analysis, that in
any of its regulatory functions the Department of Industrial Relations is
immune from tort liability. That case concerned the death of a lumber
company employee resulting from alleged defects in the design and
installation of a circular saw. The decedent's administratrix brought a
wrongful death action against the Department of Industrial Relations,
alleging negligence in the enforcement of safety standards by several
divisions of the department. 458 The court of claims dismissed the action, citing
Shelton for the proposition that the state did not waive its immunity from suit
with regard to governmental functions involving the exercise of discretion. 459
In so doing, the court changed the emphasis of the Shelton decision from a
lack of duty to immunity for discretionary governmental functions.
4" No. 75-0235, slip op. at 2.
45 Id. at 2-4.
"I OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4104.06 (Page 1973).
452 Id. § 4104.11.
4- Id. §4104.06.
4' No. 75-0235, slip op. at 4.
45 Id.
'-6 51 Ohio App. 2d at 130-31, 367 N.E.2d at 54.
45- No. 76-0441 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 23, 1976).
458 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
459 Id. at 2.
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If the application of discretionary immunity in Devoe was imprecise, the
application of that concept in Spencer, with its interpretation of Shelton,
convolutes that imprecision. At least in Devoe the statutes reasonably could
be construed to have vested a wide range of discretion in government officials
charged with the responsibility of investigating violations of and enforcing
compliance with the state securities laws in a particular case. In Shelton, not
only was inspection mandatory, but the chief of boiler inspection was
required to enforce the applicable safety regulations. In the latter case, given
the Devoe approach, from whence came the discretion to provide the basis
for immunity? Whatever the deficiencies of the Devoe opinion in its reception
of the federal discretionary function exception to governmental liability,
there is some rational basis for its analysis of the statutory scheme controlling
the actions of government officials. Both the Shelton decision, and even more
so that of Spencer, have lost touch with even that ground for application of the
exception.
It is clear that the courts in Shelton and Spencer were concerned about
imposing liability upon the state which would have an uncontrollable and far-
reaching impact upon the conduct of government safety programs. That
concern follows directly from the concept of duty-as-mixed-with-the-
concept-of-immunity analysis of Devoe. If duty is viewed as flowing from
enabling legislation which is mandatory in nature, and the mandates of that
legislation are not satisfied by the official conduct, the breach of that duty is
established. A theory that imposed liability for injuries that resulted from the
failure to adhere to the statutes would indeed have the effect of imposing a
duty upon the state which it could have no practical expectation of fulfilling.
The responsibility for safety inspections relates to virtually every place of
business or employment in the state. An undertaking by the state to eradicate
all hazardous conditions would demand a far more comprehensive program
than the presently required periodic inspection program. Liability flowing
from a missed or faulty inspection could prove to be so costly that the state
might have to discontinue the program altogether. In the view of the court,
the removal of immunity would possibly open the "floodgates of litigation,"
render the state an insurer, and impel it down the road to bankruptcy. 46 0
Application of common law principles of duty, while keeping those
principles distinct from immunity, would not lead to such drastic results and
should satisfy the courts' concerns. If the issue of breach of duty is expressed
as whether the defendant carried out the statutory requirements with the
degree of care which the ordinary reasonably prudent person would have
done under the circumstances, the basis for the fears of the courts fades in
significance. When the injured party's claim is approached in this way, the
failure to adhere to statutory strictures does not result in an automatic
conclusion of negligence. The court then must look to the issue of whether that
failure amounted to a failure to exercise the degree of care due to the plaintiff
460 See, e.g., Shelton v. Bureau for Prevention of Indus. Accidents & Diseases, No. 75-0235
(Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 6, 1975), aff'd, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125,367 N.E.2d51 (10th Dist. 1976), where the
court of claims refers to the problem of the state as insurer. No. 75-0235, slip op. at 2. The court of
appeals in the same case discussed "a 'floodgate of litigation' [that] may bankrupt the state." 51
Ohio App. 2d at 128, 367 N.E.2d at 53.
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under the circumstances. A trier of fact may well conclude that the conduct in
violation of the statute was reasonable.
On the other hand, the application of this suggested line of reasoning
would not have the effect of barring bona fide claims arising from truly
culpable violations of statute. Some circumstances may excuse an officer from
failure to carry out an effective safety inspection. However, the principles of
ordinary negligence should adequately aid the court in determining if the
circumstances justifying the excuse are present. Where they are not, and an
innocent person is injured as a result of the misconduct, the injured party
should be compensated. Opening up departments of the state to liability in
this manner does not render the state an insurer and should not put
unreasonable pressure upon the public coffers.
Further, even in the case where there has been both a breach of common
law duties and statutory requirements, the state may still be protected from
"runaway liability." If the decisions of the governmental functionaries are
such that the principles of discretionary function immunity are present, that
concept can be applied to absolve the state from liability and prevent the
incursion of unwarranted tort litigation. The rough-handed, ill-considered
approach of Spencer and Shelton carries immunity too far in the direction of
the old law of sovereign immunity.
D. Maintenance and Repair of State Highways
The area in which claimants seem to have been most successful in
imposing liability against the state has been in cases involving maintenance
and repair of state highways. In 1976, the court of claims decided Denis v.
Department of Transportation,46 1 a case frequently cited by the court in
subsequent cases as a correct statement of the law. 462 In Denis, plaintiff
alleged that his automobile was damaged when it struck a chuckhole on an
interstate highway, claiming that the chuckhole could not have been seen and
avoided because it was concealed by slush covering the roadway. In its
analysis of the case, the court set out the elements of proof which a plaintiff has
the burden of establishing in such a case: (a) that the defendant had notice,
either actual or constructive, of the evidence of the defect; (b) that the
defendant, possessing the required notice, either (i) failed to respond within a
reasonable time, or (ii) responded within a reasonable time, but did so in a
negligent manner; (c) or, that the defendant in a general sense negligently
maintains its highways. 463 Once this burden of proof is met, plaintiff has
shown that the state breached its duty to "use reasonable means to keep the
state highways safe by keeping the highways properly maintained and free
from obstructions and defects." 46 4
461 No. 75-0287 AD (Ohio Ct. CI. Feb. 27, 1976) (on reconsideration).
462 See, e.g., Hampel v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 77-0206 AD (Ohio Ct. CI. Nov. 30,1977);
DeChesne v. Department of Transp., No. 76-0625 (Ohio Ct. CI. Nov. 12, 1976); Johnson v. Ohio
Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0472 (Ohio Ct. CI. Aug. 17, 1976).
46 No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 5.
46 Id. at 2. The Tenth District Court of Appeals has succinctly stated the duty of the state with
respect to its highways: "the state has a duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condi-
tion." Knickel v. Department of Transp., 49 Ohio App. 2d 335, 339, 361 N.E.2d 486, 489 (10th
Dist. 1976).
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The first obstacle the plaintiff must overcome then is the requirement of
notice. This can be accomplished through admissions made by the state in the
Investigation Report4 5 or through the production of such documents as the
diary of the yard crew in whose area the defect is located or pertinent inter-
office communications which detail repair work done on specific sections of
highway. 46 6
A review of court of claims decisions reveals that the requirement of notice
is not an easy obstacle to overcome. An issue that may arise is whether repair
of a defect on one occasion puts the state on notice that a particular area of the
highway is hazardous. If the answer is no, then the further question arises of
how many times must the defect be repaired before the state may be said to
be on notice. Plaintiff in DeChesne v. Department of Transportation467
claimed that her car was damaged when it struck a hole in an interstate
highway on January 31, 1976. Defendant's local yard repair schedule for the
month of January revealed that the hole in question had been repaired on
January 13, 1976. The court concluded that notice, to be effective, must have
reached defendant after January 13, but before January 31. The fact that
defendant had filled the hole once before the accident was not considered
sufficient to put it on notice that this specific area of the highway presented a
hazard to motorists.
This conclusion by the court is interesting in light of the court's knowledge
of the temporary nature of road patches during winter months. A Department
of Transportation employee with thirty-two years of experience testified in
the DeChesne case that "a hole could be patched one day and in the next two
days patching might again be required."468 The court has frequently spoken
of the detrimental effect winter freeze-thaw cycles have upon impermanent
cold mix patching, which is usually the only method available to the state for
patching highways during the cold weather. 469 In Denis the court concluded,
on the basis of this knowledge, that the surface of the highway upon which
plaintiff's automobile sustained damage could have changed drastically
within the space of two days. 47 0 It would seem that in the face of judicial
46 The defendant files the Investigation Report in addition to its answer in response to
plaintiff's complaint. An allegation that the defect was created by the state is sufficient to
withstand a rule 12(B)(6) motion based upon a failure to allege that the state had notice of the
defect. Bennett v. Department of Highways, No. 75-0268 AD, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 11,
1975) (ruling on motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
46 E.g., Department of Transportation Form AU-14. Highways are divided into sections for
repair purposes. "A 'Section Number' is the most precise means of identifying repaired areas used
by the Department of Transportation." Hollis v. Department of Transp., No. 76-140 AD, slip op.
at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 10, 1976).
467 No. 76-0265 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 12, 1976).
461 Id., slip op. at 4.
461 Hollis v. Department of Transp., No. 76-0140 AD, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 10,1976).
In HoUis the court noted that "cold mix" is often the only source of patching material available
to the state in the winter because the cost of "hot mix" renders its production prohibitive. "Cold
mix" is often penetrated by water during freeze-thaw cycles causing its adherence to the adjacent
road surface to fail. The passage of constant traffic over the patched area hastens the deteriora-
tion. See, e.g., Kozak v. State Highway Dep't, No. 75-0288 AD, slip op. at2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 19,
1976); Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,1976)
(on reconsideration).
470 The court arrived at this appraisal while considering the state's defense of assumption of
the risk because the plaintiff had driven on the same section of road only three days before the
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knowledge of cold patch erosion properties, to say that the Department of
Transportation was without sufficient constructive notice is an attempt to
artificially limit the extent of governmental liability. 47 1
Another factual problem that arises in consideration of the notice problem
involves the infrequent occurrence of a phenomenon known as a "pavement
blow-up." This phenomenon occurs when the adjacent ends of two sections of
concrete highway buckle due to extreme subsurface pressure, creating a
ramp-like condition in the highway which can cause extreme control
problems in an automobile encountering it. In Knickel v. Department of
Transportation 472 the court of claims was called upon to decide whether the
state was liable for plaintiff's personal and property damage sustained when
his automobile encountered a severe "pavement blow-up." The Department
of Transportation had been repeatedly called upon to patch and fill an eleven
and one-half mile stretch of deteriorating highway and had completed
specifications for a complete overhaul of this troublesome area. 473 In July,
1974, before repair had been started, a "pavement blow-up" occurred and Mr.
Knickel's car crashed, resulting in serious injuries to him.
Examining a departmental design policy memorandum dated June 13,
1975, the court noted that this phenomenon occurs suddenly and usually
without advance warning. The memorandum, however, urged that pressure
relief joints be inserted into areas of pavement where pressure build-up was
suspected. Presented with no evidence of the existence of "blow-ups" in either
the immediate or general area, the court had to determine whether
nonetheless there was sufficient notice to impose liability. It concluded that
since defendant had notice of the generally deteriorated and dangerous
condition of the highway,474 it need not have been given notice of the specific
condition that had produced plaintiff's injuries. 475
accident. Since the road surface could deteriorate so rapidly, the court found that the plaintiff's
prior use of the highway did not constitute assumption of the risk. No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 3-4.
171 But see Hampel v. Department of Transp., No. 77-0206 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 30,1977). In
Hampel, approximately one month had elapsed between the patching of the road and the
plaintiff's accident. The court noted that "since the cold patch material which must be used in
winter has limited durability, the Department has constructive notice that further repairs to this
area would likely be necessary in the future." Id., slip op. at 1.
472 No. 75-0329 (Ohio Ct. C1. Sept. 8,1975), afi'd, 49 Ohio App. 2d 335,361 N .E.2d 486 (10th
Dist. 1976). The "blow-up" caused the abutting ends of two sections of concrete highway to rise at
least two feet above the level of the highway. The effect was that the plaintiff drove his car up a
twelve-foot-long ramp (the length of the highway sections) to the point where the sections had
met. The car then hurtled off the raised sections of highway with no road underneath. In the
plaintiff's words, he felt as though he were "flying through the air." 49 Ohio App. 2d at 336,361
N.E.2d at 488.
7 49 Ohio App. 2d at 336,361 N.E.2d at 488. The overhaul included, but was not limited to,
replacing worn pavement joints and resurfacing with "blacktop" at a total cost of $3.5 million. Id.
at 336-37, 361 N.E.2d at 488.
474 The court of claims found that the defendant's knowledge of the general condition
conceded "an awareness that a hazardous condition was likely to occur, but where, when and to
what extent was impossible of precise ascertainment." No. 75-0329, slip op. at5. The court found
this awareness to exist despite its reference to a departmental notice which said that " 'blow-
ups' . . . occur suddenly, often with little or no advance indication." Id., slip op. at 3.
The court of appeals, affirming the decision of the court of claims, ruled that "there is a general
foreseeability that blow-ups will occur and that someone will be injured as the result." 49 Ohio
App. 2d at 339, 361 N.E.2d at 489.
475 No. 75-0329, slip op. at 5. This is probably the court's most liberal statement on record
regarding notice and may best be explained as a means to effectuate a policy decision on the
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Once plaintiff has satisfied the notice requirement, he must prove that
defendant was negligent in repairing (or failing to repair) the particular defect
or was generally negligent in the maintenance of its highways. 4 76 The debate
focuses upon the question of whether the defendant's actions (or failure to
act) were reasonable under the circumstances.
A favored defense at this stage of the inquiry is that repair of the defect
was impossible because of weather conditions. In order for the defense to be
successful, however, the state must clearly establish the weather conditions on
the dates surrounding the incident in question. 477 A general allegation that the
weather would not permit repairs or a proffered department work schedule
showing a preponderance of time devoted to snow removal will not suffiee. 47
The court generally finds the weather defense persuasive when supported by
evidence of actual weather conditions prevailing at and near the time of the
accident giving rise to the claim. 4 79 However, when an area of highway has so
many holes or holes of such size that the highway section may be considered
extraordinarily dangerous, 480 the court has noted that the state may be under a
duty to repair the area immediately, even in the face of inclement weather. 411
The state frequently offers the further defense that it has only limited
resources with which to maintain its highways. The court has not consistently
question of who should bear the loss occasioned by the occurrence of a "blow-up." The court of
appeals posed the question as "who will bear the burden of the loss due to sudden blow-ups: the
state of Ohio which has the duty to maintain highways in a reasonably safe condition, or the
general public. ... 49 Ohio App. 2d at 339, 361 N.E.2d at 489. The court of appeals agreed
with the court of claims' holding that the state should bear the loss.
476 See note 463 supra and accompanying text. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the
plaintiff would prevail by proving that the defendant generally maintains its highways in a
negligent manner. Establishing that the defendant has negligently maintained sections of
highway other than the one upon which the plaintiff sustained his injuries seems irrelevant.
Indeed, proving such an allegation seems to evade the likely argument that the state maintains the
section of highway where the plaintiff was injured in a non-neghgent manner.
477 See Keller v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 76-0219, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 31,1976);
Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0472, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 17, 1976).
478 But see DeChesne v. Department of Transp., No. 76-0265, slip op. at4-5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov.
12,1976). The discussion of the reasonableness of the state's action was undertaken after the court
had found that notice was insufficient. See text accompanying note 467 supra.
479 Hollis v. Department of Transp., No. 76-0140 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 10, 1976), contains an
example of a successful defense of impossibility due to weather conditions. In Hollis, the state
showed that snow had fallen every day between the date of the plaintiff's accident and the date
the particular section of highway had last been repaired. Each day during this time span the
average snowfall was one and one-tenth inches, accumulating to depths ranging from two to six
inches. Id., slip op. at 3. The court concluded that "[t]hese figures illustrate that road repair
operations . . . would have been dangerous if not impossible." Id.
480 In Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0472 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 17, 1976), a state
highway department employee testified that in order for a chuckhole to be classified as
"dangerous" it must be at least three inches deep and two feet square. Id., slip op. at 4. A second
employee testified that the chuckhole at issue in Johnson was not deep enough to require
immediate action, that is, it did not have dimensions sufficient to classify it as "dangerous." Id. See
Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,1976) (on reconsidera-
tion). While describing a period of continuous snowfall, the Denis court noted that "during this
period, Defendant did have an obligation to repair abnormal and extraordinarily dangerous
defects of which it had, or should have had, notice." Id., slip op. at 6.
481 Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0472, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 17, 1976)
(dictum). The court, in referring to the evidence, commented that the state had offered no
evidence to establish that the weather on the day the plaintiff sustained his injuries was too severe
to permit the defendant to repair the road.
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found this "economic impossibility" defense persuasive. 482 When it has
declared the defense successful, it has done so on the basis that the increased
funding necessary to enable the more rapid and efficient repair of highway
defects would have to come from taxpayers, placing a "constant burden on
the public." 483 This approach reflects the policy decision that economic
burdens of physical injuries sustained by people using the highway should be
borne by the individual and not the general taxpaying public. However, when
faced with a case of severe injuries and the infrequently occurring but highly
dangerous hazard of a "pavement blow-up" in Knickel, both the court of
claims and the court of appeals expressed the policy that the state should bear
the burden, rejecting the economic impossibility defense.
The state may, in keeping with the language of the liability clause of the
Court of Claims Act, 484 raise any defense available to a private party in similar
circumstances. 485 It is common for the state in highway defect cases to raise
the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 486 Of course
the principles of these defenses do not change simply by virtue of their being
raised in litigation with the state, but it is interesting to note the results of their
application in specific instances. For example, the state contended in Denis
that three days prior to the accident plaintiff had traversed the section of
highway where his car was wrecked and that in going back over the section on
the fateful day, he assumed the risk. The court determined that plaintiff's
familiarity did not constitute assumption of the risk because during the winter
months, with periods of heavy precipitation and freeze-thaw cycles, the
surface of a highway may change significantly during a short period of
time. 487 It seems by this analysis that the plaintiff must be shown to have
482 Typical of this position are the court's statements in Hollis v. Department of Transp., No.
76-0140 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 10, 1976):
Defendant is responsible for an immense highway system. Its potential liability is
almost without limit. Defendant's liability must be determined in light of its capabilities.
Given unlimited funds and unlimited personnel, defendant could be charged with
keeping the highways in near-perfect condition. The defendant does not have unlimited
funds or unlimited personnel. It must within the capabilities it does possess make
priorities and trade-offs.
Id., slip op. at 4.
483 Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27, 1976).
But see Miller v. Ohio Highway Dep't, No. 754336 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 28, 1976) (overruling
state's motion to dismiss) in which the court ruled that the maintenance of forty-seven metal
expansion joints in one area of highway is not an "excessively burdensome or unreasonable task."
Id., slip op. at 4.
s OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
Baker v. Highway Dep't, No. 76-0271 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 5,1977) involved a situation in
which a motorist passing through a highway construction project had her car struck by a piece of
pipe carried by a worker. Another worker had been directing traffic. The state offered the
proposition that in all such situations the motorist is in a better position to avoid an accident than
the worker. Such an argument would seem to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of
motorists proceeding through construction areas, leaving no doubt about the state's position on
the policy question. While the court found the proposition inapplicable in Baker, it specifically
reserved judgment about its general validity. Id., slip op. at 1.
41 See, e.g., Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0472 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 17,1976); Denis
v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,1976) (on reconsideration). In
fact, there is no reason to believe that these defenses are not applicable in all cases in which the
state is charged with negligence.
487 See notes 470, 471 supra. Quaere, if the accident had occurred during the summer months,
would the court have approached the case in the same way?
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current knowledge of a specific hazard in order to have assumed the risk. In
Johnson v. Department of Transportation, 488 the state argued that riding a
motorcycle equipped with an extended fork and raised handlebars on a
much-travelled highway constituted contributory negligence.489 The court
rejected the argument, noting that such devices were within the law and that
riders of motorcycles so equipped are licensed by the state.
Two related areas deserve brief mention here: the liability of the state for
failure to post warning signs and its liability for improperly designed
highways. On the subject of warnings, the court of claims has declared that no
concrete definition of a duty to warn motorists can be devised; instead it will
consider whether a duty can be established on a case-by-case basis. 490 The
court has declared further that the state's duty to warn extends only to
extraordinarily dangerous conditions. 491 It has suggested two methods for
proving the existence of such conditions: plaintiff may show that the section of
highway where injuries were sustained was significantly more dangerous than
other sections in the vicinity, or plaintiff may show that other motorists
suffered injuries on the same highway section at the same time. 492 On the
subject of highway design, the court has held that the state has a duty to "do
the best it possibly can ''493 to provide "reasonable, practical, and feasible
construction ' 494 of highways. It does not mean, however, that the state is
under a higher duty than ordinary care. The "best it possibly can" means that
which reasonably might be expected after weighing such factors as
feasibility, cost, and notice of potential dangers. 45
An interesting feature of the decisions in this area of tort claims against the
state is the technique employed by the court of claims in identifying the
sources of the state's duty upon which liability is sought to be sustained. In the
41' No. 75-0472 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 17, 1976).
419 Id., slip op. at 7. The state produced a Department of Highway Safety specialist whose
expert opinion was that these devices decrease stability and steering control, especially in
emergency situations.
490 Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 6-7 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,
1976) (on reconsideration).
191 On this point the court has relied upon the law in other states: Petree v. Crowe, 272 So. 2d
399 (La. Ct. App. 1973), which concluded that a driver is not required to anticipate extraordinary
highway damage, and Barton v. King County, 18 Wash. 2d 573,139 P.2d 1019 (1943), which held
that a municipality's duty to warn extended to inherently dangerous situations or those likely to
mislead a prudent traveler.
The extension of a duty to warn about extraordinarily dangerous conditions was also declared
in Echard v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0308 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 18, 1976).
492 Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,1976)
(on reconsideration).
4' Haskins v. Jackson, No. 75-0275, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 8, 1976). The court also
stated that, "[r]easonableness requires only that a governmental agency do the best it possibly
can, and it is not required to meet every possible situation no matter when or where it may occur."
Id.
The court gave no indication of the source of this duty, whether by statute or previous
decision. In comparison, a portion of the California waiver of immunity deals directly with this
situation. CAL. GOVT CODE § 830.6 (West 1966). It provides that there will be no liability for design
of or construction on public property if the plan was approved in advance by a body exercising
discretionary authority, or if the plan was prepared in accordance with previously approved
standards, unless there is no reasonable basis for such approval.
494 Haskins v. Jackson, No. 75-0275, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 8, 1976).
495 Id. at 8.
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leading case of Denis v. Department of Transportation,4 98 for example, the
court quoted from a section of the Ohio Revised Code entitled "Duties and
powers of director," 497 which provides that "[t]he director of transportation
shall have general supervision of all roads comprising the state highway
system. He may . . . improve, maintain, repair, and preserve any road or
highway on the state highway system. '" 498
However, the court looked beyond the language of the code directed to
the state. It also considered code provisions establishing the liability of
counties, municipalities, and townships for lapses of street and highway
maintenance. 199 Furthermore, it cited approvingly the jury charge issued in
District of Columbia v. Woodbury50 which it believed to be an accurate
statement of general common law principles applicable to highway defect
cases.5 1 Combining the common law principles with the statutory law
applicable to the state, counties, municipalities and townships, the court
synthesized the elements of proof to be imposed upon the plaintiff.
This glaring difference of approach between the line of cases represented
by Denis, on the one hand, and the lines of cases represented by Devoe and
Shelton on the other, certainly raises the need for further inquiry. If no basis in
logic or policy can be identified and the different approaches cannot be
reconciled, then one or the other of those approaches should be abandoned.
As we have seen in the business regulation cases and the safety inspection
cases, the court of claims will focus its consideration of the question of the
existence of a state duty upon the language of the statute enabling
"0 No. 75-0287 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27, 1976).
197 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5501.31 (Page Supp. 1978).
498 No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 1. The court also referred to other duties of the director, none of
which were pertinent to the issue of negligence. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5501.04 (Page Supp.
1978). Section 5501.04 deals with the administrative designation within the Department of
Transportation, commanding the director to distribute the department's activities among the
separate divisions. Section 5501.42 rests in the director the responsibility for all trees and shrubs
within state highway limits.
Denis also cites section 2 of Bill 584, effective August 1,1975 (Appropriation Act) as containing
a duty of the director of the Department of Transportation. It states:
"Notwithstanding Chapter 5521 and sections 5501.41 and 5511.01 of the Revised Code,
the director of transportation shall remove snow and ice, and maintain, repair or
improve, and provide lighting upon interstate highways which are located within the
boundaries of municipal corporations, adequate to meet the requirements of the federal
highway administration."
Act of June 29, 1973 § 5501.41, 135 Ohio Laws 1301, 1374 (1973) (current version at Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 5501.41 (Page Supp. 1978)).
This might have been an adequate statutory basis upon which to predicate the state's duty to
maintain highways as explained in Denis because the chuckhole struck by the plaintiff was
located in an interstate highway (1-77) within the borders of the city of Cleveland. No. 75-0287
AD, slip op. at 3.
However, as noted by the court, Amended House Bill 584 became effective subsequent to the
incurrence of damage alleged in Denis. In fact, a provision of the code was in force on January 10,
1975, declaring that the Director of Transportation had no duty to resurface, maintain, or repair
state highways within the borders of municipal corporations. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5501.31
(Page Supp. 1978).
499 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 305.12 (Page 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5571.02 (Page Supp. 1978); id. § 5571.10 (as amended 1978).
5- 136 U.S. 450 (1890).
'' Denis v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 27,1976)
(on reconsideration).
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governmental action.50 2 A statute which directs that a department or agency
of the state "may" engage in certain activity or "may" refrain from certain
activity has been held to endow that department or agency with a range of
discretion from which no liability may arise.503 Yet, the code language quoted
in Denis provides that the director "may . . . improve, maintain, repair, and
preserve . . ."504 state highways. The court neglected to refer to other
provisions of the same statute which would seem to repudiate any allegations
of duty to be imposed against the Director of Transportation where the
highways are situated within the boundaries of municipal corporations.
505
The application of the Devoe and Shelton reasoning would lead to the
conclusion that the statutes simply granted authority to act and a measure of
discretion to act or not to act within that authority. The conclusion to be
reached would be that liability would not be imposed for injuries resulting
from the exercise of that discretion. Since that was not the result in Denis,
there are three alternative explanations for the difference: (1) the court was
incorrect in its construction of the statute; (2) the court was abandoning the
method of statutory construction employed by Devoe and Shelton; or (3) the
statutory basis of liability, or lack thereof, would not be the determinative
factor in the court's consideration of the duty issue.
Given the wide latitude of judicial decisions dealing with the meanings of
may" and "shall," it cannot be maintained with any degree of authority that
the court was "incorrect" in its construction of the statutory language. Courts
have construed "shall" to mean the statute is directory only and have declared
that "may" does not obviate a mandatory purpose.506 This observation further
points up the problem with making discretionary function immunity
dependent upon construction of such language.
The court of appeals has not abandoned the Devoe and Shelton method of
statutory construction, and if later decisions are indicative, neither has the
court of claims. For example, two years after Denis in Jones v. State,-5 7 the
court of appeals affirmed the court of claims dismissal of the case upon a
finding that the statute imposed no duty to suspend the business' operations.
The court of claims has reached the point in its jurisprudence where it will
go beyond a statutory scheme supportive of a discretionary construction to
ascertain governmental duty, at least in highway defect cases. The question
remains why the court would be willing to extend its analysis beyond an
inquiry into the statutes to find a predicate of state liability as it did in Denis.
The answer lies, perhaps, in the court's appreciation of common law decisions
in other jurisdictions.50 8 In Denis the court relied heavily upon the jury charge
Io- See text accompanying notes 441-47, 451-55 supra.
s50 Devoe v. State, No. 75-0105 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18, 1975), afj'd, 48 Ohio App. 2d 311,357
N.E.2d 296 (10th Dist. 1975); Adamov v. State, 460 Ohio Misc. 1,345 N.E.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
501 OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5501.31 (Page Supp. 1978).
s Id.
5w E.g., Jones v. State, No. 77 AP-688 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1977).
so7 Id. See text accompanying note 444 supra.
'o' See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.2D 425 (1958); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2D 1222 (1958). For
example, the New York courts have determined that actions sounding in negligence may be
brought against the state under the New York Court of Claims Act for failure to "maintain the
highway in a reasonably safe condition for travel at all seasons of the year." Dunn v. State, 52
N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (Ct. Cl. 1944). See also Torrey v. State, 266 App. Div. 900,42 N.Y.S.2d 567
(1943).
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in District of Columbia v. Woodbury,5 09 a United States Supreme Court
decision affirming liability of the district for injuries' sustained by plaintiff
because of improperly maintained sidewalks. The charge to the jury in that
case stated that the district was under a "duty of supervising the streets of
Washington, and keeping them in a condition fit for convenient use and safe
against accidents to travellers using them."510 Cautioning the jury that the
governmental unit was not an insurer, the trial judge had said further, "[ilt is
simply bound to practice due care and diligence in the exercise of its powers
and in the application of its resources toward the objects named."51'
In other words, "common law liability," 51 missing in the other cases, was
present in Denis. From that, the court then constructed the state's duty by
analogy to the duties imposed by the Ohio Revised Code upon governmental
entities other than the state.513 Thus it is clear that the court is not willing to
proceed along unmarked paths in the development of common law. Rather,
once other jurisdictions have marked the way, and the statutory scheme
pertaining to the state department or agency does not prohibit the imposition
of duty, the court will entertain a cause of action sounding in negligence.
Practitioners before the court would be well-advised, therefore, not to
proceed upon a theory of liability which relies solely upon the imposition of
duty by statute, but to identify cases from other jurisdictions, on point or
analogous, which mark the way through the application of ordinary tort
principles for the court.
E. State Custody over Juvenile Offenders
In Adamov v. State51 4 the Ohio Court of Claims set forth its approach for
dealing with state liability for injuries inflicted by a juvenile released from
state custody. Plaintiffs contended that the Ohio Youth Commission had been
negligent in its decision to release a juvenile in light of his history of violent
acts. 515 The state's motion for summary judgment was granted upon several
grounds.
One proposition offered by the court in support of its decision was that
there was no analogous private counterpart to the state's activity. Confine-
ment of juvenile offenders was considered by the court to be a unique state
activity having no analog in the private sector, and since the liability of the
state was to be determined in accordance with rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties, tort liability could not arise from this activity. 16 As
previously discussed, this approach does not provide a workable standard for
the determination of governmental liability, since most functions of state have
no private counterpart, and there does not appear to be such a far-reaching
limitation in the express language of the state's consent to suit. 517
5- 136 U.S. 450 (1889).
510 Id. at 463.
511 Id.
51 See notes 390-91 supra and accompanying text.
513 The court observed that the analogy was not complete because "the potential exposure of
the state is much greater than that of counties, municipal corporations, and townships." No. 75-
0287 AD, slip op. at 3.
514 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
515 Id. at 2, 345 N.E.2d at 662.
516 Id. at 6-7, 345 N.E.2d at 664-65.
517 See notes 409-10 supra and accompanying text.
1979]
81Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In other respects, however, the decision in Adamov was sound. As it had
done in the business activity regulation cases led by Devoe, the court
discussed the question of discretionary immunity in terms of the statutes
authorizing state activity. However, while the concept of discretionary
function immunity was rather poorly defined in Devoe, the reasoning in
Adamov was very similar to the policy formulation test used in Downs v.
United States in determining the application of that type of immunity.
The statutes outlining the functions and duties of the Ohio Youth
Commission are directed toward a dual purpose. The commission is directed
to order the treatment of each child committed to its custody in the way that it
considers best suited to the needs of the individual and the interests of the
public.5 18 The commission is vested with wide discretion in its decisions
whether to confine or release a child, and those decisions involve balancing
the child's needs against the public interest in protection from the
consequences of criminal behavior.519 In Adamov, the court of claims
concluded that, in light of the federal discretionary function exception, the
exercise of discretion by the Ohio Youth Commission could not provide a
basis for tort liability. 520 The analysis did not stop there, however. The court
went on to discuss the concept of discretion in rather precise terms. To qualify
for discretionary immunity, the court suggested, an official decision must
relate to basic governmental policy or objective and must be essential to the
attainment of that end. Furthermore, the court said that the decision must
involve evaluation and judgment based upon expertise and be grounded upon
requisite statutory authority. Since the decisions of the Ohio Youth
Commission involved the balancing of public interests against the need for
rehabilitative treatment of the child, the court held that the commission was
immune from liability. 521
This reasoning reflects the same considerations as the policy formulation
test of discretionary function immunity employed by federal courts. The
Ohio Youth Commission is charged with the responsibility for basic policy
decisions in the treatment of youthful offenders committed to its custody.
Given the importance of the competing interests to be placed in balance in
decisions whether to confine or release, it could be argued that those decisions
should be free of the threat of private tort litigation. The court's analysis
should withstand any criticism based upon the premise that the state activity
does not fall properly within the scope of discretionary immunity.
While the plaintiff in Adamov did not perfect an appeal, the later case of
Hahn v. Brown5 22 was decided upon substantially similar grounds, and the
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. However, the Hahn case
518 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5139.04(C) (Page 1973).
519 This balancing process is also reflected in the motivating philosophy of juvenile court
procedures. The court is directed to provide for the cure, protection, and mental and physical
development of juveniles, as well as to protect the public interest in removing the consequences
of criminal behavior. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Page 1976).
520 46 Ohio Misc. at 5, 345 N.E.2d at 666.
521 Id. The approach was borrowed from a Washington case, Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes
526-29 infra.
" No. 75-0119 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 13, 1976),afi'd, 51 Ohio App. 2d 177, 367 N.E.2d 884 (10th
Dist. 1976).
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involved different facts in as much as the alleged injury was inflicted by two
escapees from the Maumee Youth Camp. Plaintiff claimed that the youths
damaged his automobile and that the selection and enforcement of security
measures at the camp had been negligent.5 23 The court of claims dismissed the
action on the authority of its decision in Adamov. 52 4
Plaintiff sought to avoid the Adamov holding on the basis of the different
facts. The youth who attacked Mrs. Adamov had been intentionally released
from official custody on the specific statutory authority of the Ohio Youth
Commission. In Hahn there was no intention to release the offenders; they
escaped because those charged with custody inadvertently permitted it. The
court of claims explicitly rejected the attempted distinction and held that the
selection of adequate security precautions, like the decision whether to
confine or release, required the exercise of judgment and discretion. 52
The court cited a Washington case, Evangelical United Brethren Church
v. State,528 in support of its approach. In that case, a boy with known
pyromaniac propensities escaped from a state youth detention facility and set
fire to a church. The Washington Supreme Court discussed several
approaches to the determination of discretionary immunity and held the state
not liable under the principle.527 One of the approaches the court considered
was the planning-operational distinction prevalently used by the federal
courts at that time. Noting the efficacy of that approach, the court chose
instead to adopt its own version of the policy formulation test. In order to
qualify for discretionary function immunity a state decision must involve a
basic public policy objective, be essential to the accomplishment of that
policy, as opposed to a choice which would not change the course or direction
of public policy, be based upon judgment and expertise, and be grounded
upon requisite constitutional or statutory authority.5 28 Under this concept of
discretionary function, the Washington court held the selection of security
measures at a youth camp were immune.5 29
The Washington Supreme Court approach is obviously the one embraced
by the court in Adamov. Although the Adamov definition was not repeated in
Hahn, the court did suggest that a balancing of governmental objectives was
inherent in the decision of the camp administrators. The selection of security
measures, the court concluded, involved the balancing of the rehabilitative
needs of the child and the community interest in being free from criminal
behavior. The state was held to be immune under the discretionary function
exception. 530
523 51 Ohio App. 2d at 177,367 N.E.2d at 884. The plaintiff also argued that the state should be
liable under Ohio Revised Code section 3109.09, which allows a property owner to recover
damages from the parents of a minor child who willfully damages the owner's property. See Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1973). Both the court of claims and the court of appeals
concluded that whatever the rights and responsibilities of the state with regard to juveniles within
its custody, the state was not a "parent" within the meaning of this statute. 51 Ohio App. 2d at 178,
367 N.E.2d at 886.
524 No. 75-0119, slip op. at 8.
525 Id. at 6.
521 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
521 Id. at 252-55, 407 P.2d at 444-45.
528 Id. at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
529 Id. at 258, 407 P.2d at 446-47.
530 No. 75-0119, slip op. at 6.
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Unfortunately, although the court of appeals affirmed Hahn, it did not
employ the policy formulation test. Plaintiff had argued that the court of
claims had erred in relying upon Adamov, sa' a very weak ground for appeal,
since the court of appeals would not be inclined to collaterally review an
earlier unappealed trial court decision .32 The court of appeals' review of the
Adamov case was limited to a general expression of approval of the decision.
However, that statement of approval was immediately followed by the
court's reiteration of the no analogous private counterpart proposition. There
is thus no reason to believe that the policy formulation test will become
attractive to the court of appeals in the near future sa
F. Care and Custody of Patients in State Hospitals
Because of the involvement of the same policy considerations as those
arising in the context of care and custody of youthful offenders in the state, one
would expect the court of claims' analysis to be similar when the focus
changes to questions of state liability in the context of care and custody of
patients in state hospitals. That expectation has not been completely borne out
in the decisions. The first type of claim to be considered is the allegation of
official negligence in the treatment of patients entrusted to the care of state
hospitals. Generally, the court of claims has acknowledged the liability of the
state in such claims. However, it appears that the standard of care to be
applied to the hospital and its personnel will vary, depending largely upon the
type of illness afflicting the patient and the nature of the patient's claim.
The court has held that the standard of care generally to be applied to the
state is set forth in section 5122.27 of the Ohio Revised Code: "Every patient
shall be entitled to humane care and treatment and, to the extent that facilities,
equipment, and personnel are available, to medical care and treatment in
accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical practice."' 44
While acknowledging that this standard amounts to "less than the ap-
proved"535 (less than what might be approved in a private medical setting?),
the court suggests that the standard "appears to accept reality."536
The standard was applied in Hale v. Portsmouth Receiving Hospital.37
Plaintiff contended that the defendant physician negligently refused her
admission to a state mental hospital despite his knowledge of her suicidal
tendencies538 and that this negligence was the proximate cause of her later
531 51 Ohio App. 2d at 179, 367 N.E.2d at 886.
532 Id.
-33 See Leverett v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, No. 77 AP-107 (Ohio 10th
Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27,1978), where plaintiff claimed the Center had wrongfully released a patient
who later shot and killed plaintiff's husband. The case is discussed at notes 544-47 infra and
accompanying text.
534 Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Page Supp. 1978).
-a3 See Lynch v. State, No. 75-0492, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 2, 1975).
536 Id.
s37 No. 75-0104 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 29, 1976), afi'd, No. 76 AP-946 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App.
April 28, 1977).
538 No. 75-0104, slip op. at 2. The California waiver of immunity contains a provision covering
this situation. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 856.4 (West 1966). It provides that no liability may ensue for an
injury caused by the failure to admit a person to a public medical facility, unless the facility is
under a mandatory statutory duty to protect against the particular type of injury that is suffered. If
this should be the case, the public entity may still escape liability by establishing that it exercised
reasonable diligence in attempting to fulfill its duty. Id. § 815.6.
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attempted suicide. Paying great deference to the budgetary constraints upon
provision of state services, the court dismissed the complaint. Pointing out the
qualifying language of the statute making the standard of care dependent
upon the extent of availability of facilities, equipment and personnel, the
court held that the qualification cast the physician's denial of admission into an
area where no liability should attach. The provision of medical facilities,
equipment and personnel was considered to be a matter for legislative
determination, and the shortcomings in such areas could not form the basis for
a claim in negligence.539
The obvious danger in such a rationale is in its blanket application to all
refusals of admission. Unless it is clear that the refusal was based upon an
appraisal of facilities, equipment and personnel which showed the hospital
resources were taxed beyond consideration of the admission of one more
patient, the application of the qualifying language to impose a lesser standard
of care would be an erroneous interpretation of the law. Even if the hospital to
which the claimant sought admission were overextended in its resources, the
question would still remain whether the defendant's duty of care extended to
finding a hospital that could admit her. It is not clear from the opinion whether
the court considered these aspects of the claim.
When the claim involves a patient alleging injury inflicted by another
patient, the standard is further lowered. In Siegle v. Moritz, 540 a claim based
upon one patient striking another patient in the eye with a broom, the court of
appeals held that the state owes only a duty of reasonable care to prevent
harm from other patients. The decision relied upon the patients' rights section
of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides that a mental patient "shall be
given reasonable protection from assault or battery by any other person.
' 54
'
Although the decision is not clear on the matter, it seems to suggest that the
reasonableness standard imposed by the statutory right is also affected by the
personnel and material qualification of code section 5122.27.
In some cases, a patient may allege that a physician or other medically
trained person has not given treatment with the skill or care exercised by the
average professional in like circumstances. In such a case, the qualifying
language of section 5122.27 can have no application, since it is the quality of
the individual, and not the state's collective material and personnel resources,
that is being called into question. The court has applied the general common
law standard of care to determine liability: "The question is what would a
physician of ordinary skill, care, and diligence have done under similar
conditions."542 Interestingly, this same standard was applied in Colnar v.
Hawthomden State Hospital,543 where plaintiff asserted negligence on the
part of the state in the maintenance of the physical surroundings of her room.
She claimed that defendant negligently permitted her door to become locked,
negligently failed to come to her aid when summoned, and negligently
," N o. 75-0104, slip op. at 23. In order to carry this burden, the plaintiff must establish that the
particular department of the state possessed sufficient funds to allow it to increase its staffing or
facilities. Siegle v. Moritz, No. 77 AP-303, slip op. at 3 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1977).
540 No. 77 AP-303 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1977).
541 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.29(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1978).
542 Hale v. Portsmouth Receiving Hosp., No. 75-0104, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 29,1976),
afi'd, No. 76 AP-946 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1977).
543 No. 75-0410 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 28, 1976).
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permitted her window to open without providing bars or grates. The
complaint was dismissed upon a finding that plaintiff had not met her burden
of proof regarding the standard of care.
Cases also arise in this area of state activity when a patient released or
escaped from a mental institution injures someone. Given the courts' decisions
in the area of juvenile detention, the likely approach to these cases would be to
consider the discretionary aspects of the decision to retain or release patients
for the purpose of applying discretionary function immunity. That indeed has
been the court of claims' method of decision, but the court of appeals has
departed somewhat from the expected pattern.
In Leverett v. State,544 the court of claims was presented with a wrongful
death action against the state in which plaintiff alleged that the wrongful
release of a dangerous mental patient resulted in the patient later killing her
husband. Citing the Adamov and Hahn cases, the court dismissed plaintiff's
claim. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the court had erroneously applied
the liability clause of the Court of Claims Act since rules of law applicable to
private parties could be found in this case.
The court of appeals agreed with plaintiff. This court distinguished the
Adamov and Hahn decisions because those cases arose in the area of the state's
duty to incarcerate criminal offenders, an activity that has no private
counterpart. Here, the activity has a private sector counterpart because there
are private hospitals for mental patients.545 If a private mental patient care
facility could be held liable for negligent release, said the court, so could the
state pursuant to the liability clause of the Act.
Having reached that state of its analysis, the court encountered a snag: no
Ohio case could be found which discussed the imposition of liability of a
private hospital in the situation presented. At this point, the court of appeals
made a significant move in the jurisprudence of the Court of Claims Act. It
extended the common law regarding state liability into unmarked territory by
concluding that the state's physicians and hospitals have a duty to act
reasonably and in good faith in the release of dangerous mental patients. That
duty is owed to persons who can establish that an injury by such a released
patient "is proximately caused by the acts or omissions of the doctors oi
hospital." 46
The court recognized that decisions to release involve the same sort ol
balancing of interests as the penal incarceration cases. It considered th(
difficulty in "balancing the interests of a patient who would benefit frorr
permanent or periodic release, the interest of society in treating mental illnes,
and returning the patient to a normal, productive life, and the interests ol
society in keeping a dangerous, mentally ill person off the streets '"5 4.
to render the decision discretionary. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
discretionary though these acts were, the intent of section 5122.34 of the Ohio
Revised Code was that where a duty was imposed upon a private mental
facility, a corresponding duty was imposed upon a state mental hospital.
544 No. 77-0202 (Ohio Ct. C1. Jan. 31, 1978), rev'd, No. 78 AP-107 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App.
Oct. 27, 1978).
5 No. 78 AP-107, slip op. at 6.
546 Id. at 11.
547 Id. at 8.
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Two questions remain: what will constitute a breach of the duty, and why
was state liability extended so far, given a close parallel to the incarceration
cases? There can be no certain answer to the latter question. Perhaps the
seriousness of the injury claimed as well as the court's assessment of the
frequency with which such cases will be pressed persuaded it to take the
additional step. It cannot be doubted that the presence of a private
counterpart 548 was a strong factor in persuading the court to impose liability.
There was, however, no common law upon the subject, and the court of
appeals has become fond of pronouncing that in the absence of statutory or
common law liability no duty will arise to support a cause of action in
negligence. 549 Aside from the possible dilution of the Adamov adoption of the
modem view of discretionary function immunity, the decision is a
commendable example of a common law court establishing common law in
matters of first impression.
The answer to what will constitute a breach of duty is strongly suggested in
Leverett, and that answer may well provide as much protection as the
discretionary function immunity concept. The court stated that liability
would flow from negligent releases of dangerous mental patients "only when
the hospital, in exercising medical judgment, knew or should have known that
the patient, upon his release, would be very likely to cause harm to himself or
others."550 Furthermore, when the court reached the conclusion that the
decisions to release were discretionary, it emphasized that those decisions
would be "subject to rebuke only for the most flagrant, capricious, and
arbitrary abuse."55' In so doing, the court has supplanted discretionary
function immunity with a privilege that conforms to the common law concept
of privilege. The state is by no means made an insurer for injuries by released
patients. It will not even be liable where ordinary negligence leads to the
548 It is interesting to note that in this setting, the private counterpart activity is more than
"analogous;" it is the same activity as that being performed by the state.
549 See, e.g., Walker v. Department of Rehab. & Correction, No. 76 AP-970 (Ohio 10th Dist.
Ct. App. Nov. 3,1977). In Walker, the plaintiff alleged negligence by the department in paroling a
prisoner who had been convicted of stabbing with intent to wound on two previous occasions and
had been convicted of second degree murder while on parole from the second stabbing
conviction. In addition, the parolee had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon during
his parole from the murder sentence but had not had his parole revoked by the department.
Plaintiff, a police officer, was shot by the parolee and was paralyzed from the waist down as a
result of the wound. The court of claims dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and
the court of appeals affirmed:
Certainly the action brought herein is not one which could have been brought between
private parties, inasmuch as private parties have no duty, as does the state, to incarcerate
criminals and juvenile offenders. It must be remembered that the Court of Claims Act
did not create new causes of action where none existed in the past.
Id., slip op. at 8 (quoting Hahn v. Brown, 51 Ohio App. 2d 177,179,367 N.E.2d 884,886 (10th Dist.
1976)). See also City of Oregon v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio App. 2d 95, 385 N.E.2d 1084 (10th Dist.
1978), in which plaintiff alleged that negligent audits by defendant of its Clerk-Auditor office
resulted in financial losses. The court of claims had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed saying:
[I] f indeed there be any private parties to have such duty, such duty is not created by
statute but only by virtue of some other legal relationship and, hence, there is no law
making a private party liable for a failure to perform such statutory duties which were
enacted to protect the health, safety and welfare of all the citizens of Ohio.
Id. at 101-02, 385 N.E.2d at 1088.
... No. 78 AP-107, slip op. at 9. A dangerous mental patient is one who is very likely to cause
harm to himself or others. Id.
51 Id. at 8-9.
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injury of a third person. State hospital functionaries are privileged to make
determinations about release552 without liability to those who may be injured
by former patients so long as the privilege is not abused, and abuse occurs
only with the most outrageous lapses of judgment.
G. Care and Custody of Penal Institution Inmates
That the state may be held liable for injuries occurring to prison inmates is
clear,55 but determining from court of claims decisions the standard of care to
which the state will be held is not simple. In Freeman v. Denton554 the court
appeared to favor an approach akin to the discretionary function immunity
concept. Plaintiffs alleged that their civil rights had been violated by failure of
the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to properly credit parole
time toward their sentences. The court found that the language of the liability
clause of the Court of Claims Act
strongly suggests that the problems arising out of difficulties in the
management of penal institutions and in the relations between the
residente [sic] of those institutions and controlling authority are not
within the jurisdiction of this Court because there is no applicable
law to be found in the rules of law as respects suits between private
parties.&15
Clearly, if this notion were applied to all prisoners' injuries cases on the
question of state liability, no inmate could pursue a claim against the state.5 m
More commonly the court of claims has referred to chapter 4113 of the
Ohio Revised Code to establish the extent of liability of the state for prisoners'
injuries. That chapter, "Miscellaneous Labor Provisions," imposes liability on
an employer for injuries arising from acts of "fellow servants," 5 7 renders
assumption of the risk defenses unavailable to employers under certain
-5U The court drew a crucial distinction between release and readmittance:
In most instances, the doctor or hospital has only the assessment of lay people as to the
condition of the "patient," as opposed to the opinions of medical experts after admitting,
observing, and examining the patient. A duty as to readmission similar to the duty of
care in discharging would in effect require the admission of an persons suspected by lay
people to be dangerous. The dissimilarities of circumstances and pragmatic effect
convinces us that mental hospitals and doctors are not generally under a legal duty to
third parties as to decisions not to admit or readmit a patient.
Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
Quaere: Is the court suggesting that in those instances where the physician has more than lay
opinion to rely upon that a duty arises? If the answer is in the affirmative, would not that supply a
basis for distinguishing a first-time admittance and a readmittance, since in the latter instance the
physician has the benefit of the patient's history of observation and care while in the custody of
professionals?
See, e.g., Pace v. Department of Rehab. & Correction, No. 75-0539 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 21,
1976). But see Watson v. Department of Rehab. & Correction, No. 75-0204-SC (Ohio Ct. Cl.
Mar. 16, 1976).
554 No. 76-0463 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 20, 1976).
Id., slip op. at 4.
55 The California waiver of immunity contains a provision which provides specifically that
public entities (with few exceptions) are not liable for any injuries to prisoners. A public
employee will, however, be liable for negligent acts and omissions even when the public entity is
immune. In such situations the public entity may indemnify its employee, although it is not
required to do so. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6 (West 1966).
57 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.03 (Page 1973).
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conditions, 55a and permits a rule of comparative rather than contributory
negligence to be applied.559
This reliance on chapter 4113 has been disapproved by the Ohio Court of
Appeals for the Tenth District. In Fondern v. Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction,60 an inmate of Columbus Correctional Medical Center
sought recovery for injuries he sustained when caught in a steam clothes press
in the laundry room of the institution. Although the clothes press was designed
for two-handed operation for safety and its features included a dual-button
system which required both buttons to be depressed simultaneously to make
the machine operate, it was common practice for the inmates to jam or plug
one button so that only one hand could be used, a practice prohibited by
institution rules. The press, operated by plaintiff at the time of the injury had
one button jammed, and there was further evidence that the machine had
malfunctioned for the week preceding the accident. The court of claims,
finding that the "standard of care applicable from the State to an inmate
working at a job within a penal institution would be that prescribed by R.C.
4113.03 to 4113.07, " 561 awarded plaintiff $1,800 for the injury to his arm. The
state appealed on the grounds that chapter 4113 of the code was not
applicable to cases of this nature and that the findings of negligence and
absence of contributory negligence were contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence. While the court of appeals affirmed, it agreed with the state that
the court of claims erred in its reliance upon chapter 4113.
Citing an earlier court of claims opinion which had actually run counter to
the trend of that court's decisions by approving the defenses of assumption of
the risk, contributory negligence, and the "fellow-servant rule," 5 2 the court of
appeals held that an inmate of a penal institution is not an employee of the
state. The court of appeals then determined that a non-statutory standard of
care had been breached by the state. The standard of care to be applied is
ordinary negligence; "the injured prisoner must prove that the negligence of
the responsible officials proximately caused the injuries complained of.
Further, the State of Ohio may have available to it the common law defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, if applicable, in a given
case."
56
Where the prisoner is claiming to have been injured by a state employee,
the court of claims' statements about required proof have been somewhat
more explicit. The injured party must establish that an agent of the state
attacked the plaintiff and caused the injury or that the state had actual or
constructive notice that the plaintiff was in danger and failed to respond or did
so inappropriately, and that the state is responsible in some way for the acts of
its agent.56 This is a particularly sensitive area for the court. Under general
I d. §4113.06.
Id. §4113.07.
0 51 Ohio App. 2d 180, 367 N.E.2d 901 (10th Dist. 1977).
' Id. at 182, 367 N.E.2d at 902.
50 Watson v. Department of Rehab. & Correction, No. 75-0204-SC (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 16,
1976).
- 51 Ohio App. 2d at 184, 367 N.E.2d at 903.
5" Fitzgerald v. State, No. 75-0271 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 23, 1976).
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principles of respondeat superior the existence of an agency relationship and
proof that the agent was acting within the scope of employment is normally
sufficient to impose liability upon the principal. However, in other areas the
court of claims has subscribed to the view that intentional torts are ultra vires
acts and therefore outside the scope of employment.
565
The court of claims has heard a number of claims from prisoners
concerning lost or stolen property.58 6 Review of those cases shows that the
state is held to a duty of reasonable care to protect and recover the personal
property of the institutional residents.5
67
H. Enactment of Legislation or Regulations
A few residents of Ohio have taken the common exclamation "there ought
to be a law" seriously and have sought to recover damages from the state for
injury caused by the state's allegedly negligent failure to formulate legislative
rules or administrative regulations. Such suits have not been successful, but
the court of claims' handling of them is instructive.
In El v. State,56 8 plaintiff asserted that the state was negligent in failing to
enact a law which would have required the probate court to consider
appointing a guardian over his estate during a period of involuntary
confinement in a state hospital.56 9 The court of claims dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim. While the court doubted that the governor's office or
the General Assembly were instrumentalities of the state as described by the
definition section of the Court of Claims Act, it assumed that they were. It
565 See notes 399-400, 404-07 supra and accompanying text.
566 E.g., Ormsby v. Southern Ohio Correctional Facilities, No. 77-0247-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Jan.
5,1978); Boone v. Marion Correctional Inst., No. 77-0469-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 26,1977); Flint v.
Engle, No. 77-0241-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Aug. 15, 1977); Anderson v. Department of Rehab. &
Correction, No. 77-0321-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 21, 1977); Moore v. Ohio Reformatory for
Women, No. 76-0527-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 13, 1977); Mullett v. Department of Rehab. &
Corrections, No. 76-0292-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 15, 1977) (on reconsideration).
567 E.g., Mullett v. Department of Rehab. & Corrections, No. 76-0292-AD, slip op. at 2 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. Oct. 19, 1976) (Deputy Clerk's findings of law).
One such case is interesting for its facts. In Boone v. Marion Correctional Inst., No. 77-
0469-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Oct. 26,1977), claimant was permitted to attend a funeral during his term
at the Institute. Claimant decided not to return after the funeral and remained at large for nine
months. When he was returned to the Institute, he found that several items of personal property
were missing. He sued to recover the value of the property. The clerk, quoting from Ellis v. Ohio
State Reformatory, No. 76-0243-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 19, 1977), said that an escape creates the
rebuttable presumption that the prisoner intended to abandon the property. The opinion does not
indicate what might be sufficient to rebut the presumption. No. 77-0469-AD, slip op. at 1.
Quaere: Which shall control, the fact of escape, the intent to successfully escape, or the success
of the escape? Abandonment is a fairly well-developed concept of law. Should the court add
complexity by indulging in rebuttable presumptions?
'68 No. 75-0354 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 3, 1975), aff'd, 48 Ohio App. 2d 290, 357 N.E.2d 61 (10th
Dist. 1976). In 1969 Edward Martin El was arrested for resisting an attempt to evict him from his
home. Following the arrest, he was held for psychiatric evaluation and was subsequently
committed to the Lima State Hospital for treatment. Uponhis release in 1973, Mr. El successfully
fought the criminal charges which had prompted his four-year confinement. In the meantime, his
estate had fallen upon bad times. Mr. El had requested an employee to look after his cleaning
business during the period of confinement and made her a co-signatory of three bank accounts.
When he returned in 1973 he found that the funds of the accounts had been withdrawn and the
cleaning business bore the name of his former employee. He subsequently brought an action
against the governor, the General Assembly, and the citizenry of Ohio to recover his losses.
s6 No. 75-0354, slip op. at 1-3.
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found that the governor had no direct relation to the plaintiff's alleged injuries
and therefore dismissed him as a defendant on that basis. 50 Addressing the
General Assembly's liability, the court concluded that no duty to enact
legislation had been imposed upon that body. The legislative power of the
General Assembly comes from the Ohio Constitution, which imposes
limitations upon legislative power but does not mandate that laws be passed
for any particular purpose. The enactment of legislation, concluded the court,
lay within the sound discretion of the General Assembly.57' The court also
dismissed the people of Ohio as parties-defendant on the basis that rules of
law applicable to suits between private parties could not be used to resolve
the merits of plaintiff's claim.5 72
Although the principle of discretionary function immunity would seem to
have obvious application to the enactment of legislation, the concept was not
discussed in El. Rather, the decision rests upon the finding of no duty, an
approach consistent with the court's mixed concept of duty and immunity.5 7 3
El was affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals did discuss the concept of
discretion in the context of the doctrine of separation of powers, saying that
for the courts to award damages based upon the legislature's failure to act
would necessarily involve an encroachment upon the General Assembly's
inherent discretionary power.57 4 The principle of discretionary function
immunity was not fully and directly addressed, but the court of appeals'
reasoning reflected the underlying purposes for the exception, and it would
thus seem that the court would be receptive to direct treatment of the
principle. Interestingly, however, the court of appeals decision indicates that
lack of proximate cause, under ordinary negligence principles, was the
determinative aspect of the case. 575
In his concurring opinion, Judge Whiteside rejected the immunity
concept, preferring to embrace the court of claims' finding of no duty. He
observed that before one party may be required to respond in damages to
another, a breach of duty owing to the other must be established. Any duty to
enact legislation which had been imposed upon the General Assembly was
owed to the public generally, not to any particular person. Thus, he
concluded, the failure of that body to enact a law did not give rise to a claim
against the state, not because the concepts of immunity or separation of
powers precluded suit but because no duty owing specifically to plaintiff had
been established. 576
Regarding both courts' treatment of the issue of the General Assembly's
liability, it is interesting to note their application of the liability clause of the
Court of Claims Act. In both instances, the main rationale for dismissal was a
finding that plaintiff had failed to establish an element essential for making out
a prima facie case of negligence. In so doing, the courts applied rules of law
570 Id. at 4-5.
571 Id. at 5-6.
572 Id. at 6-7.
573 See notes 411-28 supra and accompanying text.
574 48 Ohio App. 2d at 294, 357 N.E.2d at 63-64.
575 Id. at 295, 357 N.E.2d at 64.
576 Id. at 296, 357 N.E.2d at 64 (Whiteside, J., concurring).
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applicable to suits between private parties. True, the courts did look to the
Ohio Constitution to determine if that document had imposed a duty. But it is
necessarily implicit in this approach that they also looked to the common law
to find a duty. Such an approach means that the courts have already looked
past the operation of discretionary function immunity to determine the
question of liability. By so doing, the courts have engaged in needless effort.
The courts should first consider the nature of the decision-making process
being challenged and evaluate it in order to determine whether that process
would be unduly influenced by the threat of private tort litigation or, if not,
whether overall public policy should foreclose litigation for other compelling
reasons. Only if this first inquiry has been resolved in favor of the complainant
should the inquiry extend into whether the applicable tort principles are
satisfied. Putting the cause of action "cart" before the "horse" of discretionary
function immunity could, in a given case, cause the court some embarrass-
ment if its first inquiry establishes the prima facie satisfaction of the elements
of a cause of action and it then has to backtrack into principles of immunity to
affirm the need for independence of legislative and executive decision-
making. In such a case, the court will have actually transgressed the intended
operation of discretionary function immunity through its first line of inquiry,
inquiry which the concept is designed to foreclose.
Another case in this category illustrates the corollary to the El proposition
that failure to enact a law will not give rise to liability on the part of the state. In
Whitlock v. McKenna,57 7 adoptive parents of a five year old child brought
suit to obtain redress for their injuries arising out of the adoption. Prior to
the adoption the child had been in the custody of the Butler County Welfare
Department. Shortly after adoption the child became unruly and disturbed
and eventually required confinement in a mental hospital. 578 Plaintiffs sued
the County Welfare Department, alleging that employees of the department
had negligently failed to discover and disclose the possible emotional or
psychiatric problems of the child. The employees' negligence was further
alleged to have been a result of the failure of the Ohio Department of Public
Welfare to provide adequate guidelines to the county department in adoption
procedures.5 7 9 The court of claims held that liability would not arise under
such circumstances. 580
The applicability of the El proposition to the portion of the claim relating
to the state welfare department's failure to provide guidelines, while
important, is not the most significant point of the case. The interesting feature
of the case is the court's treatment of the county department's liability. It was
apparent to the court of claims that the county officials had acted not under the
auspices of the state department, but in accordance with specific statutory
command. Under then Ohio adoption law, 581 the county welfare agency was
required to submit an investigation report evaluating the physical and mental
health of the child, family background, and the reason for placement away
577 No. 75-0505 (Ohio Ct. CI. Dec. 8, 1976).
578 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
579 Id. at 2.
5 Id. at 3-4.
581 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 3107 (Page 1972) (amended 1977).
[Vol. 28:149
92https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss2/3
OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS ACT
from the natural parents. The law requires that this report be made available
for inspection only upon order of the probate court.5 82 Hence, a disclosure of
the information to plaintiffs would have amounted to a violation of the specific
terms of the statute.
The principle that is involved in the court of claims' decision, and the
corollary to the El proposition, is contained in the first section of the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, excluding
"[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid."583 In Whitlock, the state
had mandated specific action by a county agency in adoption proceedings.
One secondary effect of a suit that attempts to attach liability to acts in
execution of the statute is to challenge the validity or enactment of the statute
in the first instance.5 4 El held that the General Assembly may not be held
liable in the exercise of its discretion whether to enact laws of the state. The
concept of discretionary immunity thus extends to the acts of government
officials in executing those laws.
But the possible dysfunction of the court of claims' mixed concept of duty
and immunity is illustrated by a closer look at the federal provision. Even
though government employees are able to take advantage of the immunity in
executing federal law, that immunity is lost if the execution amounts to a
failure to exercise due care. This low threshold of immunity is in stark contrast
to the court of claims jurisprudence which will bar an action if the statute
carries the authority to act with discretion. Under the federal law, the court of
claims in Whitlock would not have been able to stop at its determination that
the government employees were simply following a statutory mandate. It
would have to look behind the satisfaction of mandated action to determine if
the employees had done so with negligence. 585
I. "Orthodox" Tort Liability
In Adamov v. State588 Judge Troop interpreted the liability clause to mean
that recovery from the state could be had only in actions which were of a type
8 2 The section prior to 1976 amendments of the chapter read:
The reports of the investigation required divisions (B), (C) and (D) of this section,
shall not be filed with the other papers in the adoption proceedings, but shall be filed
separately and shall be available for inspection upon the personal direction of the
probate judge.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.05 (Page 1972) (repealed 1977). As a result of the amendments the
analogous new section now reads:
The petition, the interlocutory order, the final decree of adoption, and other
adoption proceedings shall be recorded in a book kept for such purposes and separately
indexed, the book shall be a part of the records of the probate court, and all consents,
affidavits, and other papers shall be properly filed. Such papers, records and books shall
be available for inspection only upon the consent of the court.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(C) (Page Supp. 1977).
583 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
584 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851
(10th Cir. 1956).
51 See Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); Smith v. United
States, 155 F. Supp. 605 (D.C. Va. 1957).
586 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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which could concern private parties, and "[p]rivate parties are involved in
actions for breach of contract, orthodox tort liability and the commonly
accepted equitable remedies. '" 587 In actions alleging negligence by the state,
the court of claims has diligently applied Ohio tort law, much as a court of
general jurisdiction would in a case involving only private parties.588
Application of principles of that law to "orthodox tort" situations are of
interest, if only for comparison to the situations in which the court has been
unable to discover a duty of care. They are of further interest in the court's
efforts to provide some meaning to the phrase "orthodox tort liability."
One common tort litigation situation is the slip-and-fall case. In a case
between private parties, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that
defendant created a hazardous condition on the premises or that it had actual
or constructive notice of the condition.589 That same burden is imposed upon
plaintiffs seeking damages for slip-and-fall injuries against the state. For
example, in Wilcox v. Ohio Department of Transportation,590 plaintiff
claimed she slipped on a piece of paper lying on an entrance ramp to a
roadside rest area. The court of claims held that in order for plaintiff to
recover, she must prove that the nature of the paper, or its accumulation,
constituted a dangerous condition and that the state had created the
condition.51 In the alternative, plaintiff could show that the state had notice of
the condition.5 92
The vague line that separates cases that impose liability upon the state
under "orthodox tort liability" and those that find no liability because of no
common law or statutory liability is illustrated by an alternative approach to
the Wilcox case. The court could have, as it has done in many of the cases
discussed previously, considered whether rules applicable to suits between
private parties could be employed here. In answer to that question it could
have determined that since private parties do not provide and maintain road-
side rest areas for free use of the public, there is no analogous private counter-
part and therefore no applicable common law rule.
Another illustration of this kind of case is supplied by Sibert v. Bureau of
Motor Vehicles.59 Plaintiff sought damages flowing from the bureau's alleged
58 Id. at 6, 345 N.E.2d at 664. See also Wilcox v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75-0316 AD, slip
op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 1, 1976).
588 As has already been pointed out, the determination of whether the state has a duty to any
particular plaintiff is, however, merely a function of how narrowly the activity in which the state is
engaged is defined. See text accompanying notes 590-92 infra for further illustration of this
approach.
589 Kokinos v. Ohio Greyhound, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 435, 92 N.E.2d 386 (1950).
590 No. 75-0316 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 1, 1976). See also Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Bowling
Green State Univ., No. 75-0599-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 13,1976), where the court found the state
liable for damage to an automobile when a rotten limb fell from a tree situated on land abutting a
parking lot at a state-supported university and struck the automobile. The court applied Ohio
common law, noting that a landowner with notice of a defective tree abutting a rural highway
must use reasonable care to prevent injuries to persons on the highway. Because the state had
actual notice of the condition of the tree limb, the court declined to inquire whether the university
would have a duty to inspect trees abutting the highway (or, as in this case, a parking lot). Id., slip
op. at 3.
591 No. 75-0316 AD, slip op. at 3.
592 Id.
5'3 No. 76-0569-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. Dec. 30, 1977).
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negligence which resulted in depriving plaintiff of his motor vehicle
operator's license. The bureau had confused plaintiff with another person of
the same name. In this administratively determined case, the court's
awareness of the tension between the orthodox tort liability concept and the
concept of no analogous private counterpart to the governmental activity
giving rise to the claim was demonstrated. The clerk noted that the court had
previously questioned whether this type of claim could pass scrutiny under
the no analogous private counterpart concept, 594 but concluded that the
precedent of Sprouse v. Department of Highway Safety,595 which held the
state can be liable for the failure to maintain accurate driving records, was
dispositive. Therefore, "any modification of Sprouse would have to be made
by a judge either in a subsequent case or a motion for review of this case." 5
In some cases the court of claims decisions must be considered as either a
modification of "orthodox tort liability" or possible misapplications of
"orthodox tort liability" principles. Two cases will serve as illustrations. In
Neitz v. Department of Public Works, 597 plaintiff claimed injuries resulting
from a collision with a steel cable that the state had stretched-across a toll path
adjacent to a section of the Ohio Canal. Plaintiff was operating his motorcycle
along the toll path and apparently did not see the cable. Plaintiff contended
that the cable was not discernible to vehicle operators and thus constituted a
"trap" to those who used the path. In its findings of fact, the court disagreed
with the plaintiff and made some findings crucial to the application of
ordinary tort principles to the circumstances of the case. The court found that
the cable was not a trap, that the toll path, although utilized constantly by
people as a recreation area, was in fact a dam to retain canal waters and was
not an area to which the public was invited, and that plaintiff therefore was a
trespasser and could not hold the state liable for his injuries. Upon such
findings the court held that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.598
It is likely that the court meant to say that defendant had not breached a
duty owed to plaintiff. However, it said only that no duty was owed to the
plaintiff. Taking the court to have intended the plain meaning of its words,
the pronouncement may be contrary to Ohio common law specifically and
5'4 Ruflfin v. Department of Highway Safety, No. 75-0350 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 29, 1975).
595 No. 76-0622 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 28, 1977).
59' No. 76-0569-AD, slip op. at 1.
5" No. 75-0342 (Ohio Ct. Cl. May 13, 1976).
591 Id., slip op. at 5. The court has applied established principles of law applicable between
private parties to effect some interesting results. For example, in Bunnell v. Ohio Exposition
Center, No. 75-0555 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 25, 1977), the plaintiff, while a patron of the Ohio State
Fair, was forced off a pedestrian walkway by an ambulance operated by the state's agents.
Plaintiff was startled by the ambulance's siren and in her confusion tripped over an electric cable
near the walkway. The court found that there was no justification for the operation of the
ambulance at that time and place and that the state's defense of assumption of the risk was
inapplicable because the plaintiff's attention was distracted and she was in fear of her safety.
Hence plaintiff was afforded the benefit of the emergency doctrine. The court's conclusion was
that the state had violated its duty of maintaining the walkway "in a reasonably safe condition by
controlling vehicular traffic." Id., slip op. at 7.
The state has also benefitted by the application of "orthodox" tort rules. In Reiber v.
Deercreek Lake Park, No. 75-0513-AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 30,1976), the plaintiff, whose boat had
engine trouble in the middle of a lake, was barred from recovering because he had signed a
waiver releasing the state from liability for any injuries incurred while he was towed to shore.
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"orthodox tort liability" generally. In Ohio, a landowner indeed owes a duty
to trespassers. First, a duty is owed to all trespassers to refrain from willful
or wanton wrongdoing.599 Second, once a trespasser's position of peril has
been discovered, the landowner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injury to the trespasser. 60 0 Third, if the landowner makes a change
in the condition of the land adjacent to a public highway in such a way that
the safety of travellers who may, without fault on their part, accidentally
stray upon the land, is endangered, ordinary care must be exercised.6°1 The
court of claims may have intended to say that none of these conditions were
presented by the claim and that therefore no duty arose, but it is not clear
from the Neitz opinion that none of these conditions existed.
Furthermore, in light of the court's finding of constant trespassing in the
area, "orthodox tort liability" principles would raise a duty even though there
is no case law in Ohio directly on point. When a landowner knows or should
know about frequent trespassers on the property, a duty to warn of hazards
arises if the landowner has reason to believe the trespassers will not discover
the hazards. 602 The court's finding that the cable was readily discernible
becomes crucial when the case is analyzed from this perspective. Given that
finding, it cannot be said that the court's conclusion of no duty has application
to this case.6 0 3 It by no means can stand for the proposition that the state owes
no duty to trespassers.
The other illustrative case denied liability in a claim by a mother seeking to
recover for the alleged wrongful death of her nine-year-old son who had
drowned in a lake at a state park. In McCord v. Ohio Division of Parks and
Recreation,6 4 plaintiff, decedent's administrator, contended that the
lifeguard at the lake was negligent in her duties and that the state was
negligent in training lifeguards and in providing inadequately trained
lifeguards. The state moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Ohio
"recreational user" statute which exempts landowners of recreational land
from liability to users of the land who enter without payment of
51' See Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 240, 83 N.E. 66, 68 (1907)
("trespassers, that is, persons entering without permission, assume the risk of injury from the
condition of the premises and the duty of the occupier to them is only to be careful not to injure
them by bringing force to bear upon them"); Hicks v. Village of Cortland, 123 Ohio St. 114, 117,
174 N.E. 241, 242 (1930) ("[i]t is doubtful whether ... the relationship of [the plain-
tiff] . . . could rise above that of a trespasser . . . . Hence the duty of the municipality . . .
was not higher than to abstain from intentionally or willfully injuring him, and to warn him of
hidden dangers of which it knew.").
100 Union News Co. v. Freeborn, 111 Ohio St. 105, 144 N.E. 595 (1924) (dictum); City Ice &
Fuel Co. v. Center, 54 Ohio App. 116, 6 N.E.2d 580 (1st Dist. 1936); Maple v. Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 471, 201 N.E.2d 299 (7th Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
801 Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 240, 83 N.E. 66, 68 (1907).
602 See J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMIsEs LIABirrY 10-11 (1976).
603 In comparison, in Krevics v. Ayars, 141 N.J. Super. 511, 358 A.2d 844 (1976), a case
involving strikingly similar facts as those in Neitz, plaintiff was permitted to proceed in his action
despite the existence of a statute conferring immunity upon a landowner if the use was
recreational in nature. The court said: "The hazardous condition was created by defendant. The
erection of the cable was certainly a wilful act. In view of defendant's knowledge of the use of the
motorbike trail, and considering the type of hazard erected, defendant's action may even be
construed as malicious." Id. at 516, 358 A.2d at 846.
64 No. 76-0351 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1977), rev'd, No. 76AP-797 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1,
1977), judgment of court of appeals rev'd, 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 375 N.E.2d 50 (1978).
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consideration.60 5 The statute provides that the landowner owes no duty to
recreational users to keep the premises "safe for entry or use."606 The court of
claims granted the motion, and the decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Ohio Supreme Court.60 7
The case, in its total development through the Ohio courts, involved a
curious mixture of "orthodox tort liability" principles and other aspects of
court of claims jurisprudence. In the first instance, it was clear from the
complaint that the statute should not have barred the action, though the
supreme court and apparently the court of claims believed it to be one of the
rules applicable to suits between private parties and thereby operable.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged a breach of duty in the training, provision, and
execution of lifeguard services, not a duty to keep the premises safe for "entry
and use." Sufficient facts were alleged in the complaint on that issue to have
presented a material issue of the breach of the duty alleged and thereby
escape an adverse ruling upon a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore,
the issues of whether decedent was a recreational user or whether the
recreational user statute was intended to operate against persons in decedent's
position should not have been summarily treated by the courts. There is most
assuredly an analogous private counterpart to the state activity, and although
the courts cursorily handled the issue, a serious question of whether
decedent's mother's status as a taxpayer, contributing to the creation and
maintenance of public recreational areas, was sufficient to overcome the
statutory immunity. In suits between private parties, the abrogation of duty in
such cases is overcome by the payment of a fee or other consideration.6 08 The
court of claims and Ohio Supreme Court decisions preserved yet another
"island of immunity" and may have seriously undermined the intended
operation of the "orthodox tort liability" employed under the Ohio wrongful
death statute.609
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. The No Private Counterpart Test of State Liability
The Ohio Court of Claims Act provides that liability of the state shall be
determined in accordance with rules of law applicable to suits between
private parties.610 The court of claims has interpreted this provision to
preclude liability when the state is involved in activity which is not normally
carried out by private individuals. In regard to the regulation of certain
605 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.181, 1533.18(B) (Page 1978).
60 Id. § 1533.181(A)(2).
607 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 375 N.E.2d 50 (1978), reinstating No. 76-0351 (Ohio Ct. C1. 1977). The
court of appeals had reversed the trial court, holding the recreational user statute inapplicable,
and that the foreseeability of injury arising from swimmers' reliance upon the state's voluntary
representation of safety rendered the liability clause of the Court of Claims Act applicable. No.
76AP-797 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1977).
60' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.18(B) (Page 1978).
60' For a full discussion of the case and its ramifications, see Wilkins, The Wrongful Death of
Willie McCord-or-Beware of "Free" Public Parks-The Ghosts of Immunity and the Ohio
Guest Statute Still Roam!, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 591 (1978).
6 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
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business activities and the custody and control of juvenile offenders, for
example, the court has held that the absence of analogous activity prevents the
application of the liability clause of the Act.
The Ohio courts have adhered to the no private counterpart test despite
inconsistent applications of the concept which demonstrate its unworkability.
For example, private parties are not responsible for the construction and
maintenance of highways, the validation of certificates of incorporation, the
conferral of motor vehicle operation licenses, or the custody and control of
criminal offenders, and yet the Ohio courts have found governmental liability
in each instance. To proclaim that certain activities are uniquely governmen-
tal is to state the obvious. All governmental activities are in one sense or
another unique. The provision of the Court of Claims Act that state liability
should be determined by reference to rules of law applicable in private
lawsuits should not be viewed as a limitation upon the waiver of immunity,
but rather as an opportunity by the Ohio courts to provide a remedy to
persons injured by governmental activity within the controls traditionally
imposed by principles of decision in our well-developed common law tort
compensation system. The Ohio courts should abandon the no private
counterpart test as an inaccurate and unwarranted interpretation of the Court
of Claims Act.
B. Discretionary Function Immunity
In determinations of governmental immunity two related, but distinct,
issues arise. The threshold issue is whether, despite the general governmental
waiver of immunity, certain exceptions should be made to that waiver in the
area of discretionary acts by government operatives. The principle of
discretionary function immunity is intended to preserve the independence of
legislative or executive decision-making in the formulation of public policy
and requires judicial abstention when the evaluation of the propriety of
governmental action in a given case would necessarily intrude upon the policy
decisions of coordinate branches of government. 11
In accordance with this view of discretionary function immunity, the
federal courts have applied the concept only to decisions at the planning stage
of governmental activity and have refused to apply it to those activities
deemed to be operational in nature.612 Recent federal decisions have reshaped
this distinction to more closely address the underlying reasons for
discretionary immunity, and what may be called the policy formulation test
of liability has emerged.613 Under the latter approach, the inquiry proceeds to
determine if the judgments of government officers and employees are of the
nature and quality that Congress, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, intended to
put out of the reach of judicial scrutiny in private tort litigation.614 It is not
sufficient for the application of the exception that some judgment or
discretion was exercised by governmental operatives, since the courts may
impose the requirements of reasonable care to most cases without intrusion
8' See notes 331-34 supra and accompanying text.
612 See notes 340-49 supra and accompanying text.
113 See notes 352-57 supra and accompanying text.
614 See note 335 supra and accompanying text.
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upon policy decision-making. To qualify for immunity, governmental
decisions must involve a balancing of competing interests in the formulation
of fundamental public policy. In this sense, the discretionary function
exception has no broader application than to the exercise of legislative or
quasi-legislative function. 15
The Ohio Court of Claims Act presently contains no provision analogous
to the federal discretionary function exception, despite attempts to amend it
to include one. 616 The exception has, instead, been read into the Act by judicial
gloss in several court of claims decisions. Regrettably, the Ohio courts have
yet to refine the exception to the same extent as have the federal courts. Broad
language in Devoe v. State6l7 suggested that discretionary immunity would be
applied whenever the actions of state employees involved some degree of
discretion. That language was apparently limited in the Adamov v. State18
juvenile offender case, which set out a more precise definition of discretion. In
the latter case, the court of claims stated that to qualify for immunity a
decision must relate to basic governmental policy or objective and must be
essential to the attainment of that objective. Further, the decision must have
involved evaluation and judgment based upon expertise and be grounded in
requisite statutory authority. The court's treatment of Adamov reflects the
same considerations inherent in the policy formulation test of discretionary
immunity employed by the federal courts, but the approach has not
consistently been applied in court of claims cases.
If the threshold issue of discretionary function immunity is answered in
favor of the claimant, he or she must then demonstrate a ground for recovery
pursuant to ordinary principles of tort law. Such a requirement operates to
prevent the state from becoming an insurer. Hence, the existence of duty
arises as a secondary issue. The present confusion in Ohio Court of Claims Act
jurisprudence may be the result of a failure to make this distinction between
duty and immunity. The court of claims has repeatedly looked to the enabling
legislation for a given governmental activity to determine if a duty has been
imposed. When no statutory duty has been found to be expressed, two
conclusions have followed: the court decides that no claim has been stated for
negligent performance of the activity (sometimes also cursorily saying that no
common law liability has been imposed, not a surprising conclusion at all
given the long tradition of governmental immunity in Ohio), and since no
duty has been imposed, the conduct is considered discretionary and subject to
the discretionary function exception. Conversely, in some cases where the
inspection of the statutes discloses a mandatory duty to act (where the starting
point for the court has been the analogous private counterpart analysis
sometimes even this is not necessary), the courts have decided that
"' Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1955).
616 After its first year of operation, the court of claims sent an informal report to the General
Assembly discussing problems it had encountered during that period and suggesting possible
changes in the statute. A proposed amendment, based upon those recommendations, included a
provision closely parallel to the federal discretionary function exception. Sua'rrrurE H.B. 149,
12th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1977-78).
617 No. 75-0216 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18,1975), afl'd, 48 Ohio App. 2d 311,357 N.E.2d 396 (10th
Dist. 1975).
618 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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discretionary function immunity did not apply, and the state would be liable
upon proof of violation. In these latter cases, little more than passing
consideration to the factors underlying discretionary function immunity have
been given. While perhaps at this stage of Court of Claims Act jurisprudence
some may argue that no great harm has been done in terms of the results in
given cases, it is imperative that the court of claims refine its analysis to
distinguish between the immunity and duty concepts to be assured of
avoiding embarrassment in future cases.
After five years of operation, it may be fairly said that the Court of Claims
Act has passed its "maiden run." While a cautious, conservative, perhaps even
experimental approach may be a justifiable explanation for gaps and
inconsistencies in judicial interpretations during this period, it is time for the
courts of Ohio to apply themselves affirmatively to the task of refining the
jurisprudential approaches to the Act in order to carry out fully its objective to
provide a remedy for persons injured by wrongful governmental conduct.
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